Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

These appeals involved two essentially identical actions filed in two different states by different groups of plaintiffs, each seeking to represent a class. The actions sought damages on the ground that plaintiffs' personal information was obtained by defendants in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725. Joining other courts which have dealt with similar claims, the court held that defendants' actions were not unlawful under the DPPA and affirmed the dismissal of the actions by the district courts.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs in these four cases appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissing their product liability claims for injuries allegedly caused by defendant's prescription drug, Fosamax. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision concluding that their product liability claims, brought under Virginia law, were not tolled by the pendency of a putative federal class action that raised identical claims and dismissing plaintiffs' claims as time-barred. The court held that the availability of "cross jurisdictional tolling" in this context raised questions of Virginia law that were appropriately certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class, sued defendant under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.231-408.241, alleging that defendant charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1 of the MSMLA. At issue was whether defendants violated the MSMLA by charging plaintiffs a loan discount, settlement/closing fee, document processing/delivery fee, and prepaid interest. The court held that plaintiffs did suffer a loss of money when defendant charged the loan discount, although plaintiffs received the loan discount amount two days later as part of a loan disbursement. The court also held that it could not decide whether the loan discount and the settlement/closing fee violated the MSMLA and remanded for further proceedings. The court further held that the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges and violated the MSMLA. The court finally held that because the processing/delivery free violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest was an additional violation of the statute. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs want to represent a class of more than 100 people with stakes of more than $5 million and invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act. They claim that the company violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act prohibition on pyramid schemes, 815 ILCS 505/2A(2). The company's customers sell each other the right to act as travel agencies, as well as selling travel services to the public. The district court did not decide whether the operation is a pyramid scheme, but ruled that transactions with residents of states other than Illinois are outside the Act, dismissed the non-Illinois plaintiffs, and decided that the suit is an intra-state controversy that belongs in state court. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Section 1332(d)(4) requires the court to decline jurisdiction when at least two-thirds of the members of the proposed class reside in the same state as the principal defendant. The class that plaintiffs propose is nationwide. Subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things when suit is filed; what happens later does not detract from jurisdiction already established. While the pleadings do not establish that Illinois law does apply, they do not defeat the application of that law.

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of customers with poor credit who purchased used automobiles from defendants, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The complaint asserted that defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq., and various state laws by burying hidden finance charges in the prices that plaintiffs were charged for these automobiles where defendant advertised the newer, more valuable used cars in its inventory at market prices, but sold the older, less valuable used cars to subprime credit customers for prices substantially higher than the market prices listed in the same guide. The court held that because the complaint did not contain any allegation for which it could plausibly be inferred that defendants failed to disclose a finance charge to plaintiffs, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This appeal arose from a motion for class certification filed in the trial court by petitioner where petitioner claimed that respondent violated sections 627.840(3)(b) and 627.835, Florida Statutes, by knowingly overcharging him an additional service charge of $20 twice in a twelve month period in two premium finance agreements which he entered into with respondent. At issue was whether the putative class members satisfied the requirements of commonality and predominance needed for class certification under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220. The court held that the Third District's decision was incorrect because it afforded no deference to the trial court's actual factual findings and conducted a de novo review which constituted error where the proper appellate standard of review for a grant of class certification was abuse of discretion. The court also held that the Third District incorrectly addressed whether petition satisfied section 627.835's "knowingly" requirement and incorrectly held that petitioner and the putative class members failed to satisfy rule 1.220's commonality and predominance requirements. Therefore, the court held that the Third District created conflict with Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss and Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass'n. Accordingly, the court quashed the Third District's judgment.

Minnesota homeowners brought this action against Zurn Pex, Inc. and Zurn Industries, Inc. (Zurn), alleging that brass fittings used in the company's cross linked polyethylene (PEX) plumbing systems was inherently defective. Zurn appealed the order issued by the district court certifying the warranty and negligence classes. The court held that the district court did not err by conducted a focused Daubert analysis which scrutinized the reliability of the expert testimony in light of the criteria for class certification and the current state of the evidence. In doing so, the district court conducted the requisite "rigorous analysis" of the parties' claims to determine "whether the defendant's liability to all plaintiffs may be established with common evidence." After thoroughly reviewing the record made in the district court in light of the controlling law, the court held that the district court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion and its class certification was affirmed.

Appellant, an African-American resident of Texas, sued appellees alleging that their credit-scoring systems employed several undisclosed factors which resulted in disparate impacts for minorities and violated the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601, 3619. At issue, in a certified question, was whether Texas law permitted an insurance company to price insurance by using a credit-score factor that had a racially disparate impact that, were it not for the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b), would violate the FHA, absent a legally sufficient nondiscriminatory reason, or would using such a credit-score factor violate Texas Insurance Code ("Code") sections 544.002(a), 559.051, 559.052, or some other provision of Texas law. The court answered the certified question by holding that Texas law did not prohibit an insurer from using race-neutral factors in credit-scoring to price insurance, even if doing so created a racially disparate impact.

Appellants challenged a district courtâs discovery order that directed them to disclose what they called privileged information. To achieve this end, the Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus with the Tenth Circuit. The Appellants in this case include motor fuel retailers and the retail motor fuel trade associations to which the retailers belong. The Plaintiffs in this case are consumers and other interested parties. Collectively they filed twelve putative class action cases in seven federal district courts. The Plaintiffs alleged that the retailersâ âvolumetric pricing systemâ for retail motor fuel overcharges customers. When the temperature of the fuel rises, the fuelâs volume expands, but the actual energy content stays the same â customers pay for âmoreâ fuel but half the energy. Plaintiffs allege that the temperature fluctuations and fuel volumes are accounted for in every aspect of the Appellantsâ âvolumetric pricing systemâ except at the retail level, thus overcharging retail customers. The Tenth Circuit held that Appellants devoted a majority of their appellate brief to their contention that a First Amendment privilege should be presumed with respect to the information Plaintiffs sought to discover. However, Appellants made an âunwise strategic decisionâ by seeking a presumption when they failed to prove the information was indeed privileged. The Court dismissed Appellantsâ interlocutory appeal and denied their application for writ of mandamus.