The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel payment of attorneys' fees that they say should have been but were not paid as a result of PBGC doing too little to identify and make payments to class members. The court's de novo interpretation of the wrap-up agreement gave it no reason to question the district court's conclusion that PBGC fully performed notwithstanding class counsel's unsupported assertions to the contrary. The court also held that PBGC did not prevent class counsel's performance of the wrap-up agreement. In this case, the parties intended that the wrap-up would be complete within ten years. This ten year period was unambiguous and has expired. View "Collins v. PBGC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Apple, Inc. (Apple) is the defendant in a putative class action filed by plaintiffs and real parties in interest Anthony Shamrell and Daryl Rysdyk. In their operative complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Apple's iPhone 4, 4S, and 5 smartphones were sold with a defective power button that began to work intermittently or fail entirely during the life of the phones. Plaintiffs alleged Apple knew of the power button defects based on prerelease testing and postrelease field failure analyses, yet Apple began selling the phones and continued to sell the phones notwithstanding the defect. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification but expressly refused to apply Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal.4th 747 (2012) to the declarations submitted by plaintiffs' experts. The trial court believed it was not required to assess the soundness of the experts' materials and methodologies at this stage of the litigation. The Court of Appeals determined that belief was in error, and a prejudicial error. “Sargon applies to expert opinion evidence submitted in connection with a motion for class certification. A trial court may consider only admissible expert opinion evidence on class certification, and there is only one standard for admissibility of expert opinion evidence in California. Sargon describes that standard.” The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification and reconsider the motion under the governing legal standards, including Sargon. View "Apple Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this class action lawsuit, the court of appeal correctly relied on Eggert v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal. 2d, 199 (Cal. 1942) in ruling that unnamed class members may not appeal a class judgment, settlement, or attorney fees award unless they intervene in the action.In the instant case, Class Representatives alleged that Restoration Hardware, Inc. (RHI) committed violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI liable for violations of the Act and awarded Representatives attorney fees. Appellant, an unnamed class member who never exercised her right to intervene during the class action by filing a complaint in intervention, filed a notice of appeal, challenging the award of attorney fees. The court of appeal dismissing Muller’s appeal for lack of standing, concluding that it was bound to follow Eggert. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Muller failed to intervene in the class action or file a motion to vacate the judgment and offered no persuasive reason why the court should create an exception to its long-standing rule, or overrule or distinguish Eggert, Muller was not entitled to relief. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery initially found that Wal-Mart stockholders who were attempting to prosecute derivative claims in Delaware could no longer do so because a federal court in Arkansas had reached a final judgment on the issue of demand futility first, and the stockholders were adequately represented in that action. But the derivative plaintiffs in Delaware asserted that applying issue preclusion in this context violated their Due Process rights. The Delaware Supreme Court surmised this dispute implicated complex questions regarding the relationship among competing derivative plaintiffs (and whether they may be said to be in “privity” with one another); whether failure to seek board-level company documents renders a derivative plaintiff’s representation inadequate; policies underlying issue preclusion; and Delaware courts’ obligation to respect the judgments of other jurisdictions. The Delaware Chancellor reiterated that, under the present state of the law, the subsequent plaintiffs’ Due Process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, the Chancellor suggested that the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a rule that a judgment in a derivative action could not bind a corporation or other stockholders until the suit has survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss The Chancellor reasoned that such a rule would better protect derivative plaintiffs’ Due Process rights, even when they were adequately represented in the first action. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt the Chancellor’s recommendation and instead, affirmed the Original Opinion granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss because, under the governing federal law, there was no Due Process violation. View "California State Teachers' Retirement System, et al. v. Alvarez, et al." on Justia Law

QVMC is a full-service hospital. Lampe and McNair, QVMC nurses, filed suit, alleging: violation of Business and Professions Code 17200; violation of Labor Code sections 206, 218, 226, 510, 1194, and 1198; failure to pay meal break penalties under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; inaccurate wage statements under Labor Code section 226; violation of the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) under Labor Code sections 2698–2699; unpaid wages due to illegal rounding under Labor Code sections 218, 510, 1194, 1197 and 1198; and failure to provide meal breaks under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. They moved to certify an “overtime class” of employees who earned overtime bonuses where QVMC failed to properly calculate their regular rate of pay, and alternative work schedule employees who were asked to leave work between the eighth and twelfth hour of their shift and were not paid overtime wages; a “meal break” class with a subclass of all employees who signed meal break waivers; and a “wage statement” class to include any QVMC employee who received a pay stub. The court of appeal affirmed denial of certification, agreeing that individualized issues predominated and the claims could not be proven efficiently as a class. View "Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Saber, alleging that defendants failed to deliver contractually promised care and failed to comply with certain state law requirements. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court based on the forum selection clause in plaintiffs' contracts. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings and factual development on the question of whether all of the defendants were bound by the forum selection clause contained in the contracts executed by plaintiffs. In this case, although the plain language of the forum selection clause precluded removal, a question remains as to whether all of the defendants were alter egos or otherwise bound by the clause. View "Bartels v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief under Rule 29.15, holding that Appellant’s argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective was unavailing.Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, appellate counsel did not raise as points of error the trial court’s rejections of Appellant’s requested jury instructions. In his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, Appellant argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues. The motion court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellate counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient because appellate counsel did not fail to exercise the customary level of skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney. View "Meiners v. State" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of class certification in a nationwide class action settlement arising out of misstatements by Hyundai and Kia regarding the fuel efficiency of their vehicles. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a nationwide settlement class without conducting a rigorous predominance analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) to determine whether variations in state consumer protection laws, or individual factual questions regarding exposure to the misleading statements, precluded certification. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The panel clarified some principles of attorneys' fee approval for the district court on remand. View "In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation" on Justia Law

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014), did not undermine Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2008). In this case, Home Depot filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal the district court's order remanding to state court. The Fourth Circuit deferred ruling on the petition pending consideration of the merits of the appeal. The court held that the Supreme Court has not called into question Palisades's conclusion that an additional counter-defendant is not entitled to remove under 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) or 1453(b), nor has it abandoned Shamrock Oil’s definition of "defendant" in the class action context. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). The court held that Palisades applied to Home Depot. The court also held that the district court properly declined to realign the parties and correctly remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.. View "Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court denied class certification in a wage and hour suit challenging whether U.S. Bank properly classified its business banking officers (BBOs) as exempt employees under the outside salesperson exemption. The exemption applies to employees who spend more than 50 percent of their workday engaged in sales activities outside their employer’s place of business. The trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the case is manageable as a class action, stating that it had no evidence establishing uniformity in how BBOs spent their time, despite surveys conducted by the plaintiffs and other voluminous evidence. Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of ascertainability, numerosity, and adequacy of representation but failed to show common questions of law or fact predominated over individual issues, so class treatment was not superior to other means of resolving the claims. The court of appeal affirmed. A 2015 survey was unreliable for the purpose of showing that common issues would predominate at trial. The trial court properly focused on manageability issues pertaining to the affirmative defenses, while fully understanding plaintiffs’ theory of liability. View "Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law