If a plaintiff would be entitled under a contract or statute to future attorneys' fees, such fees are at stake in the litigation and should be included in the amount in controversy. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order remanding this action to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that Swift failed to prove that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum or value of $5 million, as required for jurisdiction under CAFA. The panel held that defendants retained the burden of proving the amount of future attorney's fees by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the panel rejected plaintiff's contention that future attorneys' fees should not be included in the amount in controversy because they were inherently speculative. View "Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC" on Justia Law

A class action stemming from Southwest’s decision to stop honoring drink vouchers for “business select” customers settled with the customers receiving replacement vouchers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that 28 U.S.C. 1712, the Class Action Fairness Act, allowed the court to award class counsel (Siprut) attorney fees ($1,365,882) based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed vouchers. On remand, Siprut sought supplemental fees. For its work on the motion to amend the fee award and the prior appeal, The court called the number of hours requested “grossly excessive,” stating that counsel was trying to reach “some of the originally hoped‐for $3,000,000 that Southwest agreed not to oppose.” The court awarded $455,294 plus expenses, then vacated so that the class would receive notice. In exchange for dismissal of an appeal, by objector Markow, Siprut agreed to take $227,647 plus $3,529.68 in expenses; Southwest agreed to issue two additional vouchers for each one claimed. The court was notified that the number of vouchers claimed under the original settlement was less than one-third what the parties earlier indicated and approved the new settlement. Southwest distributed the vouchers and paid Siprut. Markow then unsuccessfully moved for $80,000 in attorney fees and an incentive award of $1,000 from Siprut’s fee award. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Unless the parties to a class action settlement, including objecting parties, expressly agree otherwise, settlement agreements should not be read to bar objectors from requesting fees for their efforts in adding value to a settlement. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Retired employees of the University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory claim that during their employment the University promised to provide them with University-sponsored group health insurance in their retirement, and this promise constituted an implied contract term that the University subsequently impaired. Those who retired before 2007 initially received University-sponsored group health insurance after their retirement, funded by the federal government as part of the University’s contract. In 2007, the federal government transferred the management and operation of Livermore to a private entity, LLNS, which transferred the retirees’ coverage to the LLNS plan. The retirees claimed the LLNS health plan “has significant disadvantages and no comparable new advantages, when compared with the University-provided retiree medical benefit plan,” After initially certifying a class of retirees, the trial court decertified the class. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erroneously assumed that each class member must prove their personal awareness of the offered retiree health benefits and that economic damages are a necessary element to an impairment claim. Retirees’ theory is that their loss of an entitlement to health insurance—since LLNS insurance can be terminated at any time—constitutes substantial impairment and this issue presents a common issue. View "Moen v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Wheelchair-using detainees sued Cook County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, based on purportedly inaccessible ramps and bathroom facilities at six county courthouses. The district court certified a class for purposes of injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs also sought damages individually for the same alleged violations. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable claims and entered a permanent injunction, finding that the defendants had violated the ADA. Relying largely on the same findings, the court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability in their personal damage actions, then submitted the question of individual damage awards to a jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The district court improperly relied on its own findings of fact when it granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their damage claims. When equitable and legal claims are joined in a single suit, common questions of fact should be tried first to a jury unless there are extraordinary circumstances or an unequivocal waiver by all parties of their jury trial rights. The court upheld the class certification. View "Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each received a letter from GC, a debt collector, notifying them that their credit-card accounts had been referred for collection. The letters contained the name and address of the original creditor and stated: [I]f you do dispute all or any portion of this debt within 30 days of receiving this letter, we will obtain verification of the debt from our client and send it to you. Or, if within 30 days of receiving this letter you request the name and address of the original creditor, we will provide it to you in the event it differs from our client, Synchrony Bank. Plaintiffs assert that the letters were deficient under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, in failing to inform Plaintiffs that GC was obligated to provide the additional debt and creditor information only if Plaintiffs disputed their debts in writing. Plaintiffs filed a purported class action. The court determined that GC’s letters created a “substantial” risk that consumers would waive important FDCPA protections by following GC’s deficient instructions, and certified a class of Kentucky and Nevada consumers, rejecting GC’s argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was not satisfied because Plaintiffs had not shown that each class member had standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that that the alleged FDCPA violations did not constitute harm sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing. Plaintiffs have Article III standing. View "Macy v. GC Services Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Camp Drug Store filed a proposed class action, alleging that Cochran Wholesale had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by faxing unsolicited advertisements to class members. The parties entered into early mediation and reached a settlement. Cochran would “make up to $700,000.00 available” but was not required to create a separate account to hold the funds or to deposit them with the court. Each class member could submit a claim for $125; if the value of the claims exceeded the total available funds, each timely claim would be subject to a pro‐rata reduction. Any funds that were not claimed by class members were to be kept by Cochran. Each representative plaintiff was entitled to an incentive award of $15,000, and class counsel was to be paid one-third of the Settlement Fund ($233,333.33). The total Cochran actually paid to claimants was $220,625.00. The court approved the settlement but reduced the proposed attorney fee to $73,468.13 and incentive awards to $1,000. Camp argued that the settlement created a common fund against which the reasonableness of the fee award should be assessed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the “common fund” argument.. Given the early stage at which the litigation settled, the reductions in the fee and incentive awards were not an abuse of discretion. View "Camp Drug Store, Inc. v. Cochran Wholesale Pharmaceutic, Inc." on Justia Law

In March 2016, soon after The Fresh Market (the “Company”) announced plans to go private, the Company publicly filed certain required disclosures under the federal securities laws. Given that the transaction involved a tender offer, the required disclosures included a Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 which articulated the Board’s reasons for recommending that stockholders accept the tender offer from an entity controlled by private equity firm Apollo Global Management LLC (“Apollo”) for $28.5 in cash per share. Apollo publicly filed a Schedule TO, which included its own narrative of the background to the transaction. The 14D-9 incorporated Apollo’s Schedule TO by reference. After reading these disclosures, as the tender offer was still pending, plaintiff-stockholder Elizabeth Morrison suspected the Company’s directors had breached their fiduciary duties in the course of the sale process, and she sought Company books and records pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The Company denied her request, and the tender offer closed as scheduled on April 21 with 68.2% of outstanding shares validly tendered. This case calls into question the integrity of a stockholder vote purported to qualify for “cleansing” pursuant to Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). In reversing the Court of Chancery's judgment in favor of the Company, the Delaware Supreme Court held "'partial and elliptical disclosures' cannot facilitate the protection of the business judgment rule under the Corwin doctrine." View "Morrison, et al. v. Berry, et al." on Justia Law

Disability rights advocates brought a proposed class action suit against Steak ’n Shake under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101, alleging they have personally experienced difficulty ambulating in their wheelchairs through two sloped parking facilities. They sought to sue on behalf of all physically disabled individuals who may have experienced similar difficulties at Steak ’n Shake restaurants throughout the country. The district court certified the proposed class. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, first holding that the plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring their claims in federal court. Although a mere procedural violation of the ADA does not qualify as an injury in fact under Article III, plaintiffs allege to have personally experienced concrete injuries as a result of ADA violations on at least two occasions. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that these injuries were caused by unlawful corporate policies that can be redressed with injunctive relief. However, the “extraordinarily broad class” certified by the district court violates the Rule 23(a)(1) requirement that the proposed class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” and Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” View "Mielo v. Steak N Shake Operations Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed a post-judgment order concluding that the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the stipulated class action settlement agreement MDHS entered into with plaintiffs. Determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal based on the collateral order doctrine, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that, under Minnesota contract law, the jurisdictional provision of the settlement agreement was ambiguous on its face. The court further held that the extrinsic evidence showed that the provision permitted the district court to extend its jurisdiction as it deemed just and equitable. View "Jensen v. Minnesota Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Objectors challenged the district court's order granting final approval of a class action settlement agreement between Remington and a class of members that alleged Remington rifles were susceptible to unintentional firing without a trigger pull. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the notice plan was adequate and satisfied the methods and mechanisms for disseminating notice set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. In this case, the notice of the settlement was adequate as the supplemental notice plan included a social media campaign, radio advertising, email notices, direct mailings and vendor posters. Furthermore, the low claim submission rate, while not ideal, was not necessarily indicative of a deficient notice plan. Finally, the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate where the record made plain that it followed meaningful discovery and investigation by class counsel and arm's length negotiations. View "Pollard v. Frost" on Justia Law