Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

James Hulce, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a putative class action suit against Zipongo Inc., doing business as Foodsmart. Hulce alleged that Foodsmart violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making unsolicited calls and sending text messages to him, despite his number being on the national do-not-call registry. Foodsmart's communications were about free nutritional services offered through Hulce's state and Medicaid-funded healthcare plan, Chorus Community Healthcare Plans (CCHP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted Foodsmart's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the calls and messages did not constitute "telephone solicitations" under the TCPA because they were not made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of services. Instead, the communications were about services that were free to Hulce, with Foodsmart billing CCHP directly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the calls and messages did not fall within the definition of "telephone solicitation" under the TCPA. The court concluded that "telephone solicitation" requires the initiation of a call or message with the purpose of persuading or urging someone to pay for a service. Since Foodsmart's communications were about free services and did not encourage Hulce to make a purchase, they did not meet this definition. The court emphasized that the purpose of the call must be to persuade someone who makes the purchasing decision to buy the services, which was not the case here. View "Hulce v Zipongo Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2023, a devastating fire in Lahaina, Maui, caused significant damage, destroying over 3,000 structures and resulting in at least 102 fatalities. Numerous lawsuits were filed by individual plaintiffs and class action plaintiffs against various defendants, including Hawaiian Electric Industries and others. Additionally, several insurance carriers filed subrogation actions to recover benefits paid to their insureds for damages caused by the fires. A global settlement agreement was reached among the plaintiffs and defendants, but the settlement required either a release of all subrogation claims by the insurance carriers or a final judgment that the insurers' exclusive remedy would be a lien against the settlement under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-10.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit reserved three questions for the Hawai‘i Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and issued an opinion. The court held that the holding in Yukumoto v. Tawarahara, which limited subrogation remedies for health insurers to reimbursement from their insureds under HRS § 663-10, extends to property and casualty insurance carriers. Therefore, under HRS § 431:13-103(a)(10)(A), the lien provided for under HRS § 663-10(a) is the exclusive remedy for property and casualty insurers to recover claims paid for damages caused by a third-party tortfeasor in the context of a tort settlement.The court also held that a property and casualty insurer’s subrogation right of reimbursement is not prejudiced by its insured’s release of any tortfeasor when the settlement documents and release preserve those same rights under HRS § 663-10. Finally, the court declined to apply the made whole doctrine to the statutory lien-claim process established by HRS §§ 431:13-103(a)(10) and 663-10 under the circumstances of this mass tort case. View "In re: The Petition for the Coordination of Maui Fire Cases. S.Ct. Order" on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, business entities owning recovery rights assigned by health insurers and other third-party Medicare payors, alleged that Defendants, including a drug manufacturer, a specialty pharmacy, and healthcare nonprofits, colluded to inflate the price and quantity of the drug Xenazine. This alleged scheme purportedly violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state laws, causing the Assignors to reimburse inflated Xenazine prescriptions at supra-competitive prices.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the class-action complaint with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that Defendants’ conduct proximately caused their injuries. The court emphasized that RICO’s proximate-causation requirement focuses on the directness of the harm, not its foreseeability. The court found the alleged causal chain too attenuated, involving numerous independent actors like physicians and pharmacists, and dismissed the state-law claims for similar reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal RICO claims, agreeing that Plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation. The court noted that the alleged scheme had more direct victims, such as distributors and wholesalers, and that the volume of Xenazine prescriptions depended on the independent decisions of doctors. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the state-law consumer-protection and unjust-enrichment claims, finding them insufficiently pleaded.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs had standing to bring claims on behalf of unidentified assignors, remanding those claims for dismissal without prejudice. The court upheld the district court’s denial of post-judgment relief and leave to amend the complaint, concluding that further amendment would be futile. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Lundbeck LLC" on Justia Law

A cyberattack on California Pizza Kitchen, Inc. (CPK) in September 2021 compromised the personal information of over 100,000 former and current employees. This led to multiple class action lawsuits against CPK, alleging negligence and other claims. The consolidated plaintiffs reached a settlement with CPK, offering cash payments and credit monitoring services to class members, with CPK required to make payments only to those who submitted valid claims. The settlement's monetary value was estimated at around $950,000, while the attorneys sought $800,000 in fees.The United States District Court for the Central District of California approved the settlement but reserved judgment on the attorneys' fees until after the claims process concluded. The consolidated plaintiffs reported a final claims rate of 1.8%, with the maximum monetary value of the claims being around $950,000. Despite expressing concerns about the scope of attorneys' fees, the district court ultimately awarded the full $800,000 in fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's approval of the class settlement, finding that the district court had properly applied the heightened standard to review the settlement for collusion and had not abused its discretion in finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the fee award, noting that the district court had not adequately assessed the actual value of the settlement and compared it to the fees requested. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the settlement's actual value to class members and award reasonable and proportionate attorneys' fees. View "IN RE: CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN DATA BREACH LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Lillian Vogt purchased a used van from a dealer and later discovered that the dealer had bought the van from a representative of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. The van had been classified as a total loss by Progressive but was sold with a clean title instead of a salvage title. Vogt believed that Progressive had mistitled the van and filed claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and negligence per se against the company. She also sought to certify two classes of individuals who purchased and owned vehicles that Progressive allegedly mistitled in the same manner.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied class certification for both classes. The court concluded that issues common to the putative class members would not predominate over member-specific issues of reliance or causation. Vogt was granted leave to appeal this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of class certification for abuse of discretion. The appellate court agreed with the district court, affirming its decision. The court held that the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims required proof of reliance, which was a member-specific question unsuitable for class treatment. Similarly, the negligence and negligence per se claims required proof of causation, which also entailed proof of reliance. The court concluded that individualized inquiries into each putative class member’s reasons for purchasing their vehicles would be necessary, making class certification inappropriate. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Vogt v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Daniel Garcia purchased cloth facemasks from several retail stores in late 2020. The retailers collected sales tax on these masks, which Garcia believed to be nontaxable. Garcia filed a class action complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against the retailers, alleging that they collected sales tax on items they knew or should have known were nontaxable, violating the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).The Court of Common Pleas overruled the retailers' preliminary objections, which argued that the complaint was legally insufficient. The Superior Court granted the retailers permission to appeal and reversed the trial court's order. The Superior Court concluded that the collection of sales tax did not occur "in the conduct of any trade or commerce" as contemplated by the UTPCPL. The court reasoned that the collection of sales tax is a statutory obligation distinct from the conduct of trade or commerce and that merchants act as agents of the Commonwealth when collecting sales tax.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that a merchant’s collection of sales tax does not occur "in the conduct of any trade or commerce" under the UTPCPL. The court emphasized that the collection of sales tax is a statutory obligation imposed on merchants, who act as agents of the Commonwealth, and is distinct from their commercial activities. The court also noted that the Pennsylvania Code requires a clear separation between the advertising of a product’s price and the sales tax due, further supporting the conclusion that tax collection is not part of trade or commerce. View "Garcia v. Foot Locker" on Justia Law

A debt buyer, Velocity Investments, LLC, purchased consumer debt from Citibank, N.A., which had been charged off as a loss. Velocity sent a written communication to David Chai regarding the debt but failed to include the required notice of Chai’s right to request records, as mandated by the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act. Chai filed a lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class, seeking statutory damages under the Act, while disclaiming any concrete injury from the violation.The Santa Clara County Superior Court certified a class of individuals who received similar communications from Velocity. Velocity moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Chai lacked standing because he admitted to no concrete injury. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the Act requires a consumer to have suffered actual damage to sue. Chai appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act does not condition a consumer’s claim for statutory damages on the existence of actual damages. The court found that the Act allows consumers to seek statutory damages for violations of their rights under the Act, regardless of whether they suffered actual damages. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, allowing Chai to pursue his claim for statutory damages. View "Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

John Doe filed a putative class action against SSM Health Care Corporation in Missouri state court, alleging that SSM shared private health information with third-party marketing services without authorization, violating Missouri law. Doe claimed that SSM's MyChart patient portal transmitted personal health data to third-party websites like Facebook. The lawsuit included nine state law claims, such as violations of the Missouri Wiretap Statute and the Computer Tampering Act.SSM removed the case to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Doe moved to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected SSM's arguments, ruling that SSM was not "acting under" a federal officer and that Doe's proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, thus lacking the minimal diversity required under CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SSM did not meet the criteria for federal officer removal because it was not acting under the direction of a federal officer. The court also held that the proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, which destroyed the minimal diversity necessary for CAFA jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand order. View "Doe v. SSM Health Care Corporation" on Justia Law