Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law

David O’Connell filed a class action lawsuit against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for fraudulent solicitation of donations. O’Connell alleged that USCCB misled donors about the use of funds collected through the Peter’s Pence Collection, which were purportedly for emergency assistance but were instead used for investments and other purposes. O’Connell claimed that if he had known the true use of the funds, he would not have donated.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied USCCB’s motion to dismiss the case, which was based on the church autonomy doctrine. The District Court found that O’Connell’s claims raised a secular dispute that could be resolved using neutral principles of law, without delving into religious doctrine. The court emphasized that it would not address purely religious questions if they arose during litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed USCCB’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the collateral order doctrine did not apply. The court held that the church autonomy defense could be adequately reviewed on appeal after a final judgment, and that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not conclusive or separate from the merits of the case. The court emphasized that the church autonomy doctrine does not provide immunity from suit but serves as a defense to liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "O'Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

Gerald Silver filed a putative class action against the City of Albuquerque, alleging that the City violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making pre-recorded phone calls to invite residents to virtual town hall meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Silver claimed he received at least seven such calls on his cell phone. The City argued that it was not subject to the TCPA as it was not a "person" under the statute and that the calls fell under the TCPA’s emergency purposes exception.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the City’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the calls fell within the emergency purposes exception of the TCPA. The court did not address whether the City was a "person" under the TCPA. Silver appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that even assuming the TCPA applies to local governments, Silver’s complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that the calls were made by a local government official, were informational, and were made necessary by the COVID-19 pandemic to inform residents about virtual town hall meetings, which were a mitigation measure in response to the pandemic. Therefore, the calls fell within the TCPA’s emergency purposes exception. The court did not need to determine whether local governments qualify as persons under the TCPA. View "Silver v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

Michael Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global, alleging a violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he subscribed to a 247Sports e-newsletter and watched videos on 247Sports.com while logged into his Facebook account. He alleged that Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to track and disclose his video viewing history to Facebook without his consent.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court found that Salazar had standing because the alleged disclosure of his video viewing history to Facebook constituted a concrete injury. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the VPPA, concluding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court reasoned that Salazar’s subscription to the 247Sports e-newsletter did not qualify him as a “consumer” because the newsletter was not “audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that Salazar had standing but held that he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court interpreted the term “goods or services” in the context of the VPPA to mean audio-visual materials, and since Salazar’s newsletter subscription did not involve audio-visual materials, he was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend his complaint. View "Salazar v. Paramount Global" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are four Oregon residents who filed a putative class action against Tillamook County Creamery Association (Tillamook) under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). They allege that Tillamook falsely represented the nature and origin of its dairy products, claiming they were sourced from small, family-owned farms in Tillamook County, while most of the milk actually came from a large factory farm in eastern Oregon. Plaintiffs argue that these misrepresentations led consumers to suffer economic harm by purchasing products they otherwise would not have bought or by paying inflated prices.The Multnomah County Circuit Court partially granted Tillamook’s motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiffs must plead that Tillamook’s false representations were observed and relied upon by anyone seeking recovery. The court dismissed the claims based on a price-inflation theory and a prohibited-transaction theory, reasoning that the class must be limited to consumers who purchased Tillamook products in reliance on the marketing representations.The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that plaintiffs’ UTPA claim required them to plead reliance on Tillamook’s representations. The court rejected the price-inflation theory, likening it to the fraud-on-the-market theory used in securities fraud cases, and found it inapplicable to consumer goods. The court also determined that the prohibited-transaction theory required proof of reliance, as the claimed loss was the purchase price resulting from misrepresentations.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that plaintiffs’ premium-price theory and prohibited-transaction theory do not require pleading reliance. The court explained that the premium-price theory alleges that Tillamook’s deceptive marketing inflated the market value of its products, causing all purchasers to pay higher prices, regardless of individual reliance. Similarly, the prohibited-transaction theory claims that plaintiffs suffered loss by purchasing misbranded or falsely advertised products, which does not depend on consumers’ awareness of the misrepresentations. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn." on Justia Law

Paul Osheske, a Facebook user, purchased a movie ticket on Landmark Theatres' website. Landmark Theatres, operated by Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., shared the name of the film, the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook identification number with Facebook without his consent. Osheske filed a class action lawsuit against Landmark, alleging that this disclosure violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Osheske’s complaint, concluding that Landmark Theatres did not qualify as a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the activities of selling tickets and providing an in-theater movie experience did not fall under the VPPA’s definition of “rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the VPPA does not apply to businesses providing a classic in-theater moviegoing experience. The court determined that the statutory text and historical context of the VPPA indicate that the Act was intended to cover the rental, sale, or delivery of video products, not the provision of shared access to film screenings in a theater. Consequently, Landmark Theatres' conduct did not make it a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court also noted that the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper, as the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. View "OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION COMPANY" on Justia Law

Francisco Rosario filed a class action lawsuit against Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Mr. Cooper) and The Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), alleging that they collected illegal and unlicensed third-party loan servicing fees on his mortgage. Rosario claimed that these fees were prohibited by the mortgage contract and Rhode Island law. He sought to represent all similarly situated individuals who were charged these fees.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The court found that Rosario's claims were based on a statute that did not provide a private right of action for borrowers to recoup fees collected by unlicensed loan servicers. Rosario appealed the decision, arguing that the defendants breached the mortgage contract by charging fees in violation of Rhode Island law and that the statute should be interpreted broadly to include loan servicing activities.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the statute in question, G.L. 1956 § 19-14.11-1, did not provide a private right of action for borrowers to recover fees collected by unlicensed loan servicers. The court also found that the statute's exception for unlicensed transactions involving lending or loan brokering did not apply to loan servicing activities. Therefore, the court concluded that Rosario's breach of contract claim could not be sustained based on the alleged statutory violations. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Rosario v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Tracy Hall filed a class action lawsuit against Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. and Walgreen Co., alleging that the company deceptively marketed a cough medicine containing dextromethorphan hydrobromide as "nondrowsy," despite drowsiness being a known side effect. The FDA regulates over-the-counter medicines, including antitussives, but does not require a drowsiness warning for the specific drug in question. Hall claimed that the labeling violated Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case and denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss. Walgreens argued that the labeling fell within the CPA's statutory safe harbor, which exempts actions permitted by regulatory bodies. The federal court then certified the question to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, asking whether the labeling decision fell within the statutory safe harbor under RCW 19.86.170.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington concluded that the statutory safe harbor applies only to actions expressly permitted by a regulatory body. Since the FDA had not specifically permitted labeling the cough medicine as "nondrowsy," the court held that the activity did not fall within the statutory safe harbor. The court answered the certified question in the negative, indicating that the labeling did not qualify for the exemption under the CPA. View "Hall v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

Connie Lange purchased a fifth-wheel camping trailer from GMT Auto Sales in August 2020, which included a $199 administrative fee. Lange later filed a class action petition alleging that GMT violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by charging this fee, arguing that fifth-wheel camping trailers do not qualify as "motor vehicles," "vessels," or "vessel trailers" under the relevant statute. GMT initially moved to dismiss the case but later moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County overruled GMT's motion to dismiss and later granted GMT's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Lange $199 and $5,000 in attorney fees. Lange then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award and reconsider the order compelling arbitration, which the circuit court denied. Lange appealed, arguing that GMT waived its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss and that the arbitration provision was unenforceable.The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing with Lange that GMT waived its right to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and reviewed the case de novo. The court found that GMT did not waive its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss, as it timely moved to compel arbitration and raised it as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading. The court also found that the arbitration provision remained enforceable despite the assignment of the retail installment contract to a bank. Lange's argument regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration provision was deemed unpreserved for review.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law