Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Named plaintiffs are five individuals with mental retardation who are institutionalized in intermediate care facilities (ICFs/MR) operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare; they allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by failing “to offer and provide the opportunity to receive services in integrated, community settings that are most appropriate settings to meet their needs. Plaintiffs claimed that there are approximately 1,272 individuals who reside in five ICFs/MR. The district court certified the class, denied a motion to dismiss, denied a motion to intervene brought by nine institutionalized individuals who oppose community placement, and granted final approval to a settlement agreement. The Third Circuit vacated in part, holding that the court abused its discretion by denying intervention as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in the remedy stage of this litigation as well as with respect to final approval of the settlement agreement. The intervenors may also challenge certification of the class. View "Benjamin v. PA Dep't of Pub. Welfare" on Justia Law

AdvancePCS is a prescription benefits manager for plans sponsored by employers, unions, and others and is retained to achieve savings by negotiating discounts from drug manufacturers, providing mail order service, contracting with retail pharmacies, and electronic processing and paying of claims. Plaintiffs are retail pharmacies that entered into agreements with AdvancePCS that include an agreed reimbursement rate and an arbitration clause. In 2003, plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that AdvancePCS engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with plan sponsors to restrain competition in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; that AdvancePCS used the economic power of its sponsors to reduce the contractual amount it pays below levels prevailing in a competitive marketplace; and that the agreements impose other limitations. For almost a year, AdvancePCS litigated without mentioning arbitration. After denial of a motion to dismiss and reconsideration, AdvancePCS filed an answer with affirmative defenses, then sought to compel arbitration. The court granted the motion. Plaintiffs did not initiate arbitration, but sought dismiss pending appeal. A different judge vacated the order compelling arbitration. The Third Circuit remanded with directions to reinstate the order compelling arbitration. On remand, a third judge granted dismissal. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate. View "In Re: Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs were doctors of chiropractic who alleged they had been victimized by the discriminatory practices of Iowa's largest health insurer, Wellmark, Inc. The district court (1) granted Wellmark's motion to dismiss claims brought under Iowa's insurance regulatory statutes because no private cause of action was provided therein; (2) granted Wellmark's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the "state action" exemption found in Iowa Code 553.6(4); (3) granted summary judgment on claims alleging Wellmark breached its obligations under a judicially approved national class action settlement in Love v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n; and (4) granted summary judgment on several specific antitrust claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the state action exemption, as the record failed to establish the challenged conduct fell within the exemption; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law

Two people who use wheelchairs and organizations that represent persons with disabilities brought a class action against the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission and the TLC Commissioner for violation of Parts A and B of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The district court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment as to liability on the ADA claim and entered a temporary injunction, requiring that all new taxi medallions and street-hail livery licenses be limited to vehicles that are wheelchair accessible until the TLC proposes and the district court approves a comprehensive plan to provide meaningful access to taxi service for wheelchair-bound passengers. The Second Circuit vacated the temporary injunction as improvidently granted. Although the TLC exercises pervasive control over the taxi industry in New York City, defendants were not required by Title II(A) to deploy their licensing and regulatory authority to mandate that persons who need wheelchairs be afforded meaningful access to taxis. View "Noel v. NY City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of thousands of retired county employees participating in county-sponsored health care plans, filed suit against the county challenging changes it made to the structure of two health benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the county. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings and with the answer provided by the California Supreme Court to the certified question in the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc.(REAOC) litigation. The court took judicial notice of the documents; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' subsidy claims and remanded so that the district court could reassess those claims in light of the California Supreme Court's opinion, and coordinate those claims with the REAOC litigation; the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' grant claims because the court found that plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to set out specifically the terms of those memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on which their claim predicated; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 12940 et seq., claim because the court found that Mr. McConnell's timely filed administrative complaint was sufficient to establish exhaustion of the administrative remedies for all class members. View "Harris, et al. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Five Medicaid recipients filed a class action against the District, alleging that the District systematically denied Medicaid coverage of prescription medications without providing the written notice required by federal and D.C. law. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. At least with regard to one plaintiff, John Doe, the allegations sufficiently established injury, causation, and redressability and the court concluded that Doe had standing to pursue his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the court had no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs had standing and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "NB, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative nationwide class of third-party payors and a putative nationwide class of individual patient-consumers who paid for prescriptions, sued pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging that they paid for oncology and hepatitis drugs that were ineffective or unsafe for the off-label uses for which they were prescribed and that defendants pursued illegal marketing campaigns to persuade physicians to prescribe the drugs for those uses. While physicians are not prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label uses, manufacturers are generally prohibited by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, from manufacturing, marketing, or selling for off-label use. Defendant had pled guilty to a criminal charge brought by the FDA and agreed to pay fine of $180 million and to pay $255 million to resolve civil claims that it defrauded Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA. The district court dismissed, for lack of standing, claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S. 2C:41-1, and other state statutory and common law causes of action. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged misconduct and the alleged harm. View "In Re: Schering Plough Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are a dissident group, within a larger class of medical patient consumers in a case alleging fraud in overcharging for the medication Lupron. The patients, along with insurers and private health care providers, obtained a $150 million settlement agreement that was approved by the district court, of which $40 million was allocated to consumers. That agreement provided that if there were unclaimed monies from the $40 million consumer settlement pool after full recovery to consumer plaintiffs, all unclaimed funds would go into a cy pres fund to be distributed at the discretion of the trial judge. Dissident plaintiffs appealed distribution of the $11.4 million cy pres fund to the Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Center and the Prostate Cancer Foundation for work on the treatment of the diseases for which Lupron is prescribed. They have already recovered more than 100% of their actual damages. The First Circuit affirmed. After expressing concern about distribution of such funds by judges and adding an audit requirement, the court noted the importance of avoiding windfalls for plaintiffs who have already been fully compensated. View "Rohn v. Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Ctr." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs sought to represent potential classes of hospital employees, some covered by collective bargaining agreements and others not, claiming that they were deprived of compensation for work performed during meal breaks, before and after shifts, and during training sessions. One case asserted only state law tort and regulatory claims; the other raised claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The state law claims were properly removed to federal court and were preempted because many were dependent on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The federal law claims, dismissed for failure to identify specific employers, were remanded to permit amendment. View "Cavallaro v. UMass Mem'l Health Care,Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Salazar, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law