Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in a putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, their primary complaint was the hospital illegally allowed its health care employees to waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute required two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8 hours. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review centered on the validity of the IWC order. In its first opinion in this case, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts over 12 hours, and the Court reversed. After the California Supreme Court granted the hospital’s petition for review in “Gerard I,” that court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the enactment of Statutes 2015, chapter 506 (Sen. Bill No. 327 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); SB 327). Upon reconsideration the Court of Appeal concluded the IWC order was valid and affirmed. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Peter Metcalfe was employed briefly by the State in the early 1970s and contributed to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). In 1981, Metcalfe took a refund of his PERS contributions. Under a statute in effect at the time, if Metcalfe later secured State employment and returned his refund to PERS with interest, he was entitled to reinstate at his prior PERS service tier and credit. But in 2005 the legislature repealed that statute, leaving a five-year grace period for regaining State employment and reinstating to a prior PERS status. The State then sent notice to former PERS members that “[d]efined benefit members who do not return to covered employment before July 1, 2010 will forfeit their defined benefit tier and all service associated with the refund.” In 2012 Metcalfe inquired about his PERS status. He was informed that even if he were to regain State employment, he could not reinstate to his prior PERS service tier and credit because under the new statute, his grace period for reinstatement ended in 2010. In June 2013 Metcalfe brought a putative class action lawsuit against the State, alleging that the 2005 legislation: (1) violated article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution; (2) deprived a class of former employees of their vested interest in the contractual “benefit to be reinstated to state employment at the tier level they previously held”; and (3) effectively breached the class members’ employment contracts. Metcalfe sought damages, but he also asked for a seemingly mutually exclusive declaratory judgment that the State must comply with former AS 39.35.350. The class was never certified. The State moved to dismiss Metcalfe’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court tentatively rejected the argument that Metcalfe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected the argument that Metcalfe’s claim was not ripe and that he lacked standing, but dismissed Metcalfe’s claim as time barred. Metcalfe appealed, and the State cross-appealed the superior court’s ruling that Metcalfe’s claim was ripe and argued that the superior court’s decision could be upheld on the ground that Metcalfe lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the contract damages claim on the alternative ground that no such claim existed; the Court reversed and remanded the declaratory and injunctive relief claim for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Under the 1887 General Allotment Act and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, the U.S. is the trustee of Indian allotment land. A 1996 class action, filed on behalf of 300,000 Native Americans, alleged that the government had mismanaged their Individual Indian Money accounts by failing to account for billions of dollars from leases for oil extractions and logging. The litigation’s 2011 settlement provided for “historical accounting claims,” tied to that mismanagement, and “land administration claims” for individuals that held, on September 30, 2009, an ownership interest in land held in trust or restricted status, claiming breach of trust and fiduciary mismanagement of land, oil, natural gas, mineral, timber, grazing, water and other resources. Members of the land administration class who failed to opt out were deemed to have waived any claims within the scope of the settlement. The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 ratified the settlement and funded it with $3.4 billion, The court provided notice, including of the opt-out right. Challenges to the opt-out and notice provisions were rejected. Indian allotees with interests in the North Dakota Fort Berthold Reservation, located on the Bakken Oil Shale (contiguous deposits of oil and natural gas), cannot lease their oil-and-gas interests unless the Secretary approves the lease as “in the best interest of the Indian owners,” 122 Stat. 620 (1998). In 2013, allotees sued, alleging that, in 2006-2009, a company obtained Fort Berthold allotment leases at below-market rates, then resold them for a profit of $900 million. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, holding that the allotees had forfeited their claims by failing to opt out of the earlier settlement. View "Two Shields v. United States" on Justia Law

American Heritage Apartments, Inc., a customer of the Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment Authority (County Authority), filed suit both individually and as a class representative asserting that the County Authority exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a monthly charge on its customers. The County Authority sought dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, arguing that a customer who seeks to dispute the rates charged must first follow the administrative procedures provided in the Utility District Law of 1937 (UDL). The trial court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the administrative procedures in Part 4 of the UDL do not apply to a rate challenge filed by an individual customer against a water and wastewater treatment authority, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the trial court’s alternative ruling on class certification is vacated, and that issue is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Am. Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. Hamilton County Water & Wastewater Treatment Auth." on Justia Law

Michael Howard appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him in the action he commenced on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated taxpayers in Cullman County against Cullman County and its Revenue Commissioner Barry Willingham, in his official capacity. Howard sought a refund of property taxes he and other taxpayers paid in 2013. Howard sought a judgment declaring that, pursuant to former section 40-7-42, the Commission's levy of property taxes for October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013, was invalid because it was done in May 2013 rather than at the Commission's first regular meeting in February 2013. He also sought the return of property taxes collected in 2013. The Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly concluded that the Commission's failure to follow the timing provision of former 40-7-42 did not invalidate its subsequent levy in 2013 of property taxes upon Howard and other property owners in Cullman County. Therefore, the Court affirmed summary judgment on all of Howard's claims in favor of Cullman County and the revenue commissioner. View "Howard v. Cullman County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review came from a class action challenging a 2011 City of Atlanta ordinance and the subsequent amendment by the City of its three defined benefit pension plans. The Ordinance and Amendment increased the percentage of salary required as the annual contributions of the members of the Plans. The action filed against the City, the Mayor, and members of the Atlanta City Council (collectively “Defendants”), was on behalf of City employees who participated in the Plans prior to November 1, 2011, and had not retired prior to that date, which was the start date for the increase, and were otherwise subject to the Amendment. The complaint alleged that Defendants breached Plaintiffs’ employment contracts and violated the impairment clause of the State Constitution when Defendants passed the portions of the Ordinance which increased the amounts that the Plaintiffs were required to contribute to the Plans, even though Plaintiffs would receive the same amount of retirement benefits to which they were already entitled prior to passage of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the subject portions of the Ordinance violated the Impairment Clause and that Plaintiffs were not required to continue to make the increased contributions to the Plans, and an order enjoining and restraining Defendants from collecting or attempting to collect the increased contributions. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract and their consequent requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Borders v. Atlanta" on Justia Law

Senne parked his car on the street in front of his Palatine, Illinois house in violation of an ordinance. A police officer stuck a parking ticket face down under the windshield wiper; it included Senne’s name, birthdate, sex, height, weight, driver’s license number, and address (outdated), plus the vehicle’s description and vehicle identification number. Senne filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which forbids knowing disclosure of personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record, “except as provided in subsection (b).” Subsection (b) permits “disclosure” “in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding”” and “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions.” After a remand, the court rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that anyone has ever taken a parking ticket from a windshield in Palatine and used personal information on the ticket. There has never been a crime or tort, resulting from personal information placed on traffic tickets. Had the Village made parking ticket information publicly available over the Internet, or included highly sensitive information such as a social security number, the risk of a nontrivial invasion of privacy would be much greater and might outweigh the benefits to law enforcement. View "Senne v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law

Ashley Tamas appealed a trial court order sustaining defendants Safeway, Inc. and Lucerne Foods, Inc.'s (collectively Safeway) demurrer to Tamas’ proposed class action complaint without leave to amend. In her complaint, Tamas alleged Safeway was culpable for misbranding its Lucerne brand of Greek yogurt as "yogurt" because the food’s ingredients included "milk protein concentrate" (MPC), which is not included on the list of allowable optional ingredients for "yogurt" as defined by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The trial court disagreed, concluding that MPC was an allowable ingredient in yogurt, because the restrictive regulation relied upon by Tamas had been stayed, and the FDA had informally agreed to allow the use of MPC in yogurt until the stay was resolved. The Court of Appeal affirmed: "The glacial pace at which the FDA has moved in attempting to resolve those concerns and redraft a new formal regulation did not, as Tamas seems to suggest, operate as a stealth reenactment of the stayed rule." View "Tamas v. Safeway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Defendant, a former employee of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that Defendant accessed Driver and Vehicle Services records without authorization in violation of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). DHS denied Defendant’s request for defense and indemnification, concluding that Defendant’s actions were outside the scope of his employment. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of appeals seeking judicial review of DHS’s decision. The court of appeals remanded the matter to DHS with instructions to grant Defendant’s request, concluding that DHS’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over Defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and therefore did not have authority to hear this appeal. View "Nelson v. Schlener" on Justia Law

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in this putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, the workers argued that a hospital policy illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute requires two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8. The principal issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the validity of the IWC order. After review, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours. However, with one exception, the retroactive application of the Court's conclusion had to be litigated on remand. The Court also determined the court incorrectly granted summary judgment and denied class certification. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Medical Center" on Justia Law