Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

This appeal stems from actions filed by holders of Argentina's bonds after the Republic of Argentina defaulted on sovereign debt. After previous panels of this court twice vacated aggregate judgments entered by the district court in favor of plaintiff classes, the court remanded with specific instructions. The district court, however, certified expanded plaintiff classes. The court concluded that the district court erred in following Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina's (Seijas II) mandate where, even though it did not expressly preclude recertification, Seijas II cannot be read to have permitted the district court to disregard the court's instructions and expand the plaintiff classes as a solution to a problem for which the court had already prescribed a specific response. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders and remanded. View "Puricelli v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from actions filed by holders of Argentina's bonds after the Republic of Argentina defaulted on sovereign debt. After previous panels of this court twice vacated aggregate judgments entered by the district court in favor of plaintiff classes, the court remanded with specific instructions. The district court, however, certified expanded plaintiff classes. The court concluded that the district court erred in following Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina's (Seijas II) mandate where, even though it did not expressly preclude recertification, Seijas II cannot be read to have permitted the district court to disregard the court's instructions and expand the plaintiff classes as a solution to a problem for which the court had already prescribed a specific response. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders and remanded. View "Puricelli v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Kivisto, co-founder and former President and CEO of SemCrude, an Oklahoma-based oil and gas company, allegedly drove SemCrude into bankruptcy through his self-dealing and speculative trading strategies. SemCrude’s Litigation Trust sued Kivisto, and the parties reached a settlement agreement and granted a mutual release of all claims. A month later, a group of SemCrude’s former limited partners (Oklahoma Plaintiffs) sued Kivisto in state court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware granted Kivisto’s emergency motion to enjoin the state action, finding that the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims derived from the Litigation Trust’s claims. The district court reversed, concluding that the claims were possibly direct and remanded. The Third Circuit concluded that the claims are derivative and reversed. Even if Kivisto owed the Oklahoma Plaintiffs unique, individual fiduciary duties in addition to the duties owed to them as unitholders, they could show neither that they were injured separately from the company or all other unitholders on the basis of that misconduct, nor that they were entitled to recovery of the units they allegedly would not have contributed or would have sold but for Kivisto’s misconduct. View "In re: Semcrude L.P." on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged consumer fraud by the seller of a dietary supplement, and the district court certified a plaintiff class of individuals “who purchased Instaflex within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective Class States for personal use until the date notice is disseminated,” under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). The court rejected defendant’s argument that Rule 23(b)(3) implies a heightened ascertainability requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of mind. In addressing this requirement, courts have sometimes used the term “ascertainability.” Class definitions fail this requirement when they were too vague or subjective, or when class membership was defined in terms of success on the merits (fail-safe classes). This class satisfied “ascertainability” View "Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC" on Justia Law

The class action complaint at the heart of this case alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 based on Dick’s alleged practice of requesting personal information from consumers during credit card transactions. The litigants reached a settlement providing for class members to receive vouchers for discounts off any merchandise purchases. The initial complaint listed Plaintiff’s counsel of record as California attorney Sean Reis of the law firm of Edelson McGuire, LLP, and several out-of-state attorneys with the notation “[p]ro hac vice admittance to be sought.” The out-of-state attorneys included Joseph Siprut of Siprut PC in Chicago, Illinois. Reis signed the complaint and signed an amended complaint filed in June 2011. While accepting responsibility for monitoring the pro hac vice application, Reis was not aware the application had been denied and assumed the application had been granted. Once the proposed class action settlement had been reached, the parties set a hearing date for an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. While preparing for this hearing, Siprut and his staff reviewed the file and were unable to locate an order granting the pro hac vice application. After learning of the status of the pro hac vice application, Reis filed a new application to admit Siprut pro hac vice. The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the second pro hac vice application. Citing rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court, the court stated that application would be denied due to the “great number of pro hac vice applications” that Joseph Siprut had made during the past year. Siprut appeared at a December 2012 hearing along with Todd Atkins, an attorney from Siprut PC, who was a member of the California State Bar. Reis did not appear. The court, affirming the tentative ruling, denied the pro hac vice application on the ground that Siprut had made 12 pro hac vice applications in the prior 11 months and there were no special circumstances under rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court which would support granting the application. Reis ultimately filed a consent to associate Atkins as counsel of record for plaintiff. Upon settlement of the class, plaintiff's counsel moved for fees. The trial court found that two of a class of 232,000 submitted claims for the merchandise credit. The court could find “absolutely no benefit really to anybody based on your claims record” and noted that most of the attorney fees sought were incurred by two out-of-state attorneys who had never been admitted pro hac vice. Final approval was granted to the settlement. In a supplemental briefing, plaintiff's counsel suggested the court grant Sirput's pro has vice application for admission nunc pro tunc to the date of first application. Counsel's application for fees was ultimately denied, and on appeal, argued the trial court erred in denying the total amount ($210,000) of fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of $11,000. The Court further affirmed the trial court's decision to reduct the amount of the plaintiff incentive award. View "Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods" on Justia Law

Consumers from six states filed suit, alleging that Volvo sold certain vehicles with defective sunroof drainage systems. The Third Circuit vacated the grant of class certification after holding that unnamed, putative class members need not establish Article III standing. The class certification opinion rejected plaintiffs’ proposal of a nationwide class and the application of New Jersey law to all claims, and directed that “the law of the state of each subclass should be applied to the subclass’s claims,” but the court did not identify which claims would be subject to class treatment. The court remanded to allow the district court to define the class membership, claims, and defenses, and so that it may rigorously analyze predominance in the first instance. View "Neale v. Volvo Cars N. Am." on Justia Law

In 2013, hackers attacked Neiman Marcus and stole the credit card numbers of its customers. In December 2013, the company learned that some of its customers had found fraudulent charges on their cards. On January 10, 2014, it publicly announced that the cyberattack had occurred and that between July 16 and October 30, 2013, and approximately 350,000 cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware. Customers filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court dismissed, ruling that the individual plaintiffs and the class lacked Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs identified some particularized, concrete, redress able injuries, as a result of the data breach. View "Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Avio claimed that Alfoccino violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3), by hiring B2B to send unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Avio and a class of similarly situated persons. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and found that Avio could not prove Alfoccino was vicariously liable for B2B’s transmission of the faxes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Avio demonstrated standing. Though the TCPA does not expressly state who has a cause of action to sue under its provisions, its descriptions of prohibited conduct repeatedly refer to the “recipient” of the unsolicited fax, and in enacting the TCPA, Congress noted that such fax advertising “is problematic” because it “shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient” and “occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.” FCC regulations define “sender” with respect to the TCPA’s prohibition of unsolicited fax advertisements as being “the person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” indicating that primary, not vicarious liability attaches to Alfoccino. View "Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, CE filed a class action suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, against King. King had commercial general liability and umbrella policies from three insurance companies, but all three disclaimed any obligation to defend or indemnify, based on provisions in the policies that appeared to exempt liability under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act from coverage. The district court certified the class. On remand, CE and King agreed to settle the case for $20 million, the limit of the insurance policies. Their agreement, approved by the district court, provided that only one percent of the judgment ($200,000) could be executed against King. Upon learning of the proposed settlement, the insurers sought a state court declaratory judgment. A state court ruled that the insurance policies do not cover liability under the Act, but CE is appealing that decision. After the settlement agreement in the federal case, but before its approval, the insurers moved to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), (b), hoping to delay approval of the settlement until there was a state-court determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to intervene as untimely. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. King Supply Co., LLC" on Justia Law