Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Apple alleging federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTS music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered iTS music and the iPod compatible only with each other. Plaintiff also alleged claims that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player (PDMP) and music download markets, which inflated Apple's music prices and deflated the value of the iPod. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's July 2009 order denying her motion to certify a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that, because plaintiff abandoned the individual claim for which she sought class certification, the issue of whether the district court erred in denying her motion to certify that claim for class treatment was waived. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim for damages based on the theory of diminution in iPod value on the ground that it was barred by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for damages based on supracompetitive music prices; and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief where plaintiff's alleged inability to play her music freely was not an "antitrust injury" that affected competition and could, therefore, not serve as the basis for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Somers v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of shippers who paid rate-based fuel surcharges, filed an antitrust action alleging that freight railroads engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy. On interlocutory appeal, the freight railroads seek to undo class certification because separate trials were needed to distinguish the shippers the alleged conspiracy injured from those it did not. The court vacated the district court's class certification decision and remanded the case to permit the district court to reconsider its decision in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which clarified the law of class actions after the district court had certified the class. View "In re: Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

An agreement between American Express and merchants who accept American Express cards, requires that all of their disputes be resolved by arbitration and provides that there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” The merchants filed a class action, claiming that American Express violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable and that arbitration could not proceed because of prohibitive costs. The Circuit upheld its reversal on remand in light of a Supreme Court holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. The Supreme Court reversed. The FAA reflects an overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements even for claims alleging violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command. No contrary congressional command requires rejection of this waiver. Federal antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or indicate an intention to preclude waiver of class-action procedures. The fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. View "Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest." on Justia Law

Comcast and its subsidiaries allegedly “cluster” cable television operations within a region by swapping their systems outside the region for competitor systems inside the region. Plaintiffs filed a class-action antitrust suit, claiming that Comcast’s strategy lessens competition and leads to supra-competitive prices. The district court required them to show that the antitrust impact of the violation could be proved at trial through evidence common to the class and that damages were measurable on a classwide basis through a “common methodology.” The court accepted only one of four proposed theories of antitrust impact: that Comcast’s actions lessened competition from “overbuilders,” i.e., companies that build competing networks in areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. It certified the class, finding that the damages from overbuilder deterrence could be calculated on a classwide basis, even though plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that his regression model did not isolate damages resulting from any one of the theories. In affirming, the Third Circuit refused to consider Comcast’s argument that the model failed to attribute damages to overbuilder deterrence because doing so would require reaching the merits of claims at the class certification stage. The Supreme Court reversed: the class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The Third Circuit deviated from precedent in refusing to entertain arguments against a damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification. Under the proper standard for evaluating certification, plaintiffs’ model falls far short of establishing that damages can be measured classwide. The figure plaintiffs’ expert used was calculated assuming the validity of all four theories of antitrust impact initially advanced. Because the model cannot bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra¬competitive prices attributable to overbuilder deterrence, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class. View "Comcast Corp. v. Behrend" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated action sought relief on behalf of two large putative classes - one whose members bought auction rate securities and one whose members issued them - alleging that defendants triggered the market's collapse by conspiring with each other to simultaneously stop buying auction rate securities for their own proprietary accounts. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs' complaints did not successfully allege a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Although the court did not reach the district court's implied-repeal analysis under Credit Suisse Securities (USC) LLC v. Billing, the district court was ultimately correct that the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Antitrust class actions alleged that defendants conspired to set a price floor for baby products. The court initially approved a settlement. Notice was sent to putative class members informing them of their right to submit a claim, opt out, or object. The deadline for submitting claims expired; the court approved the settlement and an allocation plan. Defendants deposited $35,500,000 into a settlement fund. After payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses, the remainder was slated for distribution to the settlement class. Claimants are entitled to different levels of compensation. The remainder would go to charitable organizations proposed by the parties and selected by the court. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that cy pres distributions are permissible, but inferior to direct distributions to the class, because they only imperfectly serve the purpose of compensating class members. The district court did not adequately consider that about $14,000,000 will go to class counsel, roughly $3,000,000 will be distributed to class members, and the rest, approximately $18,500,000 less administrative expenses, will be distributed to cy pres recipients. The court also needs to consider the level of direct benefit to the class in calculating attorneys’ fees. View "In re: Baby Products Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five retail grocers, each attempting to bring class-action antitrust claims against one of two wholesale grocers, appealed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims from the putative class action. The court held that the non-signatory defendants could not use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims. Since the district court found the equitable estoppel issue dispositive, it did not address the successor-in-interest argument and therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider this argument in the first instance. The court concluded that the remaining public policy arguments were moot or the court declined to issue an advisory opinion. View "King Cole Foods, Inc., et al v. SuperValu, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

The class consists of chemical companies that purchase sulfuric acid as one of the inputs into their production of chemicals. The defendants own smelters that process nonferrous minerals such as nickel and copper. They also produce sulfuric acid and sell or sold it to the members of the class. The class was certified, but the suit, alleging violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, was dismissed on the merits. The district judge ruled that the case could not go to trial on a theory of per se liability. The plaintiffs could have gone to trial on a theory of liability under the rule of reason, but chose to appeal the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on how the defendants organized their operations. The court stated that: “ If there were no joint venture, there would still be no per se violation for there would still be the legitimate business reasons for the defendants to have cooperated.” View "In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

SanDisk allegedly controls the market for NAND flash memory, a computer chip that can be erased and reprogrammed that is widely used in consumer products such as digital cameras, mobile phones, and USB drives. Retailers purchase from SanDisk, the patentee, and its licensees. Ritz filed a class action, alleging that SanDisk violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2 by fraudulently procuring patents by failing to disclose prior art and making misrepresentations to the Patent and Trademark Office and established its monopoly by enforcing patents against competitors and by threatening competitors’ customers. SanDisk asserted that Ritz lacked standing to bring a Walker Process antitrust because Ritz faced no threat of an infringement action and had no other basis to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the patents. The district court rejected the argument, acknowledging that such claims normally are brought by competitors of the patentee as counterclaims in infringement actions, but noting that the Walker Process decision places no limitation on eligible plaintiffs. On interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed that a direct purchaser is not categorically precluded from bringing a Walker Process antitrust claim, even if it would not be entitled to seek declaratory relief against the patentee under the patent laws. View "Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. Sandisk Corp." on Justia Law

AdvancePCS is a prescription benefits manager for plans sponsored by employers, unions, and others and is retained to achieve savings by negotiating discounts from drug manufacturers, providing mail order service, contracting with retail pharmacies, and electronic processing and paying of claims. Plaintiffs are retail pharmacies that entered into agreements with AdvancePCS that include an agreed reimbursement rate and an arbitration clause. In 2003, plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that AdvancePCS engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with plan sponsors to restrain competition in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; that AdvancePCS used the economic power of its sponsors to reduce the contractual amount it pays below levels prevailing in a competitive marketplace; and that the agreements impose other limitations. For almost a year, AdvancePCS litigated without mentioning arbitration. After denial of a motion to dismiss and reconsideration, AdvancePCS filed an answer with affirmative defenses, then sought to compel arbitration. The court granted the motion. Plaintiffs did not initiate arbitration, but sought dismiss pending appeal. A different judge vacated the order compelling arbitration. The Third Circuit remanded with directions to reinstate the order compelling arbitration. On remand, a third judge granted dismissal. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate. View "In Re: Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law