Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

This putative class action was before the court on an application for the approval of settlement of the class's claims for, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a merger of two publicly traded Delaware corporations. The target's largest stockholder, which acquired the vast majority of its shares after the challenged transaction was announced, objected to the proposed settlement. In addition, defendants' and plaintiffs' counsel disagreed about the appropriate level of attorneys' fees that should be awarded. The court certified the class under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) with NOERS as class representative; denied BVF's request to certify the class on only an opt out basis; approved the settlement as fair and reasonable; and awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of $1,350,000, inclusive of expenses. View "In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation" on Justia Law

The brokerage entered into agreements with customers that set a fee for handling, postage, and insurance for mailing confirmation slips after each securities trade. Plaintiff filed claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking class certification and recovery of fees charged since 1998. The brokerage removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), or the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) and (c) and 78bb(f), and obtained dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that SLUSA did not apply because any alleged misrepresentation was not material to decisions to buy or sell securities, but CAFA's general jurisdictional requirements were met. The agreement did not suggest that the fee represents actual costs, and it was not reasonable to read this into the agreement. Nor did the brokerage have an implied duty under New York law to charge a fee reasonably proportionate to actual costs where it notified customers in advance and they were free to decide whether to continue their accounts. View "Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc." on Justia Law

Fifty-four individuals and business entities sued Appellants-Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Poultry, Inc., and Russell Adams (collectively, Tyson), in association with contracts under which they were to raise chickens owned by Tyson on feed supplied by the company. Tyson moved to sever the claims for separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, allowing the plaintiffs to select eleven individuals and entities to proceed to trial under theories of violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and fraud. The poultry growers contended that Tyson targeted them for failure by delivering unhealthy birds and feed in retaliation for their refusal to modernize operations. The jury, in a nine to three split, awarded the growers compensatory and punitive damages approaching $10 million. Alleging evidentiary errors and juror misconduct, Tyson filed a motion for new trial. The trial judge recused and the new trial motion was heard by an assigned judge. Acknowledging concerns about the conduct of the trial, the substitute judge denied the motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, staying further proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: 1) where attorneys were advised that voir dire would be limited to questions not covered in the juror questionnaire and jurors gave incomplete, untruthful, and/or misleading answers in those documents, Appellants were entitled to a new trial; and 2) a poultry grower having no title to the chickens or feed placed with the grower for fattening and future marketing of the birds by the flock's owner is not an "aggrieved consumer" for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "James v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.View "Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on behalf of a class of stockholders of Occam. Defendants moved for sanctions against all plaintiffs other than Derek Sheeler for trading on the basis of confidential information obtained in this litigation. With respect to Michael Steinhardt and the funds, the motion was granted. Consistent with prior rulings by this court when confronted with representative plaintiffs who have traded while serving in a fiduciary capacity, Steinhardt and the funds were dismissed from the case with prejudice, barred from receiving any recovery from the litigation, required to self-report to the SEC, directed to disclose their improper trading in any future application to serve as lead plaintiff, and ordered to disgorge profits. With respect to Herbert Chen, the motion was denied. View "Steinhardt, et al. v. Howard-Anderson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged two transactions in this purported class action brought on behalf of the former public holders of LP units of EPE. On behalf of the first of the two purported classes, plaintiff challenged EPE's sale of Teppco GP to Enterprise Products (the 2009 Sale). On behalf of the second purported class, plaintiff challenged the merger of EPE into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enterprise Products (the Merger). Defendants moved to dismiss all claims, or in the alternative, to stay this action pending the resolution of a related case. The court held that plaintiff had standing to bring the claims asserted in Counts I, III, and V on behalf of the public holders of EPE LP units who continuously held their units from the date of the 2009 Sale through the effective date of the Merger. However, all six counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. View "Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that De Beers coordinated worldwide sales of diamonds by executing agreements with competitors, setting production limits, restricting resale within regions, and directing marketing, and was able to control quantity and prices by regimenting sales to preferred wholesalers. Plaintiffs claimed violations of antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws, and unfair business practices and false advertising. De Beers initially refused to appear, asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, but entered into a settlement with indirect purchasers that included a stipulated injunction. De Beers agreed to jurisdiction for the purpose of fulfilling terms of the settlement and enforcement of the injunction. The district court entered an order, approving the settlement and certifying a class of Indirect Purchasers in order to distribute the settlement fund and enforce the injunction. De Beers then entered into an agreement with direct purchasers that paralleled the Indirect Purchaser Settlement. The Third Circuit remanded the certification of two nationwide settlement classes as inconsistent with the predominance inquiry mandated by FRCP 23(b)(3), but, on rehearing, vacated its order. The court then affirmed the class certifications, rejecting a claim that the court was required to ensure that each class member possesses a colorable legal claim. The settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. View "Sullivan v. DB Inv., Inc." on Justia Law

Betty Bradberry and Inez T. Jones, as the "personal representatives of the heirs-at-law and/or wrongful death beneficiaries of" the decedents, Roland E. Bradberry and George D. Jones, respectively (Plaintiffs), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Carrier Corporation and multiple other defendants in the their wrongful-death action based on their decedents' exposure to asbestos in their work environment. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the death of their decedents through the contamination of the decedents' work sites. During the pendency of the proceedings, some of the defendants filed for bankruptcy. When those insolvent defendants moved to sever themselves from case due to the stay provisions under the bankruptcy code (and ultimately be dismissed), Plaintiffs fought to keep the action against all defendants together, arguing that the asbestos claims were one single cause of action that could not be split. The solvent defendants moved for a summary judgement to dismiss the case, arguing there was insufficient evidence to indicate the decedents had been exposed to any asbestos-containing projects manufactured or supplied by each defendant. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to all defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed. Upon careful review of the trial record and the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to all defendants. View "Bradberry v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant is a payroll processing firm that collects information about its customers' employees, which may include names, addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information. In 2009, defendant suffered a security breach. It is not known whether the hacker read, copied, or understood the data. Defendant sent letters to the potential identity theft victims and arranged to provide the potentially affected individuals with one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection. Plaintiffs, employees of a former customer filed a class action, which was dismissed for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Allegations of hypothetical, future injury do not establish standing under the "actual case of controversy" requirement of Article III. View "Reilly v. Ceridian Corp." on Justia Law

Consumers brought a class action against ten automobile dealerships operating under the "Medved" name and their owner John Medved, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Plaintiffs alleged that Medved's sales documents failed to disclose the price and existence of various dealer-added aftermarket products, injuring Plaintiffs who paid for those products. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one which included customers who paid for the add-ons but that were never installed, and another class for those who paid for the add-ons but who were unaware of them due to Medved's sales documents. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs could prove causation and injury in their CCPA claims with circumstantial evidence. However, the trial court did not consider whether the individual evidence presented by Medved rebutted the class-wide inferences of causation and injury which was crucial to certification of both classes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not rigorously analyzing the evidence presented by Medved to refute Plaintiffs' theories of liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further analysis to determine "to its satisfaction whether Plaintiffs could establish causation and injury.