Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

A plaintiff, Alin Pop, filed a putative class action against LuliFama.com LLC and other defendants, including several social media influencers, alleging a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). Pop claimed he purchased Luli Fama swimwear after seeing influencers endorse the products on Instagram without disclosing they were paid for their endorsements. Pop argued that this non-disclosure was deceptive and violated FDUTPA.The case was initially filed in Florida state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that because Pop's FDUTPA claim sounded in fraud, it was subject to the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court found that Pop's complaint failed to meet this standard as it did not specify which posts led to his purchase, which defendants made those posts, when the posts were made, or which products he bought. The court also found that the complaint failed to state a claim under the ordinary pleading standards.Pop appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies to FDUTPA claims that sound in fraud. The court found that Pop's allegations closely tracked the elements of common law fraud and thus required particularity in pleading. The court also held that Pop failed to properly request leave to amend his complaint, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. View "Pop v. LuliFama.com LLC" on Justia Law

Epic Games, Inc. filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google after Google removed Epic's Fortnite video game from the Google Play Store for noncompliance with its terms of service. Epic had embedded secret code into Fortnite’s software to bypass Google’s required payment-processing systems, which charged a 30% commission on in-app purchases. The jury found that Epic had proven the relevant product markets for Android app distribution and Android in-app billing services and that Google violated both federal and California antitrust laws by willfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power in those markets, unreasonably restraining trade, and unlawfully tying the use of the Play Store to Google Play Billing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California entered a three-year injunction against Google, prohibiting it from providing certain benefits to app distributors, developers, OEMs, or carriers in exchange for advantaging the Play Store. The injunction also required Google to allow developers to provide users with information about and access to alternative app billing, pricing, and distribution channels. Google appealed the liability verdict and the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict and upheld the district court’s injunction. The court rejected Google’s claim that a decision in Apple’s favor in a similar lawsuit precluded Epic from defining the market differently in this case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a jury trial on Epic’s equitable claims and Google’s damages counterclaims. The court also found that the injunction was supported by the jury’s verdict and the district court’s own findings, and that the district court had broad discretion to craft the antitrust injunction. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

In 1996, California voters enacted Proposition 218, adding article XIII D to the California Constitution, which includes section 6(b)(3). This section mandates that governmental fees or charges imposed on property must not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. Plaintiffs, representing a class of single-family residential (SFR) customers of the City of San Diego, challenged the City's tiered water rates, claiming they violated section 6(b)(3) by exceeding the proportional cost of delivering water.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the City's tiered rates did not comply with section 6(b)(3). The court concluded that the City failed to show that its tiered rates were based on the actual cost of providing water at different usage levels. The court found that the City's tiered rates were designed to encourage conservation rather than reflect the cost of service, and that the City's use of peaking factors and other methodologies lacked supporting data.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the City did not meet its burden of proving that its tiered rates complied with section 6(b)(3). The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that the City's tiered rates were not cost-proportional and that the City's methodologies were not adequately supported by data. The court also addressed the issue of class certification, finding that the class was properly certified and that the plaintiffs had a common interest in challenging the City's rate structure.The appellate court directed the trial court to amend the judgment to allow the City to satisfy the refund award pursuant to newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which requires agencies to credit refund awards against future increases in or impositions of the property-related charge. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees on appeal without prejudice, allowing the trial court to determine the entitlement to such fees. View "Patz v. City of S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Defendants, alleging violations of state securities laws. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), arguing that the case involved covered securities. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to exclude any claims related to covered securities, leading the district court to remand the case to state court. After three years of state court litigation, Defendants removed the case again, citing an expert report that allegedly identified covered securities. The district court remanded the case again and awarded Plaintiffs $63,007.50 in attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially denied Plaintiffs' motion to remand but later granted it after Plaintiffs amended their complaint. The court found that the amended complaint excluded any claims related to covered securities, thus SLUSA did not apply, and no federal question remained. After Defendants removed the case a second time, the district court remanded it again and awarded attorneys' fees, finding the second removal lacked a reasonable basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the second removal was improper because the amended complaint explicitly excluded claims related to covered securities, and thus SLUSA did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the removal was objectively unreasonable, as the district court had already addressed the issues in its first remand order. The Fourth Circuit also denied Plaintiffs' request for additional attorneys' fees for defending the appeal, stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does not authorize fee awards on appeal. View "Black v. Mantei & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

A plaintiff purchased a product marketed by the defendant as "Neutrogena Oil-Free Face Moisturizer for Sensitive Skin." She alleged that the product contained oils and oil-based ingredients, contrary to its labeling. She filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant, claiming violations of California's deceptive marketing and consumer protection laws. The district court certified a class of California purchasers of the product.The defendant challenged the district court's reliance on the plaintiff's economic expert's proposed damages model, arguing it was too preliminary and did not match the plaintiff's theory of harm. The district court found the expert's model reliable for class certification purposes, noting that similar models had been approved in other cases. The defendant also argued that the elements of materiality and reliance were not susceptible to common proof, but the district court disagreed, finding that these elements could be established by reference to an objective, reasonable consumer standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert's model could reliably measure damages on a classwide basis and matched the plaintiff's theory of harm. The court emphasized that the model need not be fully executed at the class certification stage, as long as it is reliable and capable of measuring damages in a manner common to the class. The court also held that materiality and reliance could be proven on a classwide basis using a reasonable consumer standard, and the defendant had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of reliance.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of class certification. View "Noohi v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a class action against National General Insurance Company and Integon National Insurance Company, alleging that the defendants improperly denied their car accident claims and rescinded their automobile insurance policies. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants retroactively denied insurance claims and rescinded policies based on the plaintiffs' failure to disclose household members. The plaintiffs sought class certification for 1,032 insureds who had their policies rescinded under similar circumstances.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, citing the lack of a palpable trial plan for resolving damages. The court noted that the plaintiffs admitted most of the available damages were inherently individualized and expressed concern that the plaintiffs wanted to make the case more manageable by forfeiting certain categories of damages. The court concluded that class treatment would not be a substantial benefit to the litigants.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court disagreed with the defendants' contention that common questions of law and fact did not predominate on the issue of liability. The court found that the trial court had relied on improper legal criteria by denying certification based on individualized damages and by not considering the potential benefits of class certification. The appellate court held that individualized proof of damages does not preclude class certification when common issues of liability predominate. The court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded the case, directing the trial court to certify, at minimum, a liability-only class and to consider whether any subclasses are necessary. View "Cobos v. National General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Heather Schroeder and Misty Tanner, representing a class of Indiana car owners insured by Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company and Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company, filed a lawsuit claiming that Progressive breached its contractual duty by applying "Projected Sold Adjustments" to the list prices of comparable cars when determining the actual cash value of totaled cars. The insurance policy in question specifies that the actual cash value is determined by the market value, age, and condition of the vehicle at the time of the loss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, recognized that whether Progressive paid each class member the actual cash value of their car is not susceptible to classwide proof. However, it concluded that common evidence could establish that Progressive employed an unacceptable method for calculating actual cash value payments by applying Projected Sold Adjustments. The court certified a class on this basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Progressive’s policy does not preclude the use of Projected Sold Adjustments in calculating actual cash value payments, as long as the insureds are ultimately paid the actual cash value of their totaled cars as defined under the policy and Indiana law. The court found that individual questions about whether Progressive failed to pay each class member the actual cash value of their car would overwhelm any common ones. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s class certification decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schroeder v. Progressive Paloverde Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lisa Bodenburg, an Apple customer, purchased a 200 GB iCloud data storage plan, expecting it to add to the 5 GB of free storage she already had, resulting in a total of 205 GB. When she discovered that the plan only provided 200 GB in total, she filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging breach of contract and violations of California’s consumer protection laws due to Apple’s allegedly deceptive representations about its iCloud storage plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Bodenburg’s action with prejudice. The court found that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because Apple had fulfilled its contractual obligations by providing the additional storage as described in the iCloud Legal Agreement. The court also found that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws did not satisfy the “reasonable consumer” test or the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because the iCloud Legal Agreement did not promise an additional 200 GB of storage but rather additional storage, which Apple provided. The court also held that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws failed the reasonable consumer test, as Apple’s statements were not misleading when considered in context. Additionally, the claims did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements because Bodenburg could not demonstrate that Apple’s statements were false or deceptive. Thus, the dismissal of Bodenburg’s action was affirmed. View "Bodenburg v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Linda Martin filed a class action lawsuit against the FBI, alleging that the Notice of Seizure provided to property owners did not meet the Due Process requirements under the Fifth Amendment. The FBI had seized $40,200 from Martin's safe deposit box and issued a Notice of Seizure, which Martin claimed lacked specific legal or factual bases for the seizure, thus denying her a meaningful opportunity to respond. Martin sought declaratory and injunctive relief for herself and a proposed nationwide class of individuals who had received similar notices.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Martin's individual claim as moot after the FBI returned her seized property. The court also dismissed the class action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a plausible Due Process claim. The court found that Martin had an adequate opportunity to present her Due Process challenge during the administrative proceedings and that her claim was moot because the FBI had returned her property.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Martin's individual claim as moot, as the FBI had returned her property. The court also dismissed the appeal of the class certification judgment for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Martin had not challenged the denial of class certification in her appellate briefs. The court concluded that without a certified class, it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's merits rulings on the Due Process and exhaustion claims. View "Martin v. FBI" on Justia Law

Eight citizens of Mali alleged that, as children, they were trafficked to Côte d’Ivoire and forced to work without pay on small, remote cocoa farms. After eventually returning to Mali, they brought a putative class action in the United States against seven major cocoa importers, claiming the companies violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) by knowingly benefiting from a supply chain that relied on forced child labor. The plaintiffs asserted that the importers orchestrated and controlled a cocoa supply chain “venture” and delayed meaningful action against child labor through their leadership of the World Cocoa Foundation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to connect the defendants to any specific cocoa plantations, including those where the plaintiffs had worked. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ general, industry-wide allegations lacked the specificity required to establish causation under Article III of the Constitution. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the appeal in abeyance pending resolution of a similar case, Doe 1 v. Apple Inc.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they did not plausibly allege facts showing a causal connection between their forced labor and the importers’ conduct. Specifically, the complaint failed to allege that the importers sourced cocoa, directly or through intermediaries, from the specific farms where the plaintiffs worked. The court distinguished this case from Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., where plaintiffs had plausibly traced their injuries to the defendants’ suppliers. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Coubaly v. Cargill Incorporated" on Justia Law