Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

This class action arose out of the termination of approximately 7,600 former teachers and other permanent employees of the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the State of Louisiana’s subsequent takeover of Orleans Parish schools. Although the district court denied defendants’ exceptions of res judicata, a five judge panel of the court of appeal unanimously found that res judicata ordinarily would apply to the facts of this case, but that exceptional circumstances barred its application. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted two writ applications to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiffs’ claims against the OPSB and/or the State defendants, and, if not, whether the OPSB and/or the State defendants violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights in relation to the plaintiffs’ terminations. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that res judicata applied but found no exceptional circumstances that would preclude its application. Furthermore, the Court found that, even if res judicata did not apply to certain parties’ claims, neither the OPSB nor the State defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights. View "Oliver v. Orleans Parish School Board" on Justia Law

In this case involving a class action complaint filed against CVS Pharmacy Inc. in Massachusetts Superior Court for wage and hour violations, the First Circuit clarified the removal time periods and mechanisms under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. CVS filed a second notice of removal, claiming that there was a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, holding (1) CVS’s notice of removal came too late to meet the thirty-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), and the second thirty-day deadline in section 1446(b)(3) did not apply; and (2) CVS had not met its burden to establish the substantive amount in controversy requirement. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the time limits in section 1446(b) apply when the plaintiffs’ pleadings or the plaintiffs’ “other papers” provide the defendant with a clear statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which damages can be readily calculated; (2) CVS’s second notice of removal was timely under section 1446(b)(3); and (3) CVS sufficiently demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. View "Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

A.S., who suffers from a congenital birth defect, and his mother, Miller, who ingested Paxil while pregnant, sued GSK in the Philadelphia County Court, alleging that all parties were citizens of Pennsylvania. GSK removed the case based upon diversity. On plaintiffs’ motion, the case was consolidated with other Paxil cases before a district court judge who had previously held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania and who remanded A.S.’s case and the other consolidated cases to state court. The case returned to state court on January 4, 2012. On June 7, 2013, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson, which held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware. Less than 30 days after the Johnson decision, GSK filed a second notice of removal in A.S.’s case and in eight other cases with the same procedural posture. The district court denied the motion and certified its order for interlocutory review. The Third Circuit directed remand to state court, holding that the second removal request was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) because there had been a final order. View "A.S. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp" on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable.View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

A purported class action alleged that Beachwood Hair Clinic violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, by disseminating more than 37,000 unsolicited fax advertisements in 2005 and 2006. Facing more than $18 million in statutory damages, Beachwood and its insurer, Acuity, agreed to a $4-million class settlement with the Ohio-based class representative, Siding. The settlement stipulated that separate litigation between Acuity and Siding would resolve a $2-million coverage dispute under Beachwood’s policy. Siding sought a declaratory judgment under Beachwood’s policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Acuity denying coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Siding did not establish diversity jurisdiction, which requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Unable to identify a singular interest exceeding $75,000 in the remaining $2-million coverage dispute, Siding sought to aggregate its interest with putative class members to satisfy that requirement, or to have the court consider the value of the policy dispute from Acuity’s perspective: $2 million. Acuity suggested ancillary jurisdiction via the settlement judgment in the underlying class action. The court rejected all arguments.View "Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Coverall, a janitorial franchising company, alleging that Coverall misclassified its California franchises as independent contractors and that Coverall breached its franchise agreements. After the parties settled, a sole objector filed an objection to the proposed settlement. The court concluded that the objector presented no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in declining further adjustment from the lodestar amount; the district court acted within its proper discretion when it found that the settlement contained significant benefits for plaintiffs beyond the cash recovery, and that the award, at about the third of the lodestar amount, was reasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. factors supported the conclusion that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate; the district court has no obligation to make explicit monetary valuations of injunctive remedies; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement term that objectors be available for depositions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it approved the settlement agreement consistent with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1715(b), notice requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's approval of the proposed class action settlement under Rule 23 and the award of attorneys' fees to the attorneys of the proposed class.View "Laguna v. Coverall North America" on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan.View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against MERS in state court asserting claims related to MERS's facilitation of the provision of "Esign" mortgages to consumer-borrowers. MERS appealed the district court's grant of a motion to remand to New York state court on the ground that MERS's notice of removal was untimely. The court reversed and held that, in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) cases, the 30-day removal periods of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or other paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. The court also held that where a plaintiff's papers failed to trigger the removal clocks of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3), a defendant may remove a case when, upon its own independent investigation, it determines that the case is removable. Therefore, the 30-day removal periods of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not the exclusive authorizations for removal in CAFA cases. In this instance, plaintiffs never served MERS with a complaint or subsequent document explicitly stating the amount in controversy or providing MERS with sufficient information to conclude the threshold amount in controversy was satisfied. Therefore, the removal clocks of section 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) did not commence. After MERS determined upon its independent investigation that section 1332(d) conveyed CAFA federal jurisdiction because the amount in controversy, number of plaintiffs, and minimal diversity requirements were satisfied, it properly removed the case by alleging facts adequate to establish the amount in controversy in its notice of removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law