Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled prisonersâ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree setting forth the actions the government officials would take to bring the prison system into compliance with these laws. Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages under the plan devised by the inmates and officials. Mr. Gordonâs claim was denied, and he filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Because the class action suit covered the issue Mr. Gordon raised in his appeal, his case was remanded to a panel that was working on the logistics of enforcing the plan. The parties could not resolve their disagreements concerning enforcement of the plan, and took their disagreement to the district court. The court ruled that its orders on appeal from the panelâs decisions would be final and not appealable to the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages would eventually be denied by the district court, and he appealed despite the courtâs earlier ruling. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether it could actually review appeals from denied claims of damages that stemmed from the consent decree and plan. The officials wanted the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, Court held that even if the language of the agreement provided that the lower courtâs review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Courtâs jurisdiction is invoked by statute. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decision to dismiss the officialsâ motion, and Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

The representative of the estate of a deceased individual filed a civil rights suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The court denied the motion of another (Gresham) for joinder, amendment of the complaint to include Gresham's claims, and class action certification. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Gresham was not a party to the case, in which there has been no entry of a final or appealable order disposing of all issues. The court declined to treat the filing as a petition for mandamus.