Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Eaton manufactures truck transmissions for sale to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), which offer “data books,” listing the options for truck parts. Customer choose among the options; the OEM sources the parts from the manufacturers and uses them to build custom trucks then sold to that customer. Eaton was a near-monopolist in supplying Class 8 truck transmissions. In 1989, ZF emerged as a competitor. Eaton allegedly sought to retain its market share by entering agreements with the OEMs, with increasingly large rebates on Eaton transmissions based on the percentage of transmissions a given OEM purchased from Eaton as opposed to ZF. ZF closed in 2003. In 2006, ZF successfully sued Eaton for antitrust violations. Separately, indirect purchasers who bought trucks from OEMs’ immediate customers brought a class action; that case was dismissed. In this case, Tauro attempt to represent direct purchasers in an antitrust suit was rejected because Tauro never directly purchased a Class 8 truck from the OEMs, but rather purchased trucks from R&R, a direct customer that expressly assigned Tauro its direct purchaser antitrust claims. The Third Circuit reversed. An antitrust claim assignment need not be supported by bargained-for consideration in order to confer direct purchaser standing on an indirect purchaser; it need only be express. That requirement was met. The presumption that a motion to intervene by a proposed class representative is timely if filed before the class opt-out date applies in this pre-certification context. View "Wallach v. Eaton Corp" on Justia Law

Appellants purchased tickets to Super Bowl XLV and were either displaced from their seats, relocated, or had an obstructed view of the field. The majority of the affected ticketholders settled with the NFL. However, appellants in this instance elected to file suit, alleging various claims relating to breach of contract and fraud. Most of appellants’ claims were dismissed before trial, and class certification was denied. Seven individual appellants went to trial against the NFL and prevailed on breach of contract, but not on fraudulent inducement claims. The court concluded that, because appellants have presented no authority supporting that a third-party vendor with limited responsibility is also responsible for the performance of the express ticket terms, appellants’ argument that the Cowboys are liable for their tort claims fails; an inference of fraudulent inducement is untenable; and the economic loss rule bars appellants' claims. The court also concluded that the contract claims failed where the unambiguous term of the contract entitling ticketholders to “a spectator seat for the game” was not breached by an obstructed view of the video board. Furthermore, the fraudulent inducement claims failed because appellants were not fraudulently induced to buy Super Bowl tickets thinking they would see the game on the video board. As to class certification, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify the Displaced Class, the Relocated Class, and the Obstructed-View Class. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give appellants' proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ibe v. Jones" on Justia Law

Relying on an advertiser’s claim that its fax advertising program complied with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, Stevens & Ricci allowed the advertiser to fax thousands of advertisements to potential customers on its behalf. More than six years later, Hymed filed a class action TCPA lawsuit, which settled with a $2,000,000 judgment against Stevens & Ricci. While that suit was pending, Auto-Owners sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that the terms of the insurance policy it provided Stevens & Ricci did not obligate it to indemnify or defend Stevens & Ricci in the class action. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that the sending of unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the TCPA did not fall within the terms of the insurance policy. The “Businessowners Insurance Policy” obligated Auto-Owners to “pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’, ‘property damage’, ‘personal injury’ or ‘advertising injury’ to which this insurance applies.” The “advertising injury” deals only with the publication of private information, View "Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc" on Justia Law

A mandatory arbitration clause is contained in each deposit agreement for customers of appellee SunTrust Bank. The clause permits an individual depositor to reject the agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a certain deadline. SunTrust claimed it drafted the arbitration clause in such a way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserted that even if, as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the rejection of arbitration deadline operated to give notice of the individual plaintiff’s rejection of arbitration, the complaint could not be brought as a class action because the filing of a class action could not serve to reject the arbitration clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice. Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging the bank’s overdraft fee constitutes the charging of usurious interest. At the time Bickerstaff opened his account (thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust’s deposit agreement), that agreement included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust’s deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law, and after Bickerstaff’s complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements. SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint, was filed prior to the amendment’s deadline for giving SunTrust written notice of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff’s complaint was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors, by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24, 2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line, and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement. SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff’s attorney substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, holding in essence, that the contractual language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the filing of his class action complaint. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the terms of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust’s deposit agreement did not prevent Bickerstaff’s class action complaint from tolling the contractual limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of OCGA 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint was not defeated on this ground. View "Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action petition against J.C. Penney asserting that the internet retailer unlawfully charged Iowa sales tax on shipping and handling charges. J.C. Penney forwarded the tax to the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) pursuant to the Iowa version of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act (SSUTA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of J.C. Penney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted J.C. Penney’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s statutory claims grounded in SSUTA, as the SSUTA does not create a private cause of action; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims related to the alleged unlawful payment of taxes on the ground that the remedies under Iowa Code 423.45(3) and 423.47 are exclusive remedies barring other claims for relief for wrongful payment of taxes under SSUTA; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to recover on her claims alleging shipping and handling misrepresentations. View "Bass v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Montgomery bought a Tassimo, a single-cup coffee brewer manufactured by Kraft Foods, expecting it to brew Starbucks coffee. After the purchase she struggled to find Starbucks T-Discs—single-cup coffee pods compatible with the brewer. The Starbucks T-Disc supply eventually disappeared as Kraft’s business relationship with Starbucks soured. Montgomery sued Kraft and Starbucks on behalf of a class for violations of various Michigan laws. After dismissing several claims and denying class certification on the rest, the district court entered judgment in Montgomery’s favor when she accepted defendants’ joint offer of judgment under FRCP 68. Montgomery appealed the dismissal of her breach of express and implied warranty claims, the denial of class certification on her consumer-protection claims, and the attorney’s fees awarded as part of the Rule 68 settlement (about 3% of what she had requested). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Montgomery did not purchase the item directly from defendants, for purposes of express warranty, and did not allege that the coffee maker was unfit for its ordinary purpose. View "Montgomery v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc." on Justia Law

CIT, a large finance company, leased credit‐card processing machines to businesses and individuals. The leases describe themselves as business rather than consumer contracts and contain a forum‐selection clause that requires any disputes to be litigated in Cook County, Illinois and governed by Illinois law. Each lease also required a personal guaranty, by the lessee, an agent of the lessee, or someone else. The leases were ultimately assigned to Pushpin, which filed suits in small‐claims courts in Cook County against more than 3000 of the guarantors of defaulted leases. The guarantors filed a class-action, claiming that in invoking the forum‐selection clause Pushpin hoped to induce default judgments, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and related torts. After remands, the district court accepted jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), and dismissed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: Any forum‐selection clause will be an inconvenience to a nonresident signer of the contract, so that the challenge amounted to urging a blanket prohibition of such clauses. View "Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants were business entities that organize physically challenging obstacle course events in locations throughout the United States. The four named Plaintiffs registered to participate in one of those events. Plaintiffs filed suit in Massachusetts superior court alleging that they were unable to participate in the event because of a second change of location and that Defendants refused to refund Plaintiffs’ registration fees. Plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that removal was permitted under the Class Action Fairness Act because the matter in controversy exceeded $5 million. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court arguing that Defendant failed to show that over $5 million was in controversy. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court. The district court then dismissed the case and compelled mediation and arbitration of the dispute. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Defendants met their burden of showing that over $5 million was in controversy in this matter. Remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Delbert Soseeah, Maxine Soseeah and John Borrego filed this action against defendants Sentry Insurance, Dairyland Insurance Company, Peak Property and Casualty Insurance Company, and Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (collectively Sentry) claiming, in part, that Sentry failed to timely and properly notify them and other Sentry automobile insurance policyholders of the impact of two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions regarding the availability of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under their respective policies. The complaint alleged that Delbert Soseeah, after being injured in a motor vehicle accident, made a claim for UM/UIM benefits under two policies of automobile insurance issued by Sentry to Mrs. Soseeah. According to the complaint, Mrs. Soseeah “never executed a valid waiver of UM/UIM coverage under the” two policies and, consequently, Mr. Soseeah “demanded that . . . Sentry reform” the two policies “to provide stacked uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage limits equal to the limits of the liability coverage on each of the vehicles covered by the” policies pursuant to the two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions. Sentry purportedly refused to reform the policies and rejected Mr. Soseeah’s claim for UM/UIM benefits. The complaint alleged that Sentry, by doing so, violated New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act (UPA), violated a portion of New Mexico’s Insurance Code known as the Trade Practices and Frauds Act (TPFA), breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breached the terms of the two policies. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Sentry subsequently sought and was granted permission to appeal the district court’s class certification ruling. Because plaintiffs failed to establish that all members of the general certified class suffered the common injury required by Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the general class. Because the district court’s certification ruling did not expressly address the Rule 23 factors as they applied to each of the identified subclasses, the Court did not have enough information to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying two subclasses. Consequently, the Court directed the district court on remand to address these issues. View "Soseeah v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellant/cross-appellee OXY USA Inc. appealed the grant of summary judgment to appellees/cross-appellants, a class of plaintiffs represented by David and Donna Schell, and Ron Oliver, on the question of whether their oil and gas leases required OXY to make "free gas" useable for domestic purposes. OXY also appealed: the district court’s certification of plaintiffs' class; the denial of a motion to decertify; and an order to quash the deposition of an absent class member. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's: denial of their motion for attorneys' fees; denial of their motion for litigation expenses; and denial of an incentive award. Notably, plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. OXY opposed dismissal for mootness, but argued that if the Tenth Circuit found mootness, the Court should vacate the district court’s decision. Appellees/cross-appellants were approximately 2,200 surface owners of Kansas land burdened by oil and gas leases held or operated by OXY, executed separately from approximately 1906 to 2007. The leases contained a "free gas" clause. The clauses weren't identical, but all, in substance, purported to grant the lessor access to free gas for domestic use. All of the plaintiffs who have used free gas obtain their gas from a tap connected directly to a wellhead line. In addition, some members of the plaintiff class (including about half of the current users of free gas) received royalty payments from OXY based on the production of gas on their land. In August 2007, OXY sent letters warning free gas users that their gas may become unsafe to use, either because of high hydrogen sulfide content or low pressure at the wellhead. These letters urged the lessors to convert their houses to an alternative energy source. On August 31, 2007, leaseholders David Schell, Donna Schell, Howard Pickens, and Ron Oliver filed this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, seeking a permanent injunction, a declaratory judgment, and actual damages based on alleged breaches of mineral leases entered into with OXY for failure to supply free usable gas. After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that that OXY’s sale of the oil and gas leases at issue here mooted its appeal; therefore, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the cross-appeal had not been mooted by this sale, and affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the denial of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and an incentive award. View "Schell v. OXY USA" on Justia Law