Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals comprised two putative class actions brought by skycaps affiliated with two major airlines. After Defendants, the airlines, each introduced a $2 per bag fee for curbside service for departing passengers at airports that did not inure to the benefit of the skycaps, Plaintiffs sued the airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference, among other claims. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ADA does not preempt common-law claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after an analysis of statutory language, congressional intent, and case law, holding that the ADA preempted Plaintiffs' common-law claims. View "Brown v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Investors in Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. brought a class action against the mortgage originator alleging violations of the Securities Act based on omissions and misrepresentations in the stock offering documents. The district court dismissed on the grounds that it found no omissions or misrepresentations in the offering documents, and if there were, they were not material. Plaintiffs broadly challenged all of the district court's holdings. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Slater v. AG Edwards & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action alleging that defendants participated in a global Internet conspiracy to sell illegal prescription drugs, in violation of the laws of the United States and Virginia. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against four foreign banks for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Rule 4(k)(2) did not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the banks because exercising jurisdiction over them would not, in the circumstances here, be consistent with the United States Constitution and laws. Subjecting the banks to the coercive power of the court in the United States, in the absence of minimum contacts, would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders dismissing the complaint against the banks. View "Unspam Technologies v. Chernuk" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia appealed from the structural injunction entered by the district court in this class action challenging the policies and practices of the District's "Child Find" system under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court vacated the order certifying the class, and consequently, the orders finding liability and ordering relief to that class. The court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of whether a class, classes, or subclasses may be certified, and if so, thereafter to redetermine liability and appropriate relief. View "DL, et al v. DC, et al" on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law