In 2010, Hungarian survivors of the Holocaust filed a purported class action in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that in 1944 the Hungarian national railway transported Fischer and up to 500,000 other Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz and other concentration camps. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had neither exhausted remedies that may be available in Hungary nor established that the national railway is engaged in commercial activity in the U.S., as necessary to support the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. In 2016, Kellner, a member of the putative class, filed her own complaint against the Hungarian national railway in Budapest’s Capital Regional Court, which dismissed the case. In 2017, the district court received a “Motion to Reinstate” based on “class member” Kellner’s efforts to exhaust remedies in Hungary. The district court rejected the motion: [A]lthough there was a proposed class in this case and Kellner may have been a putative class member, … No class was certified …. Kellner ... is not a named party … and lacks any standing.” The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked authority to consider an appeal from a party not subject to the order sought to be challenged. View "Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the certification of a class composed of individuals whose payment card information was compromised as a result of the 2013 Target security breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's recertification of the class on remand, holding that the district court did not err in certifying the proposed class, which included both persons who suffered an actual financial loss and those who had not yet suffered a loss. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by including the costs of notice and administration expenses as a benefit to the class as a whole in calculating the total benefit to the class, and in finding that the settlement agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. Finally, the court affirmed the attorneys' fee award. View "Sciaroni v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Optometrists across the country noticed that Chase Amazon Visa credit card accounts had been fraudulently opened in their names, using correct social security numbers and birthdates. The victims discussed the thefts in Facebook groups dedicated to optometrists and determined that the only common source to which they had given their personal information was NBEO, where every graduating optometry student submits personal information to sit for board-certifying exams. NBEO released a Facebook statement that its “information systems [had] NOT been compromised.” Two days later, NBEO stated that it had decided to further investigate. Three weeks later, NBEO posted “a cryptic message stating its internal review was still ongoing.” NBEO advised the victims to “remain vigilant in checking their credit.” Victims filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated. These plaintiffs allege that they have already suffered actual harm in the form of identity theft and credit card fraud; they have been concretely injured by the use or attempted use of their personal information to open credit card accounts without their knowledge or approval. There is no need to speculate on whether substantial harm will occur. The complaints contain allegations demonstrating that it is both plausible and likely that a breach of NBEO’s database resulted in the fraudulent use of the plaintiffs’ personal information. View "Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc." on Justia Law

Optometrists across the country noticed that Chase Amazon Visa credit card accounts had been fraudulently opened in their names, using correct social security numbers and birthdates. The victims discussed the thefts in Facebook groups dedicated to optometrists and determined that the only common source to which they had given their personal information was NBEO, where every graduating optometry student submits personal information to sit for board-certifying exams. NBEO released a Facebook statement that its “information systems [had] NOT been compromised.” Two days later, NBEO stated that it had decided to further investigate. Three weeks later, NBEO posted “a cryptic message stating its internal review was still ongoing.” NBEO advised the victims to “remain vigilant in checking their credit.” Victims filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated. These plaintiffs allege that they have already suffered actual harm in the form of identity theft and credit card fraud; they have been concretely injured by the use or attempted use of their personal information to open credit card accounts without their knowledge or approval. There is no need to speculate on whether substantial harm will occur. The complaints contain allegations demonstrating that it is both plausible and likely that a breach of NBEO’s database resulted in the fraudulent use of the plaintiffs’ personal information. View "Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc." on Justia Law

Dean, an Agritech shareholder, filed a class-action complaint on February 11, 2011, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has a two-year statute of limitations and a five-year statute of repose, 28 U.S.C. 1658(b). The accrual date for the limitation period is February 3, 2011 and for the repose period, November 12, 2009. In May 2012, the district court denied class certification; the action settled and the suit was dismissed. On October 4, 2012, Dean’s counsel filed a new, timely, complaint (Smyth), with a new set of plaintiffs. Eight shareholders sought lead-plaintiff appointment but the district court again denied class certification. The Smyth plaintiffs settled their individual claims and dismissed their suit. Resh, who did not seek lead-plaintiff status in the earlier actions, filed a class action in 2014 after the statute of limitations expired. The Supreme Court’s 1974 “American Pipe” decision established that the timely filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for all persons encompassed by the class complaint and that members of a class that fails to gain certification can timely intervene as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending action and applies to putative class members who, after denial of class certification, “prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene.” The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and reinstated dismissal of Resh's suit. Upon denial of class certification, a putative class member may not, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or filing an individual action, commence a new class action after the limitations period. The “efficiency and economy of litigation” that support tolling of individual claims do not support maintenance of untimely successive class actions. View "China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh" on Justia Law

In July 2014, Allen‐Gregory filed a putative class action alleging that Fortville violated class members’ due process rights by terminating their water service without a hearing. Fortville revised its procedures, instituting a hearing process effective November 2014. In December 2014, the plaintiffs again sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the new procedures did not comport with due process. The parties agreed to a settlement. In September 2015, the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The settlement stated that its purpose was to “fully, finally, and forever resolve, discharge and settle all claims released herein on behalf of the named plaintiffs and the entire class.” It defined the class as “[a]ll customers of the Town of Fortville ... from July 9, 2012 through October 31, 2014 who had their water service terminated and who paid a reconnection fee,” and included an expansive, global release of all claims. Kilburn‐Winnie, a member of the class, received settlement proceeds. In November 2015, Kilburn‐Winnie filed this case alleging that Fortville disconnected her water service again for failure to timely pay her water bill in March and April of 2015 and that the hearing procedures implemented in November 2014 were so complicated and burdensome that they violated her procedural due process rights. The court granted Fortville summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; res judicata barred the claim because the parties settled a prior class action that involved the same claim. View "Kilburn-Winnie v. Town of Fortville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen Bushansky filed a shareholder derivative action on behalf of nominal defendant NantKwest, Inc. Based on a forum selection provision contained in NantKwest's certificate of incorporation, Delaware was designated as the forum for shareholder derivative actions, the trial court dismissed Bushansky's suit. Bushansky argued on appeal that the forum selection provision was never triggered since a condition precedent to its operation was never met: Delaware courts had personal jurisdiction over all indispensable parties named as defendants, and since Delaware courts lacked jurisdiction over one of the defendants at the time the action was filed in California, the condition was not met and, thus, the forum selection provision was not triggered. The California Court of Appeal found the provision, however, did not specify that personal jurisdiction had to be determined as of the date an action is filed and no later. "In fact, it is silent as to when personal jurisdiction in Delaware must exist. Faced with that silence, we - in accord with a well-established principle of contract law - presume that the parties intended a reasonable timeframe for the condition to be fulfilled." The Court found dismissal based on the forum selection clause was proper. View "Bushansky v. Soon-Shiong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Yvonne Reid and Serena Wong sued defendants the City of San Diego (City) and the San Diego Tourism Marketing District (TMD) in a putative class action complaint, challenging what they allege is "an illegal hotel tax." The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations and other grounds. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding some of the causes of action were time-barred and the remainder failed to state facts constituting a cause of action. View "Reid v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the district court’s denial of class certification on the basis that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) element of superiority.Plaintiff was terminated at the conclusion of her six-month probationary period due in part to concerns with her background check and credit report. Plaintiff sued the organization that performed the background check, asserting claims in her individual capacity, as well as a claim for class action. The district court determined that Plaintiff met the four rule 23(a) prerequisites but failed to meet her burden regarding the two rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion for class certification on grounds that she failed to satisfy the superiority requirement, and (2) therefore, there need be no discussion regarding the district court’s holding regarding the predominance requirement. View "Ascencio v. Orion International Corp." on Justia Law

Huff worked for Securitas, which hires employees to work as security guards, and contracts with clients to provide guards for a particular location. Securitas typically provides long-term placements. After Huff resigned, he sued Securitas, alleging a representative cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code, 2698) and citing Labor Code sections 201 [requiring immediate payment of wages upon termination of employment]; 201.3(b) [requiring temporary services employers to pay wages weekly]; 202 [requiring payment of wages within 72 hours of resignation]; and 204 [failure to pay all wages due for work performed in a pay period]. The trial court held that Huff was not a temporary services employee under section 201.3(b)(1), and, therefore, could not show he was affected by a violation and had no standing to pursue penalties under PAGA on behalf of others. The court of appeal affirmed the subsequent grant of a new trial. Under PAGA an “aggrieved employee” can pursue penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of others; the statute defines an aggrieved employee as having suffered “one or more of the alleged violations” of the Labor Code for which penalties are sought. Since Huff’s complaint alleged that another violation of the Labor Code (separate from the weekly pay requirement) affected him personally, the failure to establish a violation of the weekly pay requirement did not preclude his entire PAGA claim. View "Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc." on Justia Law