Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Antitrust & Trade Regulation
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LG Display sought to appeal the district court's rejection of their assertions of federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332. South Carolina initiated these cases in state court, alleging violations of the State's Antitrust Act and its Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA), S.C. Code 39-3-130, -180. The court concluded that CAFA's minimal diversity requirement was not satisfied in either of these cases, and the district court properly remanded them to state court. Accordingly, the petitions for appeal of LG Display were granted and the Remanded Decisions were affirmed. View "AU Optronics Corp. v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought a class action suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, against the largest United States casket manufacturer, Batesville; and against the three largest United States funeral home chains and distributors of Batesville caskets. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to foreclose competition from independent casket discounters (ICDs) who sold caskets directly to consumers at discount prices and maintained artificially high consumer casket prices in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, by engaging in a group boycott to prevent ICDs from selling Batesville caskets and dissuading consumers from purchasing caskets from ICDs. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants used concerted efforts to restrict casket price competition, including coordinating prices, limiting the advertisement of pricing, and engaging in sham discounting. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the claim for attorneys' fees and costs; affirmed the district court's dismissal of Consumer Appellants' and FCA's injunctive relief claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. View "Funeral Consumers Alliance Inc, et al v. Service Corp. Intl, et al" on Justia Law

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These thirteen consolidated appeals brought by class counsel and six groups of objectors (collectively, Objectors) challenged the district court's decisions regarding attorney fee awards after the settlement of an antitrust class action against West Publishing Corp. and Kaplan, Inc. In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed nine separate appeals challenging the propriety of the district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees to class counsel McGuireWoods on account of a conflict of interest and to deny fees to objectors for their efforts in securing that decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the district court's decisions were not legally erroneous, the respective fee orders were affirmed, with the exception of the order denying fees to the Schneider Objectors, which the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Disner" on Justia Law

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In this putative class action, Plaintiffs were doctors of chiropractic who alleged they had been victimized by the discriminatory practices of Iowa's largest health insurer, Wellmark, Inc. The district court (1) granted Wellmark's motion to dismiss claims brought under Iowa's insurance regulatory statutes because no private cause of action was provided therein; (2) granted Wellmark's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the "state action" exemption found in Iowa Code 553.6(4); (3) granted summary judgment on claims alleging Wellmark breached its obligations under a judicially approved national class action settlement in Love v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n; and (4) granted summary judgment on several specific antitrust claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on the state action exemption, as the record failed to establish the challenged conduct fell within the exemption; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law

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Schering held a patent on the controlled release coating applied to potassium chloride crystals for treatment of potassium deficiencies. Potential generic manufacturers filed an abbreviated application for approval (ANDA),Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399, asserting that the Schering patent was invalid or would not be infringed by their new generic drugs. Schering’s subsequent infringement suits were resolved through agreements in which it paid the generic manufacturers to drop patent challenges and refrain from producing a generic drug for a specified period. Congress amended Hatch-Waxman to require pharmaceutical companies who enter into such settlements to file for antitrust review. The FTC filed an antitrust action with respect to Schering’s settlements. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of purchasers of the drug. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the class, but reversed its presumption that Schering’s patent was valid and gave Schering the right to exclude infringing products until the end of its term, including through reverse payment settlements. The court directed use of a “quick look rule of reason analysis” based on economic realities of the settlement rather than labels. The court must treat any payment from a patent holder to a patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable by showing that the payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offers some pro-competitive benefit. View "In Re: K-Dur Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

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In a class action, any settlement must be approved by the court to ensure that class counsel and the named plaintiffs do not place their own interests above those of the absent class members. In this false advertising case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a class action settlement, negotiated prior to class certification, that included cy pres distributions of money and food to unidentified charities. The settlement also included $2 million in attorneys' fees, the equivalent of a $2,100 hourly rate, while offering class members a sum of $15. The Court set aside the class settlement, holding (1) the district court did not apply the correct legal standards governing cy pres distributions and thus abused its discretion in approving the settlement; and (2) the settlement failed because the negotiated attorneys' fees were excessive. Remanded. View "Dennis v. Berg" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were automated teller machine (ATM) cardholders, who alleged horizontal price fixing of fees charged to the ATM owners by the banks when cardholders retrieve cash from an ATM not owned by their bank. Plaintiffs did not directly pay the allegedly fixed fee. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit for lack of antitrust standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as indirect purchasers, Supreme Court precedent established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois prohibited Plaintiffs from bringing this suit; (2) Plaintiffs did not qualify for the narrow exception to the Illinois Brick rule; and (3) Plaintiffs did not have standing under the Clayton Act to proceed with their Sherman Act suit. View "Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. " on Justia Law

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This case involved two putative class actions, consolidated on interlocutory appeal, brought by purchasers of real estate brokerage services in South Carolina. Each complaint alleged that the real estate brokerages serving as board members of the local multiple listing service (MLS) conspired to unfairly restrain market competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently pled the plurality of actors necessary for section 1 to apply. At this early stage of the litigation, the court was not in a position to weigh the alleged anticompetitve risks of the MLS rules against their procompetitive justifications. This rule of reason inquiry was best conducted with the benefit of discovery and the court expressed no view on the merits of the litigation beyond recognizing the sufficiency of the complaints. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Co." on Justia Law

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Named plaintiff Sue O'Brien and a class of similarly situated consumers (O'Brien) sued the maker of Brighton handbags, other accessories, and luggage, defendant Leegin Creative Leather Products (Brighton), alleging violations of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. O'Brien contended that Brighton's practices as a wholesale supplier and retailer constituted illegal price-fixing, entitling her and other class members to recovery. The district judge granted Brighton's motion for summary judgment and motion for partial summary judgment in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding, inter alia, (1) the district judge erred in his demand for proof of a "concrete injury," which required reversal of summary judgment; (2) Brighton was not entitled to summary judgment under a "rule of reason," which is not applied in a price-fixing action brought under the relevant statutes; (3) the district judge erred in ruling that the claims of the plaintiff class did not involve horizontal price-fixing; and (4) the district judge correctly determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained for trial on the issue of whether there was an unlawful combination or arrangement between Brighton and its retailers who had no express agreements as Heart Stores or luggage sellers. View "O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

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A proposed consent order from an FTC investigation indicated that U-Haul attempted to implement a scheme to collude with competitors, Budget and Penske, to raise prices for truck rentals. The FTC concluded that U-Haul's conduct violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). The proposed consent order was designed to prevent collusion. U-Haul consented to the relief, but did not admit the conduct or violation. A consumer filed a complaint charging U-Haul with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A by engaging in an attempted price-fixing scheme and seeking damages on behalf of a large class. The suit, a follow-on action after a proposed government consent decree, is common in antitrust cases. Because the FTC Act contains no private right of action and the Sherman Act is of doubtful application to price-fixing, the suit rested chapter 93A, which prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and permits consumer class actions. The complaint alleged that U-Haul's actions caused plaintiff to pay at least 10 percent more for truck rentals than she would have absent the unlawful action. The district court dismissed, stating that the complaint failed plausibly to allege injury. The First Circuit vacated, finding the claim plausible. View "Liu v. Amerco" on Justia Law