Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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Plaintiffs in this case were royalty owners entitled to receive a share of the production of natural gas in a gas field. Plaintiffs brought a class action against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (APC) and its affiliates challenging the manner in which APC was paying royalties on natural gas production under the respective oil and gas leases. Timothy Coulter represented the plaintiff class and negotiated a settlement agreement. More than 6,000 members made up the settlement class, one of whom was Stan Boles. Boles objected to the amended class certification and the class settlement agreement negotiated by Coulter. The district court approved the settlement despite Boles' objection. Boles appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the adequacy of the class representation or the character of the settlement agreement.View "Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

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Respondents filed a complaint against AT&T Mobility LLC ("AT&T"), which was later consolidated with a putative class action, alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free. AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with respondents and respondents opposed the motion contending that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The district court denied AT&T's motion in light of Discover Bank v. Superior Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. At issue was whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 2, prohibited states from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures. The Court held that, because it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, California's Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA. Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.View "AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Norem purchased a “Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Policy” from Lincoln Benefit. With variable life insurance, part of the premium is allocated to the insurer’s investment funds, called subaccounts. Policyholders may move their investments within the subaccounts and the death benefit, which is guaranteed not to fall below a certain amount. With variable universal life, the policyholder may easily invest and alter insurance coverage. The policy is comprised of the policy value, which represents the investment component, and its net amount at risk, which represents the insurance component. Norem purchased his policy because he wanted both life insurance and an investment vehicle for the proceeds from the sale of his ownership of a medical business. The policy has a “cost of insurance” (COI) charge deducted monthly from the policy. The policy explains how the COI rate is calculated. Norem filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated policyholders, claiming that Lincoln Benefit breached the terms of its policies in its method of calculating the COI rate.Before deciding on class certification, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincoln Benefit, concluding that its calculation of COI rates did not breach the contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Norem v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co." on Justia Law

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Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform oil spill. On appeal, BP challenged the district court's decision upholding the Claims Administrator's interpretation of the settlement agreement between it and the class of parties injured in the oil spill and the district court's dismissal of its action for breach of contract against the Administrator and denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the balance of equities favored a tailored stay where those who experienced actual injury traceable to loss from the Deepwater Horizon accident continued to receive recovery but those who did not receive their payments until this case was fully heard and decided through the judicial process weighed in favor of BP. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and instructed the district court to expeditiously craft a narrowly-tailored injunction that allowed the time necessary for deliberate reconsideration of significant issues on remand. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of BP's suit against the Claim Administrator. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued the servicer of his loan (Bank) in a putative class action, asserting that the Bank's requirement that he maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount sufficient to cover the replacement value of his home breached the terms of his mortgage contract. The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Specifically, Defendant contended that the Bank, under a covenant of the mortgage contract, could not require more than the federally mandated minimum flood insurance. The covenant was a standard uniform covenant prescribed by the FHA pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided en banc First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract, as (1) the Bank's reading of the contract was correct and Plaintiff's was incorrect; (2) Plaintiff could not avoid dismissal on the grounds that his specific understanding or the actions of the parties created an ambiguity; and (3) the United States' position articulated in its amicus brief, which stated that Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract was incorrect, reinforced the Court's conclusion. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

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This case concerned the 2011 NFL lockout. Active NFL players filed a class action suit (Brady suit) against the NFL, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and other claims. Retired NFL players also filed suit against the NFL and its teams, alleging antitrust violations (Eller I suit). After both actions were consolidated, the Brady suit was settled, the players re-designated the NFLPA as their collective bargaining agent, the NFL and NFLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the settlement terms, the Brady plaintiffs dismissed their action, the lockout ended, and the 2011 NFL season commenced. Carl Eller and other retired NFL players (plaintiffs) then filed this class action (Eller II) against the NFLPA and others. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, alleging claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of a prospective separate contractual relation with the NFL that would provide more than the increased benefits provided in the 2011 CBA. Even if plaintiffs alleged a reasonable expectation of prospective contractual relations or economic advantage with the NFL, plaintiffs failed to allege facts proving that defendants improperly or wrongfully interfered with these advantageous prospects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eller, et al. v. NFL Players Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

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Representing a class of truck owner-operators, Walker sued Trailer Transit, a broker of trucking services, for breach of contract in Indiana state court. Trailer Transit removed the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), section 1332(d)(2). Walker argued that notice of removal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after Trailer Transit “first ascertained” that the class’s theory of damages could result in recovery of more than $5 million. The district court denied a motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The earliest possible trigger for removal was Walker’s response to Trailer Transit’s requests for admission seeking clarification of the theory of damages. Even that response did not affirmatively specify a damages figure under the class’s new theory, so the removal clock never actually started to run View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a putative consumer class action suit against DirecTV and Best Buy, alleging violations of California's consumer protection laws. The arbitration agreement at issue in this instance was a customer service agreement between DirecTV and individuals who believed they purchased DirecTV equipment from Best Buy stores. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion held that Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2, preempted the State of California's rule rendering unenforceable arbitration provisions in consumer contracts that waive collective or class action proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement in this case was enforceable under Concepcion and, therefore, the district court did not err in compelling plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against DirecTV. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs were not required to arbitrate their claims with Best Buy. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law