Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The district court denied a motion to certify a class to sue Zions Bank and its payment-processor subsidiaries for alleged civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d). The complaint that the defendants conspired to conduct a fraudulent telemarketing scheme that caused unauthorized debits from bank accounts owned by Reyes and members of the proposed class. The court concluded that there were no issues common to the class and Reyes could therefore satisfy neither the commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), nor the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). The court recognized Reyes’ theory of a sham enterprise, but focused on the fact that different sales pitches were used and different products were pitched. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the district court did not adequately consider evidence of the structure of each of the alleged fraudulent schemes and related FTC investigations. If absolute conformity of conduct and harm were required for class certification, unscrupulous businesses could victimize consumers with impunity merely by tweaking the language in a telemarketing script to get access to personal information such as account numbers. View "Reyes v. Netdeposit, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two related class-action lawsuits that were first brought by Appellees almost fifteen years ago. Appellees sought damages from Appellants, Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Management Company, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA). The trial court eventually certified a class of plaintiffs and ruled that all class members could recover damages. The trial court then ruled that Appellants violated the OCSPA and awarded damages to each class member. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order certifying the class without squarely addressing Appellants’ claim that there was no showing that all class members had suffered damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the trial court’s order certifying the class, holding (1) all members of a plaintiff class must have suffered injuries as a result of the conduct challenged in the suit; and (2) because the class certified in this case included plaintiffs whose damages were inchoate, the class as certified was inconsistent with the law. View "Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims individually and on behalf of three putative classes against Defendant seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Prior to the parties’ agreed-upon deadline for the class certification motion that Plaintiff announced it would pursue, Defendant tendered to Plaintiff an offer for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Four days after receiving the offer, Plaintiff moved for class certification. The unaccepted offer was subsequently withdrawn due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the offer. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of matter jurisdiction, arguing that its unaccepted and withdrawn Rule 68 offer resolved any case or controversy between the parties, thereby mooting Plaintiff’s claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a rejected and withdrawn offer of settlement of the named plaintiff’s individual claims in a putative class action made before the named plaintiff moves to certify a class does not moot the named plaintiff’s claims and divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs purchased Align, Procter & Gamble’s probiotic nutritional supplement, and found that the product did not work as advertised—that it did not promote their digestive health. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of state unfair or deceptive practices statutes because it has not been proven scientifically that Align promotes digestive health for anyone. The district court certified five single-state classes from California, Illinois, Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina under FRCP 23(b)(3) comprised of “[a]ll consumers who purchased Align . . . from March 1, 2009, until the date notice is first provided to the Class.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed class to be sufficiently ascertainable; there is significant evidence that Plaintiffs could use traditional models and methods to identify class members. View "Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

Burglars stole four desktop computers from Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation’s Illinois administrative offices. The computers contained unencrypted private data relating to approximately four million Advocate patients. Six of those patients brought a putative class action alleging that Advocate did too little to safeguard their information, asserting claims for willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. The district court dismissed the FCRA claims for failure to state a claim. It also found that four of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their injuries were too speculative; the thieves had stolen their information but had not yet misused it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Using information internally does not count as “furnishing … to third parties,” so the Act’s reasonable‐procedures provision did not apply, and the FCRA claims were properly dismissed. View "Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

Burglars stole four desktop computers from Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation’s Illinois administrative offices. The computers contained unencrypted private data relating to approximately four million Advocate patients. Six of those patients brought a putative class action alleging that Advocate did too little to safeguard their information, asserting claims for willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. The district court dismissed the FCRA claims for failure to state a claim. It also found that four of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their injuries were too speculative; the thieves had stolen their information but had not yet misused it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Using information internally does not count as “furnishing … to third parties,” so the Act’s reasonable‐procedures provision did not apply, and the FCRA claims were properly dismissed. View "Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged consumer fraud by the seller of a dietary supplement, and the district court certified a plaintiff class of individuals “who purchased Instaflex within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective Class States for personal use until the date notice is disseminated,” under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). The court rejected defendant’s argument that Rule 23(b)(3) implies a heightened ascertainability requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of mind. In addressing this requirement, courts have sometimes used the term “ascertainability.” Class definitions fail this requirement when they were too vague or subjective, or when class membership was defined in terms of success on the merits (fail-safe classes). This class satisfied “ascertainability” View "Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC" on Justia Law

Purchasers of notebook computers, manufactured by HP, filed a class action, alleging that certain notebook computers manufactured by HP contained inverters that HP knew would likely fail and cause display screens to dim and darken at some point before the end of the notebook’s useful life. They claimed violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the Consumer Legal Remedies 2 Act (CLRA), unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty. After years of litigation, the trial court ultimately made a “no merits” determination as to the CLRA claim, and granted HP’s motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. The court of appeal affirmed class certification; reversed the summary adjudication of UCL claims and the no merits determination as to certain CLRA claims; and affirmed summary adjudication of some breach of express warranty claims, while reversing others. View "Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard" on Justia Law

In 2013, hackers attacked Neiman Marcus and stole the credit card numbers of its customers. In December 2013, the company learned that some of its customers had found fraudulent charges on their cards. On January 10, 2014, it publicly announced that the cyberattack had occurred and that between July 16 and October 30, 2013, and approximately 350,000 cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware. Customers filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court dismissed, ruling that the individual plaintiffs and the class lacked Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs identified some particularized, concrete, redress able injuries, as a result of the data breach. View "Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents, three married couples, obtained home equity lines of credit from Petitioners, a bank and its loan officer. Approximately four years later, Petitioners filed a putative class action alleging that these transactions were part of an elaborate “buy-first-sell-later” mortgage fraud arrangement carried out by Petitioners and other defendants. Petitioners alleged numerous causes of action, including fraud, conspiracy, and violations of Maryland consumer protection statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners, concluding that the statute of limitations barred several of Respondents’ claims and that no Petitioner violated the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law as a matter of law. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Court of Special Appeals (1) erred in concluding that Respondents stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law; and (2) erred in concluding that it was a question of fact to be decided by the jury as to whether Respondents’ claims against Petitioners were barred by the relevant statute of limitations. View "Windesheim v. Larocca" on Justia Law