Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a class action in Louisiana state court on behalf of a class of Louisiana medical providers against three Louisiana defendants, alleging that defendants failed to comply with the preferred provider organization (PPO) notice provisions of Louisiana law. Homeland Insurance Company subsequently appealed the district court's class action to Louisiana state court. Because it concluded that the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness Act applied, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4), the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellants filed a class action, alleging that defendant, a chemical manufacturer, sold thiodiglycol (TDG) to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, which then used it to manufacture mustard gas to kill Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq during the late 1980's. At issue was whether appellants have alleged viable claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, or the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350. The court held that the TVPA excluded corporations from liability. The court also held that the ATS imposed liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law, but only if the attendant conduct was purposeful. Appellants, however, have failed to plead facts sufficient to support the intent element of their ATS claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Costco appealed the district court's order granting class certification in a class action brought by Shirley Ellis, Leah Horstman, and Elaine Sasaki (plaintiffs), alleging that Costco's promotional practices discriminated based on gender. The court held that at least one plaintiff (Sasaki) had standing to bring suit. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in its analyses of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's findings on those issues and remanded for application of the correct standard. The court further held that, although the district court correctly determined that Sasaki was an adequate class representative, the court held that Ellis and Horstman were inadequate representatives for pursuing injunctive relief, given that they were former employees, and remanded for the district court to consider whether they were adequate representatives if a (b)(3) class was certified. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and remanded for reconsideration.

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiffs sued Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. State. 408.231-.241, alleging, for a putative class, that Countrywide charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1. The district court granted summary judgment for Countrywide and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that because interest accrued for the two days before plaintiffs receive the loan discount and settlement/closing fee as a result of the alleged MSMLA violations, plaintiffs have raised a material issue of fact as to whether the alleged violations caused their loss. The court also held that because the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges, it violated the MSMLA. The court further held that because the document processing/delivery fee violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest Countrywide collected on plaintiffs' loan was an additional violation of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Following a 2007 train derailment and three-day fire that allegedly exposed a small Ohio town to cancer-causing agents, plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of a putative class. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the normal background level of dioxin is four parts per trillion and that the range within area homes was from 11.7 to 274 ppt. A doctor testified about increased risk of cancer. The district court granted summary judgment for the train company, finding that plaintiffs had not established general or specific causation and, as a matter of law, any increased risk of cancer or other diseases was too insignificant to warrant the court's ordering a lengthy period of medical monitoring. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the absence of conclusive medical evidence that plaintiffs faced even a one-in-a-million increased risk of cancer.

This case stemmed from a putative class action challenging origination and foreclosure procedures for home loans maintained within the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal of their First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. The court was unpersuaded that plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to support their claims. Although plaintiffs alleged that aspects of the MERS system were fraudulent, they could not establish that they were misinformed about the MERS system, relied on any misinformation in entering into their home loans, or were injured as a result of the misinformation. Although plaintiffs contended that they could state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, Arizona state law did not recognize this cause of action and their claim was without a basis. Plaintiffs' claim depended upon the conclusion that any home loan within the MERS system was unenforceable through a foreclosure sale, but that conclusion was unsupported by the facts and law on which they relied. Therefore, because plaintiffs failed to establish a plausible basis for relief on these and their other claims raised on appeal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.

Plaintiff sued three defendants in Louisiana state court, alleging that there was an enterprise between all three defendants to misappropriate funds using a Texas bill review company's under-calculation of recommended payments to hospitals. Defendants subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court holding that the local controversy exception to federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), applied to this class action suit filed by plaintiffs and remanding this case to Louisiana state court. The court held that, based on its conclusion that plaintiff failed in its burden to establish that the sole local defendant formed a significant basis of the claims of the potential class, the court vacated the remand order and directed that the case be reinstated on the district court's docket.

Plaintiffs (Insured) filed a class action claiming violations of the Texas Insurance Code, alleging insurance discrimination in the non-standard insurance market, which served lower income individuals and those drivers with less than ideal driving records. Defendants (Insurance Companies) each moved to dismiss the case based on the "local controversy" and "home state" mandatory abstention provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court concluded that the underlying case presented questions of Texas state law regarding insurance policies issued for automobiles in the state of Texas by Texas County Mutuals to Texas citizens. The Insured's case did not appear to be national litigation, so the spirit and intent of CAFA were not fulfilled. Therefore, the court held that the district court properly applied the "local controversy" and "home state" mandatory abstention provisions of CAFA diversity jurisdiction.

Appellants, current and former shuttle bus drivers at the Minneapolis-St.Paul International Airport, brought suit against appellees in Minnesota state court alleging misclassifications of its drivers as franchisees rather than employees. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the motion to compel arbitration, erred in enforcing the class action waiver clauses in the drivers' contracts, and erred in dismissing the federal action instead of staying it pending arbitration. The court held that the district court did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration where appellants agreed to have an arbitrator determine threshold questions of arbitrability and therefore, appellants agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, transportation worker exemption applied. The court also held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion foreclosed appellants' claim that the district court erred in concluding the class action waivers were enforceable where the Supreme Court recently held that the FAA preempted a state-law-based challenge to the enforceability of class action waivers. The court held that, under the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action rather than staying it pending completion of the arbitration.