Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Eric and Todd Romano, trustees of the Romano Law, PL 401(k) Plan, filed a class action against John Hancock Life Insurance Company. They claimed that John Hancock breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not passing through the value of foreign tax credits received from mutual funds to the defined-contribution plans. The Romanos argued that John Hancock should have used these credits to reduce the administrative fees charged to the plans.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of John Hancock, concluding that John Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary regarding the foreign tax credits and did not breach any fiduciary duties. The court also ruled that the Romanos and the class lacked Article III standing because they failed to establish loss causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that John Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary concerning the foreign tax credits because these credits were not plan assets. The court explained that the foreign tax credits were a result of John Hancock's ownership of mutual fund shares and were not held in trust for the benefit of the plans. Additionally, the court found that John Hancock did not have discretionary authority over the management or administration of the separate accounts that would make it a fiduciary under ERISA. Consequently, the Romanos' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and engaging in prohibited transactions failed as a matter of law. View "Romano v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company (USA)" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioners sought to disqualify a trial court judge based on alleged bias and prejudice. The key facts revolve around a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit initiated by the real parties in interest against the petitioners, their employer. During the litigation, the trial judge made comments suggesting the petitioners were attempting to evade liability through corporate restructuring. These comments were cited by the petitioners as evidence of bias.The Fresno County Superior Court judge struck the petitioners' statement of disqualification as untimely. The petitioners then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) precluded the application of the timeliness requirement in section 170.3(c)(1) when a party alleges judicial bias or prejudice. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the nonwaiver provision should be interpreted to prohibit all forms of waiver, including implied waiver due to untimeliness.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) applies only to judicial self-disqualification and does not affect the timeliness requirement for party-initiated disqualification attempts under section 170.3(c)(1). The Court emphasized that the statutory text, structure, legislative history, and case law support this interpretation. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment and remanded the case for the lower court to determine whether the petitioners' statement of disqualification was filed in a timely manner. View "North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of Wisconsin, filed two class action complaints against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). They alleged that Experian failed to include a required statement in the "Summary of Rights" portion of their consumer reports, violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)(D). Plaintiffs sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Experian removed the cases to federal court, where Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing they lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they did not suffer a concrete harm. The federal court agreed and remanded the cases to state court.In state court, Experian moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs lacked standing under Wisconsin law and that their FCRA claim did not fall within the statute's "zone of interests." Plaintiffs contended California law should apply and that they had standing under it. The trial court, referencing the recent Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. decision, which required a concrete injury for standing in California state courts, granted Experian's motion. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing Limon was wrongly decided.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found Limon persuasive, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete or particularized injury. The court noted that under both California and federal law, an informational injury without adverse effects is insufficient to confer standing. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Experian was affirmed. View "Muha v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Sophia Zhou and other investors filed a federal securities fraud class action against Desktop Metal, Inc. and several of its corporate officers after the company's stock price dropped in late 2021. The stock lost value following Desktop Metal's disclosure of an internal investigation that revealed corporate mismanagement and necessitated the recall of two key products. Zhou alleged that the defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes, including manufacturing Flexcera resin at non-FDA-registered facilities and marketing the PCA 4000 curing box for use with Flexcera without FDA certification.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Zhou's complaint for failure to state a claim. Zhou appealed, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her "scheme liability" claim and that she adequately stated a securities fraud claim based on material misrepresentations and omissions. The district court had found that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim and that her complaint failed to plead any materially false or misleading statement or omission.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim because she failed to adequately argue it in her opposition to the motion to dismiss or in her supplemental briefing. The court also determined that the district court correctly found that Zhou's complaint did not allege any materially false or misleading statements. Specifically, the court held that statements about Flexcera's FDA clearance, regulatory compliance, and product qualities were not rendered misleading by the alleged omissions. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Zhou's complaint. View "Zhou v. Desktop Metal, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., and Ticketmaster LLC, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs had purchased tickets through Ticketmaster’s website, which required them to agree to Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use. These terms included an arbitration agreement mandating that disputes be resolved by an arbitrator from New Era ADR, using expedited/mass arbitration procedures.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the clause delegating the authority to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator was unconscionable under California law, both procedurally and substantively. The court also held that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the delegation clause and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionable under California law. The court found that the delegation clause was part of a contract of adhesion and that the terms on Ticketmaster’s website exhibited extreme procedural unconscionability. Additionally, the court identified several features of New Era’s arbitration rules that contributed to substantive unconscionability, including the mass arbitration protocol, lack of discovery, limited right of appeal, and arbitrator selection provisions.The Ninth Circuit also held that the application of California’s unconscionability law to the arbitration agreement was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). As an alternate and independent ground, the court held that the FAA does not preempt California’s prohibition of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion in large-scale small-stakes consumer cases, as established in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. The court concluded that Ticketmaster’s Terms and New Era’s Rules were independently unconscionable under Discover Bank. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC." on Justia Law

Michael Salazar filed a putative class action against the National Basketball Association (NBA) alleging violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he signed up for the NBA’s free online newsletter, provided personal information, and watched videos on NBA.com. He alleged that the NBA disclosed his video-watching history and Facebook ID to Meta Platforms, Inc. without his consent, violating the VPPA.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court concluded that while Salazar had standing to sue, he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the VPPA only applies to consumers of audiovisual goods or services, and the NBA’s online newsletter did not qualify as such. The court also found that signing up for the newsletter did not make Salazar a VPPA “subscriber.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Salazar’s alleged injuries were sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing. It also found that the district court erred in holding that Salazar was not a “subscriber of goods or services” under the VPPA. The appellate court concluded that the VPPA’s definition of “goods or services” is not limited to audiovisual materials and that Salazar’s exchange of personal information for the NBA’s online newsletter made him a “subscriber.” Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Salazar v. NBA" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Three former satellite service technicians filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, DirectSat USA, LLC, alleging violations of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They claimed that DirectSat failed to compensate them for work-related tasks performed beyond forty hours per week. The district court initially certified a class of full-time Illinois DirectSat technicians but later vacated this certification and certified a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class to resolve fifteen questions related to DirectSat’s liability.The case was reassigned to another district judge in 2019. Before the trial, the district court decertified the Rule 23(c)(4) class. The plaintiffs settled their individual claims but reserved the right to appeal the decertification decision. The district court found that the class action was not a superior method for adjudicating the plaintiffs' controversy due to the variance in the amount of time technicians spent on work-related tasks and the individualized nature of their piece-rate compensation system.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a party seeking certification of an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) must show that common questions predominate in the resolution of the specific issues to be certified, not the entire cause of action. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to decertify the class, concluding that a class action was not a superior method for resolving the controversy due to the individualized nature of the claims and the necessity for numerous separate trials to determine liability and damages. View "Jacks v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. (GOH) engaged in a scheme to underpay its employees by misappropriating fringe benefits owed under the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) and the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA). This led to two class-action lawsuits against GOH. GOH sought coverage under its insurance policy with Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City), which denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide coverage. GOH and its Board of Directors counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaration that certain claims in the class actions were covered under the policy.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed GOH's counterclaims, concluding that the claims were not covered under the policy due to a policy exclusion for claims related to "Wage and Hour Violations." The court also granted Twin City's motion for judgment on the pleadings, affirming that Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH for the class-action claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit agreed that the claims in question were not covered under the policy because they were related to wage and hour violations, which were explicitly excluded from coverage. The court emphasized that the exclusion applied broadly to any claims "based upon, arising from, or in any way related to" wage and hour violations, and found that the factual allegations in the class actions were indeed related to such violations. Thus, Twin City had no duty to defend or indemnify GOH under the terms of the policy. View "Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Glenn O. Hawbake, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a class action against Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, which allegedly violated Arkansas insurance law through a uniform adjustment practice. The named plaintiff, Misty Huddleston, claims that Progressive improperly reduced medical expense insurance coverage (Med-Pay) benefits by considering payments from secondary health-care insurance. This practice, documented as "Code 563," adjusts Med-Pay benefits based on amounts paid or anticipated to be paid by the insured’s health-care provider, rather than the actual billed amount.The Pope County Circuit Court certified the class, which includes all Arkansas residents who had Med-Pay claims adjusted by Progressive using Code 563 and received less than the policy limit for their claims between February 16, 2017, and September 28, 2023. Progressive appealed the certification, arguing that the claims were not common to the class, did not predominate over individual issues, Huddleston was not typical of the class, and a class action was not a superior method for handling the claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court found that the commonality requirement was met because the core issue—whether Progressive’s adjustment practice was lawful—applied uniformly to all class members. The court also determined that common questions predominated over individual issues, as the legality of the adjustment practice was central to the case. Huddleston’s claims were deemed typical of the class because they arose from the same conduct by Progressive. Finally, the court held that a class action was the superior method for adjudicating the claims, as it would avoid repetitive litigation and ensure consistent adjudications. View "PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY v. HUDDLESTON" on Justia Law