Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The district court certified a class in a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for the court re-evaluate the gravity of class counsel’s misconduct and its implications for the likelihood that class counsel will adequately represent the class. The district court concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by the law firm representing the class "could ever arguably justify denial of class status." The court must weigh the firm's misleading statements and the risk that the firm is in this case purely for itself and not for the benefits that the suit if successful might confer on the class. View "Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction. View "Damasco v. Clearwire Corp." on Justia Law

This case was remanded from the U.S. Supreme Court. Appellants Keith Litman and Robert Watchel asked the Third Circuit to reverse a district court order that compelled them to arbitrate their contract dispute with Cellco Partnership (d/b/a Verizon Wireless) on an individual rather than class-wide basis. In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit vacated the district court order because a recent Third Circuit precedent bound the Court to conclude that class arbitration should have been available to Appellants. Verizon responded by seeking a stay of the mandate and seeking review by the Supreme Court. Having reviewed the supplemental briefing and applicable legal authority, the Third Circuit concluded that the applicable law at issue that required the availability of classwide arbitration created a scheme inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order compelling individual arbitration in accordance with the terms of the individual Appellants’ contracts with Verizon.

Plaintiff claims that defendants are billing aggregators engaged in "cramming" by placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills, arranged unauthorized charges on plaintiff's telephone bill, and were responsible for unauthorized charges on the telephone bills of more than one million Indiana telephone numbers. Defendants produced evidence that plaintiff actually ordered the services in question. Plaintiff argued that the service was not legally authorized if defendants did not possess all customer authorization documentation required by the Indiana anti-cramming regulation, 170 IAC 7-1.1-19(p). That law does not provide a private right of action, but plaintiff argued that defendants' failure to comply proved unjust enrichment and provided a basis for suit under Indiana's Deceptive Commercial Solicitation Act, Ind. Code 24-5-19-9. The district court denied class certification and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants, which are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies. There was no unjust enrichment and the DCSA does not apply; plaintiff ordered and received services. Common issues do not predominate over individual issues, as required for a class under FRCP 23(b)(3).

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Defendants faxed unsolicited advertisements to plaintiff and others, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. One of the recipients filed a proposed class action in Wisconsin, but dismissed its complaint after the four-year limitations period had run, but before the class was certified. Plaintiff's motion to intervene was denied. The district court denied a motion to dismiss plaintiff's subsequent complaint, reasoning that the limitations period was tolled by the state court filing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal.