Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Four named plaintiffs filed three separate class action lawsuits in state court alleging, inter alia, that three Missouri credit unions, by participating in a subprime motor vehicle lending and investment program administered by now-bankrupt Centrix Financial, LLC, violated provisions of the Missouri Uniform Commercial Code (Mo UCC) and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). Defendants removed under the Class Action Fairness Act and moved to dismiss the complaints. The district court issued three identical orders dismissing all the state law claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the three appeals and affirmed, holding that plaintiffs' Mo UCC claims were time-barred and that the MMPA expressly exempted Missouri credit unions. View "Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit Union" on Justia Law

In this purported class action on behalf of borrowers holding home mortgage loans serviced by Bayview, plaintiffs claimed that Bayview improperly added fees to borrowers' accounts in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 through 46A-8-102. At issue was whether, under the statute of limitations, "the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement" was June 5, 2007, the loan acceleration date set by Bayview. The court concluded that the acceleration date was the operative date for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, because no further payments were scheduled after that date. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the statute of limitations began to run from the acceleration date, and that, therefore, plaintiffs' claims were time barred. View "Delebreau v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

E-Shops filed a class action complaint, after receiving a number of chargebacks resulting from fraudulent use of U.S. Bank credit cards, alleging that U.S. Bank knowingly allowed itself to be an instrument of the fraud, thereby making E-Shop's performance under its contract with its merchant bank more expensive. The district court dismissed E-Shops complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, holding that E-Shops failed to satisfy the required pleading standards. View "E-Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M&T Bank, alleging that it improperly charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied M&T Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court held that, under the delegation provision, the decision of whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement was a decision for an arbitrator, and the district court erred in making the decision itself. Further, the court believed that it was prudent for the district court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, so the court did not reach whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Given v. M&T Bank Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against KeyBank, alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, in connection with private student loans that KeyBank extended to plaintiffs. The court concluded that (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule and (2) the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts must be enforced because it was not unconscionable. Therefore, the court did not reach the question, presented in Appeal No. 10-15934, whether the NBA and the regulations of the OCC preempted plaintiffs' UCL claims. Accordingly, in Interlocutory Appeal No. 09-16703, the court reversed the district court's denial of KeyBank's motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order staying the case and compelling arbitration. Because the disposition of that appeal rendered the district court's subsequent dismissal order a nullity, the court dismissed Appeal No. 10-15934 as moot. View "Kilgore, et al. v. Keybank, et al." on Justia Law

In 2009, lender issued plaintiff a four-month trial loan modification, under which it agreed to permanently modify the loan if she qualified under Home Affordable Mortgage Program guidelines, implemented by the Department of the Treasury to help homeowners avoid foreclosure during the decline in the housing market. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, claiming that she did qualify and that lender refused to grant her a permanent modification. She alleged violations of Illinois law under common-law contract and tort theories and under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The district court dismissed, finding that HAMP does not confer a private federal right of enforcement action on borrowers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff stated viable claims under Illinois law for breach of contract or promissory estoppel, fraud, and unfair or deceptive business practices. Claims of negligent misrepresentation or concealment were not viable. HAMP and its enabling statute (12 U.S.C. 5219(a)) do not contain a federal right of action, but neither do they preempt otherwise viable state claims. View "Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Army and Air Force Exchange Service issues credit cards to military personnel to purchase uniforms and other merchandise from post-exchange stores on military bases. During the relevant period balances for uniforms were interest-free. Plaintiff opened an account in 1997 and became delinquent in 2000. In 2009 He filed suit claiming that the interest rate on delinquent debt exceed that specified in the agreement. The Exchange the conducted an audit and adjusted the accounts of 46,851 individuals, including plaintiff, who received a refund. A second audit resulted in adjustments to accounts of an additional 103,320 individuals. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim as moot and denied class certification. The Federal Circuit vacated. While plaintiff's individual claim was moot, it is unclear whether the claims of all class members were satisfied. View "Russell v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged.

Plaintiffs sued Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. State. 408.231-.241, alleging, for a putative class, that Countrywide charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1. The district court granted summary judgment for Countrywide and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that because interest accrued for the two days before plaintiffs receive the loan discount and settlement/closing fee as a result of the alleged MSMLA violations, plaintiffs have raised a material issue of fact as to whether the alleged violations caused their loss. The court also held that because the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges, it violated the MSMLA. The court further held that because the document processing/delivery fee violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest Countrywide collected on plaintiffs' loan was an additional violation of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.