Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were five independent retail pharmacies licensed in California, and Defendants were prescription drug claims processors. In 2002, Plaintiffs filed a federal class action suit alleging that Defendants failed to comply with Cal. Civil Code 2527, which requires prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize information on pharmacy fees and transmit that information to their clients. The district court dismissed the cases for lack of standing without reaching the merits. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Plaintiffs had standing, reversed the district court, and remanded. On remand, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that section 2527 unconstitutionally compels speech in violation of the California and U.S. Constitutions. The district court denied the motions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to answer a question of state law. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) section 2527 implicates the right to free speech guaranteed by the California Constitution and is subject to rational basis review; and (2) the statute satisfies that standard because the compelled factual disclosures are reasonably related to the Legislature's legitimate objective of promoting informed decisionmaking about prescription drug reimbursement rates.View "Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft of property, and one count of second-degree battery. After the court of appeals affirmed on direct appeal, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective (1) for failing to move for a directed verdict at trial, as a directed-verdict motion would not have been successful; (2) for "opening the door" to certain testimony, as counsel's tactical decision about how to cross-examine the witness was supported by reasonable professional judgment; and (3) in investigating and preparing Appellant's case.View "Mason v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more. During the trial proceedings, the trial court excluded expert witness testimony challenging the reliability of the breach-alcohol testing machines used on Defendant. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the generic charge but found Defendant guilty of driving with 0.08 percent or more of alcohol in his blood. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding the challenged expert testimony. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court properly excluded the challenged expert testimony, holding that the fundamental reliability of a federally approved, properly calibrated and employed breath-testing machine used in the application and enforcement of a per se statute is a matter that has been determined as policy by the Legislature, and a defendant's expert witness may not invite a jury to nullify that determination in the manner at issue here.View "People v. Vangelder" on Justia Law

In November 2002, Appellee Beverly Roethlein, an Allentown taxpayer, filed a class action complaint against Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., and Michelle Portnoff, Esquire (the firm's sole shareholder) seeking recovery for unjust enrichment and violations of Section 502 of Act 6, Pennsylvania’s Loan Interest and Protection Law. Portnoff serves as a private tax collector for various municipalities and school districts, and had contracts with 22 municipalities to represent them in the collection of delinquent real estate taxes. Taxpayers would be charged $150 for the opening of a file and preparation of a demand letter; $150 for the filing of a lien and preparation of a second letter; and $150 for preparation and filing of a writ of scire facias. The contracts required the municipalities to enact an ordinance or resolution authorizing Portnoff to impose legal fees upon the delinquent taxpayer. From the time a file was sent to her for collection, Portnoff began charging 10% interest on the principal. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Loan Interest and Protection Law provided taxpayers with a cause of action to challenge costs imposed for the collection of delinquent taxes or to seek damages and attorneys’ fees for improperly-imposed costs. Furthermore, at issue was whether Section 7103 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act authorized a municipality to recover the administrative costs it incurs in collecting delinquent taxes. After review, the Court concluded that Act 6 does not provide a cause of action for claims which do not involve the loan or use of money. Furthermore, the Court concluded Section 7103 of the MCTLA allows a municipality to recover fees it pays to a third-party tax collector for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assoc." on Justia Law

Petitioners in these combined cases were former public employees who filed actions in the circuit court alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA). The circuit courts dismissed the complaints for Petitioners' failures to exhaust their administrative remedies, concluding that the exhaustion of administrative remedies available pursuant to the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Procedure was a necessary precondition to the filing of a circuit court action. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the circuit courts, holding (1) a public employee, whose employment confers grievance rights before the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board, is not required to exhaust the administrative Grievance Procedure before initiating a complaint in the circuit court alleging violations of the WVHRA; and (2) the commencement of the Grievance Procedure does not preclude the institution of a circuit court action prior to exhaustion of the Grievance Procedure. Remanded.View "Weimer v. Sanders" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) under Kansas' version of a stand-your-ground-law in effect at the time of the crime, he was immune from prosecution; and (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he was immune from prosecution under the stand-your-ground statute because he made the argument for the first time on appeal, and the statute must be asserted before trial or opens or a dispositive plea is entered; and (2) the prosecutor made an incorrect statement of law about the jury's process during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, but this error was harmless.View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and burglary of a dwelling. The trial court imposed death sentences for the murders of both victims. Defendant appealed, raising several issues with regard to the penalty phase that led to the imposition of the death sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) any error in the trial court's finding of the aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing victim impact statements or in admitting photographs of the murder victims; (3) the imposition of the death penalty in this case was proportionate and supported by the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors; and (4) sufficient evidence in the record supported Defendant's convictions.View "Kalisz v. State" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC"), the defendant in an action pending at the Lamar Circuit Court filed by the City of Vernon on behalf of itself and other similarly situated entities, appealed the court's order that certified a class in that action. Vernon stated that it had reached an agreement with AMIC regarding individual claims and therefore no longer wished to pursue them. AMIC filed a response to Vernon's motion in which it argued that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it because now the case was missing its named representative, and therefore the requirements for a class action could not be met. Vernon argued it had the right to withdraw from the pending litigation, but because the trial court certified the class, the litigation remains viable. Vernon requested time in which to allow the class to name a new representative. The Supreme Court agreed with Vernon that the trial court should have the opportunity to determine whether a new named plaintiff should be certified. "The trial court is the proper entity to decide whether to allow the class members to amend their complaint to substitute a new named plaintiff and to determine whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy requirements in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to represent the class." As such, AMIC's appeal was dismissed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Vernon et al. " on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 4301.69(A), which prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person. At Defendant's trial, the State had difficulty proving what Defendant sold to an informant was beer as defined by statute. The court then took judicial notice that Bud Light was, in fact, beer. Defendant was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact - the alcohol content by volume of Bud Light - that was not something that was "generally known." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that because there was no evidence admitted on the statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Defendant to the informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and double jeopardy barred a retrial. View "State v. Kareski" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, a matter of first impression: "does Delaware recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling?" Plaintiff Jose Blanco was allegedly exposed to a toxic pesticide manufactured by Defendant Dow Chemical Corporation in 1979-1980. In 1993, he entered a class action lawsuit against Defendant in Texas. The case stalled in procedure, with class certification being ultimately denied. Defendants moved to dismiss, citing the run of the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the putative Texas action tolled the statute of limitations. The Delaware superior court concluded that Delaware recognized the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling. Defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that until class action certification is denied, individual claims are tolled under Delaware law. Accordingly the Court answered the question in the affirmative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Dow Chemical Corp. v. Blanco" on Justia Law