Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of the Boeing Company’s 2005 sale, to Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. of facilities in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. Boeing terminated the Division's entire workforce of more than 10,000. The next day, Spirit rehired 8,354 employees, who had been selected by Boeing’s managers. Although older employees predominated in the workforce both before and after the sale, a lower percentage of older workers than younger ones were rehired. The plaintiffs sued, seeking to be declared a class of about 700 former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit. The Employees alleged, among other things, that Boeing, Onex, and Spirit violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In two separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on the Employees’ Title VII and ADA claims, and their ERISA and ADEA claims. The court denied the Employees’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the Employees' claims on appeal, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's judgment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Apsley v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it. View "Senne v. Vill. of Palatine" on Justia Law

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA. View "Westefer v. Neal" on Justia Law

A taxpayer class filed an illegal-exaction complaint. The case was remanded for the circuit court to ascertain a remedy consistent with the Supreme Court's decision that the taxpayers had proved a valid claim for illegal exaction of increased ad valorem library taxes for the 2007 ad valorem tax year. In this appeal, the taxpayers contended that the circuit court erred in applying the voluntary-payment rule to class members who paid the tax in question prior to the date the complaint for illegal exaction was filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order appealed was not a final order and did not contain specific factual findings of any danger of hardship or injustice that could be alleviated by an immediate appeal, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Robinson v. Villines" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, nine children in the custody of PMC, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against three Texas officials, in their official capacities, seeking to represent a class of all children who were now, and all those who will be, in the State's long-term foster care. The gravaman of plaintiffs' complaint is that various system-wide problems in Texas's administration of its PMC subjected all of the children in PMC to a variety of harms. Applying the standards announced in the Supreme Court's recent opinion, Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the court held that the district court failed to conduct the "rigorous" analysis required by Rule 23 in deciding to certify the proposed class. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by certifying a class that lacked cohesiveness under Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. View "M.D., et al. v. Rick Perry, et al." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Carol Perdue, individually and as next friend and guardian of her daughter, Anna; William D. Motlow, Jr.; and Shane Sears (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the objectors"), all of whom were objecting class members in class-action litigation related to the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition ("PACT") Trust Fund a/k/a The Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Tuition Trust Fund, appealed the trial court's judgment that approved a class-action settlement concluding the litigation. The objectors largely complained that as contributors or beneficiaries of the PACT fund, it was being mismanaged and underfunded to their detriment. While the case was pending, the Alabama Legislature changed the laws directly impacting the management and funding of the PACT program. The PACT Board responded to the change in the law by moving to dismiss the objectors' suit as moot. The issues on appeal before the Supreme Court involved terms of the settlement agreement: the objectors contended that the trial court permitted language in the agreement that ran afoul of the changed laws and disregarded objections of the complaining members of the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case: "[t]he scope of the objections in the trial court was not the narrow question whether the order should bind only the objectors, but, on the contrary, the issue presented [was] the broader question whether the trial court's judgment approving the settlement agreement [was] due to be affirmed. . . . the objectors are allowed to appeal that aspect of the trial court's order that affects them - 'the [circuit court's] decision to disregard [their] objections.' If the judgment [was] affirmed, the settlement agreement affects them in that it binds them, as members of the class, to terms of a settlement agreement inconsistent with 16-33C-19." View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Roger Mills, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, appealed a judgment that dismissed his claims against the City of Grand Forks to recover the amount of fines and fees collected in the past for noncriminal traffic violations by the City exceeding the amount the City could legally impose under state law. The City cross-appealed that judgment. In 2004, a Grand Forks police officer cited Plaintiff with careless driving. Under Grand Forks City Code, the maximum fine for violation of a noncriminal offense was $1,000 "in the discretion of the court." Plaintiff pled not guilty and proceeded to trial in municipal court. Plaintiff was found guilty. The municipal court imposed against Plaintiff "a fine in the amount of $151 with $0 suspended" and a hearing fee of $15. Plaintiff appealed to district court for a new trial; the court affirmed the conviction and the fine and fees totaling $166. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, but on December 1, 2004, the Court dismissed the appeal because the district court judgment was "not appealable under N.D.C.C. 39-06.1-03(5)." On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff brought a "Class Action Complaint for Restitution" in state district court seeking the amount of monies paid to Grand Forks exceeding the state law limits for fines for similar state offenses. Plaintiff asserted the excess fines, fees and charges were "involuntary and void." The City argued Plaintiff's claims were precluded by both res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the prior federal court action, and by res judicata because Mills failed to challenge the City's fine scheme in the 2004 state court proceedings. Because the district court correctly ruled Plaintiff's claims were thus barred by res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Mills v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Salazar, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Randolph Farber, Scott Becker, and Critter Clinic (Farber) alleged that the Manager of the Defendant-Respondent State Insurance Fund (SIF or "the Fund") failed to comply with I.C. 72-915, which provides the means by which the SIF Manager may distribute a dividend to policyholders. The district court determined that the gravamen of Farber's claim implicated the statute and held that the three-year statute of limitation provided by I.C. 5-218(1) barred all claims that accrued prior to July 21, 2003. Farber timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the five-year statute of limitation in I.C. 5-216 applied to Farber's claim. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accord with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum. Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers brought a class action asserting breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment. For the reasons set out in City of Dallas v. Albert, the court concluded that: (1) the ordinance's adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City's loss of immunity from suit; (2) the City had immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers' claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City's immunity by amending the Local Government Code. View "City of Dallas v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law