Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In 2005, during plaintiff's employment, defendant issued an employee handbook, including a provision that all employment-related disputes, whether initiated by an employee or by defendant, would be "resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration," that disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act were among those subject to the arbitration policy, that disputes cannot be brought as class actions or in representative capacities, and that the Federal Arbitration Act was its governing authority. Plaintiff signed a receipt that reiterated the arbitration policy. After his employment ended, plaintiff filed a class action, alleging violation of the FLSA by failing to adequately compensate him and other similarly-situated employees for overtime work. The district court denied a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, finding that the provision was illusory because the employer retained the right to terminate or modify the provision at any time. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that under the provision the company could make amendments almost instantaneously. View "Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accord with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum. Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers brought a class action asserting breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment. For the reasons set out in City of Dallas v. Albert, the court concluded that: (1) the ordinance's adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City's loss of immunity from suit; (2) the City had immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers' claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City's immunity by amending the Local Government Code. View "City of Dallas v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law

Robert and Janet McKeage (Relators) sued Bass Pro Outdoor World in a five-count petition for charging a document preparation fee for purchasing a boat. Relators subsequently sought class certification of both in-state and out-of-state customers based upon the purchase agreement's choice of law provision, which required the application of Missouri law to all transactions. The circuit court certified a class that was limited to contracts entered into within the state. Relators sought relief by way of a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by limiting the putative class members to only those whose transactions occurred in Missouri where the class of plaintiffs that Relators sought to certify was limited to those who were charged a document preparation fee and whose contracts contained the Missouri choice of law provision. View "State ex rel. McKeage v. Circuit Court (Cordonnier)" on Justia Law

Former customers of RCM, a subsidiary of the now-bankrupt Refco, appealed from a dismissal of their securities fraud claims against former corporate officers of Refco and Refco's former auditor. RCM operated as a securities and foreign exchange broker that traded in over-the-counter derivatives and other financial products on behalf of its clients. Appellants, investment companies and members of the putative class, claimed that appellees, former officers and directors of Refco, breached the agreements with the RCM customers when they rehypothecated or otherwise used securities and other property held in customer brokerage accounts. The district court dismissed the claims for lack of standing and failure to allege deceptive conduct. The court held that appellants have no remedy under the securities laws because, even assuming they have standing, they failed to make sufficient allegations that their agreements with RCM misled them or that RCM did not intend to comply with those agreements at the time of contracting. View "Capital Mgmt Select Fund Ltd., et al. v. Bennett et al." on Justia Law

In November 1998, Respondent David Moeller’s 1996 Honda Civic CRX was damaged in a collision. Respondent had an insurance policy through Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers). Farmers chose to repair Respondent's damaged car, and he authorized the repairs. In May 1999, Respondent brought suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Farmers policy holders in Washington State asserting a breach of contract claim on the grounds that Farmers failed to restore his vehicle to its "preloss condition through payment of the difference in the value between the vehicle's pre-loss value and its value after it was damaged, properly repaired and returned." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the contract between Farmers and Respondent provided for the diminished value of the post-accident, repaired car. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the policy language at issue here allowed for recovery for the diminution in value. View "Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Arkansas state court against defendants, asserting causes of action for unjust enrichment, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of contract. After defendants removed the case to federal district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), plaintiff sought permission to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice so that he could refile an amended complaint in state court that would avoid federal jurisdiction. The district court granted plaintiff's voluntary motion to dismiss without prejudice. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court should have considered whether the motion to voluntarily dismiss was an improper forum-shopping measure. The court agreed and reversed the court's dismissal, remanding for consideration of the issue. View "Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Appellants brought various claims before Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrators against Ameriprise, a financial-services company, for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation related to the decline in value of various financial assets owned by appellants and managed by Ameriprise. Ameriprise answered appellants' FINRA complaint by asserting, principally, that appellants released their claims by operation of a settlement agreement in a class-action agreement suit that had proceeded between 2004 and 2007 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After FINRA arbitrators denied Ameriprise's motion to stay appellants' arbitration, Ameriprise moved in the district court, in which the class action had been litigated and settled, for an order to enforce the settlement agreement that would enjoin appellants from pressing any of their claims before FINRA arbitrators. The district court concluded that the class settlement barred all of appellants' arbitration claims and therefore granted Ameriprise's motion and ordered appellants to dismiss their FINRA complaint with prejudice. The court held that the district court had the power to enter such an order and that several of appellants' arbitration claims were barred by the 2007 class-action settlement. Therefore, the court affirmed in part. But because the court concluded that appellants' arbitration complaint plead claims that were not, and could not have been, released by the class settlement, the court vacated in part the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for the entry of an order permitting the non-Released claims to proceed in FINRA arbitration. The court dismissed as moot appellants' appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration. View "In Re: American Express Finance Advisors Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

Consumers brought a class action against ten automobile dealerships operating under the "Medved" name and their owner John Medved, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Plaintiffs alleged that Medved's sales documents failed to disclose the price and existence of various dealer-added aftermarket products, injuring Plaintiffs who paid for those products. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one which included customers who paid for the add-ons but that were never installed, and another class for those who paid for the add-ons but who were unaware of them due to Medved's sales documents. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs could prove causation and injury in their CCPA claims with circumstantial evidence. However, the trial court did not consider whether the individual evidence presented by Medved rebutted the class-wide inferences of causation and injury which was crucial to certification of both classes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not rigorously analyzing the evidence presented by Medved to refute Plaintiffs' theories of liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further analysis to determine "to its satisfaction whether Plaintiffs could establish causation and injury.

The class certification issue presented in this case arose from a dispute concerning the payment of medical bills under the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No-Fault Act). Plaintiffs Pauline Reyher and Dr. Wallace Brucker filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) alleging that it failed to pay full, reasonable amounts in medical expenses in violation of the No-Fault Act and its own contracts. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to certify two classes that included all insureds and providers, respectively, who submitted medical bills to State Farm and were reimbursed for less than the full amounts. The trial court denied the motion for certification on grounds that Plaintiffs failed (among other things) to establish the "predominance" requirement. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to enter an order certifying the class. State Farm appealed, arguing that the appellate court's finding of "predominance" was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and reversed the appellate court.

This appeal was the consolidation of four appeals brought by objectors to a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that AHS engaged in a pattern of wrongfully denying claims under its home warranty contracts. Two class action lawsuits resulted from these allegations: the first was brought in California state court (Edleson Action) and this case, originally filed in the Northern District of Alabama. After the California court rejected a proposed settlement in the Edleson Action, the parties in this case reached a settlement agreement, which the district court approved. Four sets of objectors appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the reference to the Edleson agreement and the other information at issue provided reasonable notice under the circumstances. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it reviewed the validity of the settlement action and rejected objectors' claims to the contrary. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.