Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Defendants manufacture and distribute FDA-approved prescription eye drop medications for treating conditions such as glaucoma. Bottles are pre-packaged with a fixed volume of medication; labeling does not indicate how many doses or days of treatment a patient can extract from the bottle. The dimensions of the bottle’s dropper tip dictate the size of the drop dispensed. Scientific research indicates that a normal adult’s inferior fornix – the area between the eye and the lower eyelid – has a capacity of approximately 7-10 microliters (µLs) of fluid. If a drop exceeding that capacity is placed into an eye, excess medication is expelled, providing no pharmaceutical benefit to the patient. Expelled medication also may flow into a patient’s tear ducts and move into his bloodstream, increasing the risk of certain harmful side effects. These studies conclude that eye drops should be 5-15 µLs. Defendants’ products emit drops that are considerably larger so that at least half of every drop goes to waste. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of a putative class action (Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332) under state consumer protection statutes. The consumers’ allegations of injury were sufficient to confer standing. Plaintiffs claim economic interests in the money they spent on medication that was impossible for them to use; their concrete and particularized injury claims fit comfortably in categories of “legally protected interests” readily recognized by federal courts. View "Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories" on Justia Law

The FDA approved Depakote for treating seizures, migraine headaches, and conditions associated with bipolar disorder. Physicians may prescribe it for other "off-label" uses, but a drug’s manufacturer can promote it only as suitable for uses the FDA has found safe and effective. Abbott, which makes Depakote, encouraged intermediaries to promote Depakote’s off-label uses for ADHD, schizophrenia, and dementia, hiding its own involvement. Abbott pleaded guilty to unlawful promotion and paid $1.6 billion to resolve the criminal case and False Claims Act suits, 31 U.S.C. 3729–33. Welfare-benefit plans that paid for Depakote’s off-label uses sought treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964, for a class comprising all third-party payors. Following a remand, the court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs could not show proximate causation, a RICO requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Payors are not the most directly, injured parties. Patients suffer if they take Depakote when it is useless and may be harmful and costly. Physicians also may lose, though less directly. Because some off-label uses of Depakote may be beneficial to patients, it is hard to treat all off-label prescriptions as injurious to the Payors; if they did not pay for Depakote they would have paid for some other drug. In addition, some physicians were apt to write off-label prescriptions whether or not Abbott promoted such uses. Calculation of damages would require determining the volume of off-label prescriptions that would have occurred absent Abbott’s unlawful activity. View "Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

Direct purchasers of Wellbutrin XL, a drug for treating depression, sued, alleging that GSK violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by entering into an unlawful conspiracy with Biovail, GSK’s partner in the development of Wellbutrin XL, to delay the launch of generic versions of the drug. Indirect-purchasers asserted similar theories under state law. The purchasers claim that GSK delayed the launch of generic versions by supporting baseless patent infringement suits and a baseless FDA Citizen Petition aimed at generic drug companies and by entering into an unlawful reverse payment settlement agreement with potential competitors. The district court granted GSK summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence that GSK’s patent litigation was a sham or that the settlement delayed the launch of generic Wellbutrin XL. The court granted GSK’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of the purchasers’ economic expert; decertified the indirect-purchaser class for lack of ascertainability; dismissed the indirect-purchaser claims brought under the laws of states that were not the home of a named class representative; and denied Aetna’s motion to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed. After considering the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, FTC v. Actavis, the court concluded that the purchasers failed to establish a genuine dispute of fact either as to whether GSK engaged in sham litigation or whether GSK’s actions delayed the launch of generic Wellbutrin XL. View "In re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Serena Kwan appealed the dismissal of her second amended complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In 2014, Kwan, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, filed a class action against Defendants-Appellees, SanMedica International, LLC (“SanMedica”), and Sierra Research Group, LLC (“Sierra”), alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). The complaint was based on an allegation that the defendants falsely represented that their product, SeroVital, provided a 682% mean increase in Human Growth Hormone (“HGH”) levels, that it was clinically tested, and that “peak growth hormone levels” were associated with “youthful skin integrity, lean musculature, elevated energy production, [and] adipose tissue distribution." The Ninth Circuit concluded the district court correctly concluded that California law did not provide for a private cause of action to enforce the substantiation requirements of California’s unfair competition and consumer protection laws. Further, the district court did not err in concluding that Kwan’s second amended complaint failed to allege facts that would support a finding that SanMedica International’s claims regarding its product, SeroVital, were actually false. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal. View "Kwan v. Sanmedica Int'l" on Justia Law

The district court certified eight classes, consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies for treatment of glaucoma. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large and wasteful, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, so that the price of the eye drops is excessive and that the large eye drops have a higher risk of side effects. There was no claim that members of the class have experienced side effects or have been harmed because they ran out of them early. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. The court noted possible legitimate reasons for large drops, the absence of any misrepresentation or collusion, and that defendants’ large eye drops have been approved by the FDA for safety and efficacy. “You cannot sue a company and argue only ‘it could do better by us,’” nor can one bring a suit in federal court without pleading that one has been injured. The plaintiffs allege only “disappointment.” View "Eike v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Cephalon’s patent, issued in 1997, claimed a specific distribution of modafinil, used to treat sleep disorders. Cephalon obtained Reissue Patent 516 in 2002. Cephaolon’s use of modafinil was patent-protected until April 2015. In 1998, the FDA approved Cephalon’s New Drug Application (NDA) for the brand-name drug Provigil and granted New Chemical Entity exclusivity until December 2005, as an orphan drug. Cephalon later obtained six months of pediatric exclusivity, 21 U.S.C. 355a(c). Without the patent, Cephalon’s exclusivity would have ended in June 2006. In December 2002, four generic drug each independently filed an Abbreviated NDA seeking to sell generic modafinil. All four were treated as the first filer. Each application certification “automatically counts as patent infringement,” 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A)), so Cephalon sued all four, then entered into “reverse-payment settlements” to keep each out of the market. A putative class of wholesalers who purchased Provigil directly from Cephalon filed suit, alleging a global conspiracy involving Cephalon and the generic manufacturers, 15 U.S.C. 1; four separate conspiracies; and monopolization, 15 U.S.C. 2. A motion for class certification was filed after eight years of litigation. One month later the court granted defendants summary judgment on the antitrust conspiracy claim. The court certified the class after three defendants settled for $512 million. The Third Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further consideration of whether joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) was satisfied. View "In Re: Modafinil AntiTrust Litig." on Justia Law

Fabry Disease, a rare genetic disorder, leaves afflicted persons unable to synthesize a key enzyme that helps the body break down fats. Untreated, Fabry patients suffer progressively more severe symptoms, including pain in their extremities, gastrointestinal issues, vision and hearing losses, stroke, and heart and kidney failure, eventually leading to premature death. Researchers at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine developed a method for producing a replacement enzyme, which effectively treats (but does not cure) Fabry. After patenting this method, Mt. Sinai granted an exclusive license to Genzyme, which became the sole producer of the replacement enzyme, "Fabrazyme," the only FDA-approved enzyme replacement therapy for the treatment of Fabry. Genzyme provided the drug to Fabry patients until 2009. After a virus was discovered in improperly cleaned equipment at the company's manufacturing facility, Genzyme reduced production, leading to a Fabrazyme shortage. The company began rationing. Despite setbacks in reestablishing production levels, in 2011 Genzyme diverted some Fabrazyme to the European market, allegedly because of competition Genzyme faced from an alternative enzyme replacement therapy approved only in Europe. Two class action complaints were consolidated and dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part, for lack of standing, noting “the utter failure of any plaintiff (other than Mooney) to plausibly allege that he or she suffered an injury in fact as a result of accelerated disease progression or receipt of a contaminated drug.” View "Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp." on Justia Law

Warner Chilcott, a brand-name drug manufacturer that owns the patent covering Loestrin 24 Fe, and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which sought to introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24, entered into a settlement agreement wherein Watson agreed to delay entry of its generic version of Loestrin 24 in exchange for favorable side deals. Thereafter, Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. announced that it would introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24. Warner and Lupin settled on terms similar to those between Warner and Watson. Two putative classes of plaintiffs brought antitrust claims that the settlement agreements were violations of the Sherman Act and constituted illegal restrains on trade under FTC v. Actavis. At issue in this case was whether such settlement agreements are subject to federal antitrust scrutiny where they do not involve reverse payments in pure cash form. The district court dismissed, concluding that Actavis applies only to monetary reverse payments and that Plaintiffs had alleged the existence of non-cash reverse payments only. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred in determining that non-monetary reverse payments do not fall under the scope of Actavis. Remanded. View "In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three health-benefit plans (HBPs), filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and state laws, claiming that Aventis engaged in a pattern of mail fraud by failing to disclose the true risks of the antibiotic drug telithromycin, marketed as “Ketek.” The district court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a class of all HBPs that paid for Ketek prescriptions on the theory that such HBPs were injured as a result of paying for Ketek prescriptions that would not have been written if Aventis had not concealed Ketek’s safety risks. The court concluded that UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Zyprexa) does not foreclose class certification for all RICO mail‐fraud claims brought against a drug manufacturer. However, the court concluded that Zyprexa’s reasoning applies to this case, and bars plaintiffs’ attempt to certify a class. While it may be possible for a class of plaintiffs to prove the causation element of a pharmaceutical fraud claim such as this one with generalized proof, plaintiffs have failed to offer such proof here. Therefore, class certification was correctly denied. The court's certification decision necessarily disposes of the summary judgment question as well: if plaintiffs’ RICO claims cannot be proved by generalized proof and plaintiffs have adduced no individualized proof, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive summary judgment. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the state‐law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sergeants Benevolent Ass'n v. Sanofi-Aventis US" on Justia Law

Whether a third-party payer (TPP) will cover the cost of a member’s prescription depends on whether that drug is listed in the TPP’s formulary. Pharmacy Benefit Managers prepare TPPs’ formularies of drugs approved for use by TPP members by analyzing research regarding a drug’s cost effectiveness, safety and efficacy. In 1999, the FDA approved Avandia as a prescription for type II diabetes. TPPs included Avandia in their formularies and covered Avandia prescriptions at a favorable rate. GSK downplayed concerns about Avandia’s heart-related side effects. In 2010, the FDA restricted access to Avandia in response to increasing evidence of its cardiovascular risks. TPPs (union health and welfare funds) sued GSK on behalf of themselves and similarly situated TPPs. asserting that GSK’s failure to disclose Avandia’s significant heart-related risks violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based on predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, tampering with witnesses, and use of interstate facilities to conduct unlawful activity. They also claimed unjust enrichment and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and other states’ consumer protection laws. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the TPPs adequately alleged the elements of standing. View "In Re: Avandia Mktg.,Sales Practices & Prod. Liab." on Justia Law