Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The district court presided over four class action cases. Two insurance companies (collectively, Defendants) were the defendants in the two underlying cases. Allianz Life Insurance Company (Allianz) was a defendant in the other cases. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed and attached a declaration by Dr. Craig McCann to support their theories. When Defendants moved to exclude the opinion, the court appointed an expert witness, Dr. Zvi Bodie, to evaluate Dr. McCann's opinion. The district court ordered Dr. Bodie's report sealed until it determined whether the report was admissible. In its case, Allianz filed a motion for summary judgment and a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. McCann. Defendants settled with the plaintiffs before the district court ruled on the Daubert or summary judgment motions. Allianz subsequently intervened in the underlying cases and requested the unsealing of Dr. Bodie's report. The district court denied its motion, ruling that the presumption in favor of public access to judicial records did not apply to the records at issue because they were attached to a non-dispositive Daubert motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion, because the records at issue were filed in connection with pending summary judgment motions. View "Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A." on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit concerned a private securities fraud class action suit brought against a bank holding company and its management. State-Boston Retirement System, a shareholder and lead plaintiff, sought to prove that the holding company had misrepresented the level of risk associated with commercial real estate loans held by its subsidiary. After the trial, the District Court submitted the case to the jury on a verdict form seeking general verdicts and answers to special interrogatories. When the jury returned a verdict partially in favor of State-Boston, the holding company moved for judgment as a matter of law. Perceiving an inconsistency between two of the jury's interrogatory answers, the District Court discarded one of them and granted the motion on the basis of the remaining findings. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that was error: "[w]hen a court considers a motion for judgment as a matter of law -even after the jury has rendered a verdict- only the sufficiency of the evidence matters. . . .The jury’s findings are irrelevant." Despite the District Court’s error, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of loss causation, an element required to make out a securities fraud claim. The Court therefore affirmed. View "State-Boston Retirement System v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

In a class action, any settlement must be approved by the court to ensure that class counsel and the named plaintiffs do not place their own interests above those of the absent class members. In this false advertising case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a class action settlement, negotiated prior to class certification, that included cy pres distributions of money and food to unidentified charities. The settlement also included $2 million in attorneys' fees, the equivalent of a $2,100 hourly rate, while offering class members a sum of $15. The Court set aside the class settlement, holding (1) the district court did not apply the correct legal standards governing cy pres distributions and thus abused its discretion in approving the settlement; and (2) the settlement failed because the negotiated attorneys' fees were excessive. Remanded. View "Dennis v. Berg" on Justia Law

In this purported class action on behalf of borrowers holding home mortgage loans serviced by Bayview, plaintiffs claimed that Bayview improperly added fees to borrowers' accounts in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 through 46A-8-102. At issue was whether, under the statute of limitations, "the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement" was June 5, 2007, the loan acceleration date set by Bayview. The court concluded that the acceleration date was the operative date for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, because no further payments were scheduled after that date. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the statute of limitations began to run from the acceleration date, and that, therefore, plaintiffs' claims were time barred. View "Delebreau v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents brought this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Philip Morris, alleging that Philip Morris's marketing of its cigarettes violated Minnesota's consumer protection statutes. Respondents asserted claims under Minn. Stat. 8.31(3a) and for common law fraud and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Respondents' motion to certify the class. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment to Philip Morris on the consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) and then dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed the class certification but reversed the grant of summary judgment and reinstated Respondents' section 8.31(3a) consumer protection claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents' consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) were previously released; and (2) because all of Respondents' claims had been dismissed, the issue of whether the plaintiff class was properly certified was moot. View "Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56. View "Virgilio, et al. v. Terrabrook Vista Lakes L.P., et al." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, curtails use of automated dialers and prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed for the call. AT&T hired a bill collector to call cell phone numbers at which customers had agreed to receive calls. The collection agency used a predictive dialer that works autonomously until a human voice answers. Predictive dialers continue to call numbers that no longer belong to the customers and have been reassigned to individuals who had not contracted with AT&T. The district court certified a class of individuals receiving automated calls after the numbers were reassigned and held that only consent of the subscriber assigned the number at the time of the call justifies an automated or recorded call. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent plaintiffs a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that the complaint contained enough factual content to allow inference that the law firm was a "debt collector" because it regularly attempted to collect debts. The complaint also alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting debts owed to others incurred for personal, family[,] or household purposes" and that in the year before the complaint was filed, the firm had sent more than 500 people "dunning notice[s]" containing "the same or substantially similar language" to that found in the letter and documents attached to the complaint in this case. Further, the complaint alleged enough to constitute regular debt collection within the meaning of 1692a(6). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reese, et al. v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree, & Adams, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to establish a nationwide class of thousands of borrowers who allegedly paid inflated appraisal fees in connection with real estate transactions financed by Wells Fargo. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims contending that the appraisal practice of Wells Fargo and Rels unjustly enriched Rels and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.; and Arizona's anti-racketeering statute (AZRAC), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2314.04. Because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a concrete financial loss caused by a RICO violation, the district court did not err in concluding that they lacked standing under RICO and AZRAC. In regards to the UCL claims, the court agreed with the district court that the complaint did not allege "lost money or property" where plaintiffs admitted that Wells Fargo charged them market rates for appraisal services as disclosed on the settlement. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims under RESPA Section 8(a) and (b), as well as plaintiffs' assertion that the district court erred in dismissing their claims with prejudice rather than sua sponte allowing them leave to amend the complaint for the third time. View "Gomez, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law