Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants were business entities that organize physically challenging obstacle course events in locations throughout the United States. The four named Plaintiffs registered to participate in one of those events. Plaintiffs filed suit in Massachusetts superior court alleging that they were unable to participate in the event because of a second change of location and that Defendants refused to refund Plaintiffs’ registration fees. Plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that removal was permitted under the Class Action Fairness Act because the matter in controversy exceeded $5 million. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court arguing that Defendant failed to show that over $5 million was in controversy. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court. The district court then dismissed the case and compelled mediation and arbitration of the dispute. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Defendants met their burden of showing that over $5 million was in controversy in this matter. Remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc." on Justia Law

William Burgess, a common stock shareholder of BancorpSouth, Inc., filed a shareholder derivative action after a Special Committee comprised of BancorpSouth directors and officers rejected his presuit demand. In that presuit demand and in his Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Burgess made various claims relating to alleged misrepresentations in company publications directed to shareholders following the 2008 economic downturn. Ultimately, the Circuit Court dismissed the action. Finding no reversible error in the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burgess v. Patterson" on Justia Law

William Burgess, a common stock shareholder of BancorpSouth, Inc., filed a shareholder derivative action after a Special Committee comprised of BancorpSouth directors and officers rejected his presuit demand. In that presuit demand and in his Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Burgess made various claims relating to alleged misrepresentations in company publications directed to shareholders following the 2008 economic downturn. Ultimately, the Circuit Court dismissed the action. Finding no reversible error in the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burgess v. Patterson" on Justia Law

P.F. Chang’s restaurant company announced that its computer system had been breached and some consumer credit- and debit–card data had been stolen. Kosner had dined at a P.F. Chang’s and paid with his debit card. Four fraudulent transactions were made with the card he had used; he cancelled it and purchased, for $106, a credit monitoring service to protect against identity theft, including against use of the card’s data to open new accounts in his name. Lewert used a debit card at the same restaurant (thought to be not among those breached) and had no fraudulent transactions, but claims that he spent time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report. Lewert and Kosner sought to represent a class of all similarly situated customers, under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing, finding they had not suffered the requisite personal injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed. At least some of the injuries alleged qualify as immediate and concrete injuries sufficient to support Article III standing; all class members should be allowed to show that they spent time and resources tracking down possible fraud, changing automatic charges, and replacing cards as a prophylactic measure. View "Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc" on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Graiser, an Ohio citizen, saw a “Buy One, Get One Free” eyeglasses advertisement at the Beachwood, location of Visionworks, a Texas eye-care corporation operating in more than 30 states. According to Graiser, a Visionworks salesperson quoted Graiser “a price of $409.93 for eyeglasses, with a second eyeglasses ‘free.’” Alternatively, the salesperson told Graiser that he could purchase a single pair of eyeglasses for $245.95. Graiser filed a purported class action in state court, alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Visionworks removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), claiming that the amount in controversy recently surpassed CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000. Graiser successfully moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under the 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that section 1446(b)’s 30-day window for removal under CAFA is triggered when the defendant receives a document from the plaintiff from which it can first be ascertained that the case is removable under CAFA. The presence of CAFA jurisdiction provides defendants with a new window for removability, even if the case was originally removable under a different theory of federal jurisdiction. View "Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Weitzner, a Brooklyn, New York doctor, filed a putative class action against Sanofi and Vaxserve, alleging that they transmitted more than 10,000 facsimiles to members of the class without the prior express invitation or permission, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Before a motion for class certification was filed, defendants made offers of judgment under FRCP 682 to both Weitzner and his professional corporation: $1,500 for each facsimile advertisement sent to Plaintiff “understood to be eleven (11) facsimile transmissions.” Defendants also offered to pay costs and to stop sending any facsimile advertisements in violation of the TCPA. Plaintiffs did not respond to the offers. More than 14 days after defendants made their offers, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending their unaccepted offers mooted the case. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs had not engaged in “undue delay” in failing to file their motion for class certification and a successful class certification motion would “‘relate . . . back to the filing of the class complaint.’” The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, held that an unaccepted offer does not make such a case moot. View "Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc" on Justia Law

Tyson employees working in the kill, cut, and retrim departments of an Iowa pork processing plant are required them to wear protective gear. The exact composition of the gear depends on the tasks a worker performs on a given day. Tyson compensated some, but not all, employees for donning and doffing, and did not record the time each employee spent on those activities. Employees sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and an Iowa wage law. They sought certification of their state claims as a class action under FRCP 23 and of their FLSA claims as a “collective action,” 29 U.S.C. 216. The court concluded that common questions, such as whether donning and doffing were compensable, were susceptible to classwide resolution even if not all of the workers wore the same gear. To show that they each worked more than 40 hours a week, inclusive of time spent donning and doffing, the employees primarily relied on a study performed by an industrial relations expert, Dr. Mericle. He conducted videotaped observations analyzing how long various donning and doffing activities took, averaged the time, and produced an estimate of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department. These estimates were added to the timesheets of each employee. The jury awarded about $2.9 million. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. The most significant question common to the class is whether donning and doffing is compensable under FLSA. Because a representative sample may be the only feasible way to establish liability, it cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim was brought on behalf of a class. Each class member could have relied on the Mericle sample to establish liability had each brought an individual action. View "Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law