Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs filed this action against Cox Enterprises, Inc., on behalf of themselves as well as a putative class consisting of all persons in the United States who subscribe to Cox for so-called premium cable and who paid Cox a monthly rental fee for the accompanying set-up box. In order to receive full access to Cox’s premium cable services the plaintiffs had to rent the set-up box from Cox. The plaintiffs alleged that this constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the Sherman Act. The case came before the Tenth Circuit on the district court's denial of their request for class certification. Upon review of the materials filed with the Court and the applicable law, the Tenth Circuit concluded the case was not appropriate for immediate review, and denied plaintiffs' request. View "Gelder, et al v. CoxCom Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, sent a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff, Catherine Evon, in "care of" her employer. Evon filed a class action lawsuit alleging (1) Mickell's act of sending letters "care of" the class members' employers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition on communication with third parties, and (2) the contents of the letter violated the Act's prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held Mickell's act of sending "care of" letters constituted a per se violation of the Act, and reversed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion on that issue; and (2) held that the contents of the letter did not violate the Act, and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion in that regard. Remanded. View "Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were automated teller machine (ATM) cardholders, who alleged horizontal price fixing of fees charged to the ATM owners by the banks when cardholders retrieve cash from an ATM not owned by their bank. Plaintiffs did not directly pay the allegedly fixed fee. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit for lack of antitrust standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as indirect purchasers, Supreme Court precedent established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois prohibited Plaintiffs from bringing this suit; (2) Plaintiffs did not qualify for the narrow exception to the Illinois Brick rule; and (3) Plaintiffs did not have standing under the Clayton Act to proceed with their Sherman Act suit. View "Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. " on Justia Law

This case arose from a 1999 class action suit against the maker of silicone breast implants. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama approved a mandatory, limited fund class settlement which resolved tens of thousands of claims arising from injuries allegedly caused by defective implants manufactured by Inamed Corporation. In 2006, Zuzanna Juris filed an individual suit in California state court naming Inamed and its successor Allergan, alleging injuries caused by her Inamed implants. Defendants contended that Juris' lawsuit was barred by the 1999 class settlement. Juris countered that she could avoid the settlement's res judicata effect on due process grounds. The district court held that the class settlement precluded Juris from prosecuting the California case. Juris appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the method the Alabama court approved for distributing class notice was constitutionally deficient because she did not receive actual, individual notice. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Juris' assertion that she should have received actual, individual notice rested on a "faulty premise." Even assuming a heightened notice standard applied in this case, the Court concluded that Juris was unable to demonstrate that the notice in the class proceeding was constitutionally deficient. Finding no other error in the district court's holding that the class settlement precluded Juris' California case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that court's judgment. View "Juris v. Inamed Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of absolute privilege that grants immunity to litigants and their attorneys from being sued for defamation based on public statements they make about a judicial proceedings either before or after the proceeding is filed. Specifically, the issues before the Supreme Court in this case were: (1) whether pre-litigation statements made by an attorney to prospective clients in the presence of the press regarding a potential mass-tort lawsuit; and (2) whether statements made directly to the press by an attorney or party after such lawsuit was filed, are absolutely privileged, thus barring any lawsuit for defamation. The district court found in the affirmative on these issues and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, finding that absolute privilege did not apply to statements made before or after a complaint was filed when the statements were made before the press. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that absolute privilege indeed does apply to pre-litigation statements made by attorneys in the presence of the press if (1) the speaker is seriously and in good faith contemplating a lawsuit at the time the statement was made; (2) the statement is reasonably related to the proposed litigation; (3) the attorney has a client or identifiable prospective clients at the time the statement was made; and (4) the statement is made while the attorney is acting in the capacity of counsel or prospective counsel. View "Helena Chemical Co. v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Larry Frederick brought a putative class action suit against Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford) in Colorado state court; Hartford removed the case to federal court. Looking to the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, the district court concluded that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5,000,000 (which was required for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Accordingly, the district court remanded the case to state court. In reaching its decision, the district court acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit had not defined the burden a defendant must carry to prevent a remand in a CAFA suit. Faced with this question, the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant in these circumstances is entitled to present his own estimate of the amount at stake and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount in 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2) (currently $5,000,000). The Court emphasized that the preponderance standard applies to punitive damages as well, and that such damages cannot be assumed when calculating the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Frederick v. Hartford" on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity. View "Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Arrienne Mae Winzler brought state law claims against Defendant-Appellee Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. (Toyota) on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of 2006 Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix owners and lessees. She alleged that the cars harbored defective "Engine Control Modules" ("ECMs"), making them prone to stall without warning. As relief, she asked for an order requiring Toyota to notify all relevant owners of the defect and then to create and coordinate an equitable fund to pay for repairs. Before addressing whether Plaintiff's class should be certified, the district court held her complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As Plaintiff began her appeal, Toyota announced a nationwide recall of 2005-2008 Toyota Corolla and Corolla Matrix cars to fix their ECMs. Arguing that these statutory and regulatory processes were exactly the relief sought in Plaintiff's complaint, Toyota asked the Tenth Circuit to find that its recall rendered Plaintiff's case moot. "Because prudential mootness is arguably the narrowest of the many bases Toyota has suggested for dismissal, and because it is sufficient to that task, [the Court has] no need to discuss any of Toyota's other arguments for the same result." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

Five Medicaid recipients filed a class action against the District, alleging that the District systematically denied Medicaid coverage of prescription medications without providing the written notice required by federal and D.C. law. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. At least with regard to one plaintiff, John Doe, the allegations sufficiently established injury, causation, and redressability and the court concluded that Doe had standing to pursue his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the court had no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs had standing and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "NB, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the competitive bidding for an airport advertising concession. After the completion of the bid process, plaintiff - the second-place finisher - brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a conspiracy to violate plaintiff's equal protection rights during the bid process. The court concluded that plaintiff's conspiracy claim failed against defendants because the underlying proposed equal protection claim failed, lacking the sufficient identifiable group required. Therefore, the court concluded that the facts and inferences in this case pointed overwhelmingly in favor of defendants. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's post-verdict order denying judgment as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to grant judgment as a matter of law to defendants. View "Corey Airport Services, Inc. v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc." on Justia Law