The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the class and the approval of the insurance class action settlement. The settlement agreement requires Banner to refund to class members a portion of the money they had paid, with a minimum of $100 per class member, and provides some nonmonetary benefits, with a total value of roughly $40 million.The court concluded that the Allen Trust's argument that the district court improperly placed upon it the burden of overcoming the settlement provides no basis for reversal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Dickman class met the requirements of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a); and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e)(2). View "1988 Trust For Allen Children v. Banner Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Objectors challenged the district court's judgment approving a class action settlement that includes Freddie Mac, with FHFA as its conservator, as a member of the plaintiff settlement class and enjoins FHFA from further pursuing Freddie Mac claims that were at issue in the action. The Second Circuit rejected FHFA's contention that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to treat FHFA or Freddie Mac as a member of the settlement class or to rule that conservatorship assets were within the scope of the settlement.However, the court concluded for other reasons that the district court's March 8, 2019 prejudgment ruling that FHFA is a member of the settlement class was erroneous. The court explained that the Settlement Class, as certified by the district court, consists of persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired interests in the NovaStar bonds "prior to May 21, 2008." However, because FHFA did not succeed to the interests of Freddie Mac until September 6, 2008, it acquired no interest in Freddie Mac's NovaStar bonds until that date. Therefore, FHFA is not a member of the Settlement Class and the court modified the judgment to reflect the court's ruling. View "N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. NovaStar Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's sua sponte remand and therefore denied the petition for permission to appeal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiffs, a group of current and former mobile homeowners and their homeowners' association, filed this action in Florida state court against numerous defendants, alleging violations of the Florida Antitrust Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. After removal to federal court, the district court sua sponte remanded back to state court, reasoning that federal-question jurisdiction no longer existed because the amended complaint asserted only state law claims and that CAFA did not provide jurisdiction because a claim brought in a representative capacity under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 "is not a class action, as that term is understood for CAFA jurisdiction."The court concluded that when a court sua sponte orders a remand, it is not "granting" its own "motion" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)—any more than it would be "denying" its own motion in the absence of such an order. Because the remand in this case was not ordered upon the motion of any party, the court concluded that section 1453(c)(1)'s exception does not apply here. View "Ruhlen v. Holiday Haven Homeowners, Inc." on Justia Law

The case arose when four Micron Technology, Inc. employees filed a class action complaint against Micron in 2019, asserting violations of the Idaho Wage Claim Act. At the time, Micron had in place a compensation plan called the Incentive Pay Plan (IPP), in which eligible employees could earn yearly bonuses based on a number of performance metrics. The Employees alleged that the bonuses they received on November 23, 2018, for Micron’s 2018 fiscal year should have been greater. Micron moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Employees’ complaint was time-barred by Idaho Code section 45-614. Micron argued that section 45-614’s six-month statute of limitations applied to the Employees’ complaint because they sought “additional wages,” as opposed to “unpaid wages.” The district court granted Micron’s motion for summary judgment. The Employees timely appealed, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations applied. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Manning v. Micron Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' putative class action, alleging that they were misled by claims made on packages of dog food manufactured and distributed by Champion. Because plaintiffs have not challenged the district court's determinations that they lacked standing to claim that Champion misrepresented that the dog food is BPA-free, the court did not reach the merits of their related arguments.In this case, plaintiffs were required to plausibly allege that because of defendant's affirmative misrepresentations or material omissions, their dog food packaging could deceive a reasonable consumer. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' omission-based claims because none of Champion's packaging statements are deceptive or misleading, and thus none require corrective disclosures. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Champion was required to disclose further information because of its special knowledge of material facts to which plaintiffs did not have access. The court stated that this duty to disclose based on special knowledge arises only in limited circumstances, which are not present in this case. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' breach of warranty and unjust enrichment claims are premised on the same allegations of deception that are insufficient to support the fraud claims, and thus they fail for the same reasons. View "Song v. Champion Petfoods USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Chris Williams was fined in Spokane Municipal Court for speeding in a school zone, an infraction captured by a traffic safety camera. Williams did not contest the infraction when it was issued, but before the Washington Supreme Court, he argued the camera was improperly positioned to photograph vehicles outside of the school zone. As a result, Williams contended that his infraction and the resulting municipal court judgment were invalid. Instead of moving to vacate the judgment in municipal court, Williams filed a putative class action complaint in superior court against the City of Spokane (City) and American Traffic Solutions Inc. (ATS), seeking a refund of his fine and declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Williams’s complaint had to be dismissed. The Supreme Court found that in accordance with court rules, statutes, and case law, Williams had to seek a refund of his infraction fine from the municipal court that issued the judgment. Until he did, Williams did not have standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Therefore, all of his claims were precluded. The Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded this case to the superior court for dismissal of Williams’s complaint. View "Williams v. City of Spokane" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a remand to state court and the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' class action suit alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by Experian. Plaintiffs alleged that the FCRA required Experian to disclose behavioral data from its "ConsumerView" marketing database, "soft inquiries" from third parties and affiliates, the identity of certain parties who procured consumer reports, and the date on which employment data was reported.The panel concluded that the allegations of injury to plaintiffs' informational and privacy interests as recited in the first amended complaint are sufficiently concrete to support Article III standing at this pleading stage. The panel also concluded that none of the information plaintiffs contend Experian failed to include in its section 1681g of the FCRA disclosures is subject to disclosure under section 1681g(a)(1), (3) or (5), considered individually or in combination. View "Tailford v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Darilyn Baker, individually and on behalf of a certified class, appealed an order denying her motion for a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of RW Enterprises, Inc. and Randy Westby. This case has been before the North Dakota Supreme Court three times. Prior to the Baker III decision, the district court dismissed Baker’s claims after finding the defendants did not violate disclosure requirements of the North Dakota Retail Installment Sales Act (“RISA”). Baker appealed. In Baker III, the Supreme Court concluded the retail installment contracts did not comply with RISA’s disclosure requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of a willful violation of RISA and the remedies available for noncompliance with the disclosure requirements. On remand, Baker filed a motion requesting the district court to approve a settlement with Autos, Inc., Robert Opperude, and James Hendershot, dismiss all claims under RISA, and grant summary judgment on the usury claim against RW Enterprises and Westby. The court approved the settlement but denied the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. At trial, Baker requested the jury be instructed on a partnership between the defendants. The district court declined to provide the partnership instruction, but provided an instruction on “acting in concert” in order for Baker to establish the defendants worked together. The jury found RW Enterprises and Westby did not violate RISA. By answering “no” to the RISA violation, the verdict form instructed the jury to stop answering other questions and return the form to the court. Had the jury found RW Enterprises and Westby in violation, the next question was whether the contract charged usurious interest and if so, what damages were suffered by the plaintiffs. Baker moved for a new trial arguing the district court provided an improper verdict form and jury instructions. The district court denied Baker’s motion. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Baker v. Autos, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

A group of pet owners brought a class action against Champion Petfoods USA, Inc., alleging representations on Champion’s packaging on its Acana and Orijen brands of dog food were false and misleading. Champion’s dog food packaging contained a number of claims about the product, advertising the food as “Biologically Appropriate,” “Trusted Everywhere,” using “Fresh and Regional Ingredients,” and containing “Ingredients We Love [From] People We Trust.” The district court dismissed the claims as either unactionable puffery or overly subjective and therefore not materially misleading to a reasonable consumer. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding Plaintiffs’ claims failed to allege materially false or misleading statements on Champion’s packaging because the phrases failed to deceive or mislead reasonable consumers on any material fact. View "Renfro, et al. v. Champion Petfoods USA, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Swift reached a settlement pertaining to class claims alleging violations of California labor law, and claims brought under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves “and other current or former employees.” Peck and Mares objected to the settlement agreement. The district court gave final approval of the settlement.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the PAGA settlement. Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he was not a party to the underlying PAGA action. Although Peck is a class member of the class action, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action. Objectors to a PAGA settlement are not “parties” to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class members are “parties” to a class action. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement did not make him a party. Although Peck has a separately-filed PAGA action, that does not make him a party to this PAGA case.The court vacated the approval of the class action settlement. The district court erred in applying a presumption that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation; the error was not harmless. That erroneous presumption cast a shadow on the entire order. On remand, the district court must make findings in accordance with the applicable heightened standard. View "Peck v. Swift Transportation Co." on Justia Law