Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Sentinel for criminal contempt of court for resisting the Superior Court's order granting him a writ of habeas corpus and "using its position as a probation company to attempt to collect a debt that is not owed or due by threatening to have [plaintiff] jailed without bond." Plaintiff also alleged that Sentinel engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity under O.C.G.A. 16-14-1 et seq. Sentinel removed the suit to the district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The court rejected plaintiff's arguments under CAFA; concluded that the district court did not err in shifting the burden of production to plaintiff in response to Sentinel's testimonial evidence; and concluded that plaintiff offered no citation to support the theory of corporate liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sentinel. View "McGee v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

The district court presided over four class action cases. Two insurance companies (collectively, Defendants) were the defendants in the two underlying cases. Allianz Life Insurance Company (Allianz) was a defendant in the other cases. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed and attached a declaration by Dr. Craig McCann to support their theories. When Defendants moved to exclude the opinion, the court appointed an expert witness, Dr. Zvi Bodie, to evaluate Dr. McCann's opinion. The district court ordered Dr. Bodie's report sealed until it determined whether the report was admissible. In its case, Allianz filed a motion for summary judgment and a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. McCann. Defendants settled with the plaintiffs before the district court ruled on the Daubert or summary judgment motions. Allianz subsequently intervened in the underlying cases and requested the unsealing of Dr. Bodie's report. The district court denied its motion, ruling that the presumption in favor of public access to judicial records did not apply to the records at issue because they were attached to a non-dispositive Daubert motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion, because the records at issue were filed in connection with pending summary judgment motions. View "Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A." on Justia Law

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA. View "Westefer v. Neal" on Justia Law

John Graham, a Canadian citizen, was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Graham appealed, raising a number of arguments, including the contention that because he was extradited from Canada on a federal premeditated murder charge, under the specialty doctrine of federal extradition law, the State lacked personal jurisdiction to prosecute him on the State felony murder charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Canada consented to waive specialty with respect to the state charge at issue, the State had jurisdiction to prosecute Graham for felony murder; (2) the circuit court erred in admitting certain hearsay, but the error was harmless; (3) there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) Graham's life sentence without parole was authorized by statute and was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Jordan was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant's request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal, and (2) Defendant's right to cross-examine a witness was not improperly restricted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant in this case clearly and unequivocally asserted his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and the trial court's denial of Defendant's request without canvassing him was a violation of that right; and (2) the trial court did not improperly restrict Defendant's cross-examination of the witness. Remanded for a new trial on the charge of reckless endangerment in the first degree. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a class action that began more than a quarter century ago where Idaho state prisoners at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) prevailed on their claims that, inter alia, because of deliberate indifference, without any connection to a legitimate penological purpose, the inmates were subjected to needless pain and suffering on account of inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The district court issued an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations and the injunctions remained in effect in 2008 and 2009 when the facts giving rise to this case occurred. The Portland law firm of Stoel Rives, LLP was appointed to represent the prisoner class. At issue on appeal was whether Stoel Rives was entitled to an attorneys' fee award in the class action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that, in this case, the judge had discretion to consider whether Stoel Rives's work on a motion to compel conformity to the injunction was "directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief." The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in awarding fees in a reasonable amount for bringing about that conformity with the injunction. Here, Stoel Rives's work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost. The firm showed no evidence of milking the case, and the fees were "directly and reasonably incurred." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Balla v. State of Idaho, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant William Coleman was serving a fifteen-year sentence following his convictions on charges pertaining to his relationship with his ex-wife when he went on a hunger strike. Following a trial, the trial court granted the former commissioner of correction's application for a permanent injunction authorizing the department of correction to restrain and force-feed Defendant to prevent life-threatening dehydration and malnutrition. Defendant was subsequently force-fed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined (1) the state's interests outweighed Defendant's common-law right to bodily integrity; (2) the forcible administration of artificial nutrition and hydration to Defendant did not violate his constitutional right to free speech and privacy; and (3) international law did not prohibit medically necessary force-feeding under such circumstances. View "Comm'r of Corr. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Leslie Roberts pleaded no contest to one count of rape and was found guilty by the district court. Roberts' crimes subjected him to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years in prison under Jessica's Law. The district court denied Roberts' motion for a departure and sentenced him to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years in prison along with lifetime postrelease supervision. For the first time on appeal, Roberts argued that both aspects of his sentence violated his constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the cruel and unusual punishment claim was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the departure motion. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with complicity to commit assault in the first degree, attempted burglary in the first degree, and tampering with physical evidence in a juvenile proceeding. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time. The district court found there was no probable cause to believe Appellant had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses under Ky. Rev. Stat. 635.020(4) and therefore declined to order transfer of Appellant to circuit court as a youthful offender. The Commonwealth filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the circuit court to order the district court to transfer Appellant as a youth offender. The circuit court granted the writ, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ of mandamus issued by the circuit court was not an abuse of discretion where (1) a crime committed by complicity can fall under the mandatory transfer provision of section 635.020(4), and complicity to commit an offense involving use of a firearm requires transfer when an offense involving direct use of a firearm would; and (2) the district court erred in finding that a firearm was not used in Appellant's offense. View "K.R. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law