Darilyn Baker, individually and on behalf of a certified class, appealed an order denying her motion for a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of RW Enterprises, Inc. and Randy Westby. This case has been before the North Dakota Supreme Court three times. Prior to the Baker III decision, the district court dismissed Baker’s claims after finding the defendants did not violate disclosure requirements of the North Dakota Retail Installment Sales Act (“RISA”). Baker appealed. In Baker III, the Supreme Court concluded the retail installment contracts did not comply with RISA’s disclosure requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of a willful violation of RISA and the remedies available for noncompliance with the disclosure requirements. On remand, Baker filed a motion requesting the district court to approve a settlement with Autos, Inc., Robert Opperude, and James Hendershot, dismiss all claims under RISA, and grant summary judgment on the usury claim against RW Enterprises and Westby. The court approved the settlement but denied the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. At trial, Baker requested the jury be instructed on a partnership between the defendants. The district court declined to provide the partnership instruction, but provided an instruction on “acting in concert” in order for Baker to establish the defendants worked together. The jury found RW Enterprises and Westby did not violate RISA. By answering “no” to the RISA violation, the verdict form instructed the jury to stop answering other questions and return the form to the court. Had the jury found RW Enterprises and Westby in violation, the next question was whether the contract charged usurious interest and if so, what damages were suffered by the plaintiffs. Baker moved for a new trial arguing the district court provided an improper verdict form and jury instructions. The district court denied Baker’s motion. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Baker v. Autos, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

A group of pet owners brought a class action against Champion Petfoods USA, Inc., alleging representations on Champion’s packaging on its Acana and Orijen brands of dog food were false and misleading. Champion’s dog food packaging contained a number of claims about the product, advertising the food as “Biologically Appropriate,” “Trusted Everywhere,” using “Fresh and Regional Ingredients,” and containing “Ingredients We Love [From] People We Trust.” The district court dismissed the claims as either unactionable puffery or overly subjective and therefore not materially misleading to a reasonable consumer. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding Plaintiffs’ claims failed to allege materially false or misleading statements on Champion’s packaging because the phrases failed to deceive or mislead reasonable consumers on any material fact. View "Renfro, et al. v. Champion Petfoods USA, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Swift reached a settlement pertaining to class claims alleging violations of California labor law, and claims brought under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves “and other current or former employees.” Peck and Mares objected to the settlement agreement. The district court gave final approval of the settlement.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the PAGA settlement. Peck may not appeal the PAGA settlement because he was not a party to the underlying PAGA action. Although Peck is a class member of the class action, a PAGA action is distinct from a class action. Objectors to a PAGA settlement are not “parties” to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class members are “parties” to a class action. The fact that Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement did not make him a party. Although Peck has a separately-filed PAGA action, that does not make him a party to this PAGA case.The court vacated the approval of the class action settlement. The district court erred in applying a presumption that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and the product of a non-collusive, arms-length negotiation; the error was not harmless. That erroneous presumption cast a shadow on the entire order. On remand, the district court must make findings in accordance with the applicable heightened standard. View "Peck v. Swift Transportation Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, whose vehicles had been “totaled,” sued Liberty, an auto insurer, and CCC, alleging that Liberty breached its contracts with its insureds and that both companies violated Washington’s unfair trade practices law and committed civil conspiracy. Liberty’s valuation method uses a report about the value of “comparable vehicles,” provided by CCC. To account for the difference between the average car owned by a private person and the cars for sale at dealerships, CCC reduces a totaled car’s valuation.The district court declined to certify a proposed class because individual questions predominated over common questions and individualized trials were superior to a class action. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Whether Liberty and CCC’s condition adjustment violates the Washington state regulations is a common question but to show liability for breach of contract or unfair trade practices, the plaintiffs must show an injury. Establishing an injury will require an individualized determination for each plaintiff; those individualized determinations predominate over the common questions. A class action here would involve adjudicating issues specific to each class member’s claim, and that would be unmanageable. Individual trials would be a better way to adjudicate those issues. View "Lara v. First National Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A class action claimed Nationstar violated consumer protection laws in servicing class members’ mortgage loans. Years later, the parties filed a notice of settlement. A magistrate granted preliminary approval. In order of priority, the parties proposed that the $3,000,000 settlement fund pay for administrative expenses up to $300,000, attorneys’ fees, a class representative award, and class claims. The settlement proposed notice by Email, Postcard, and Longform. The Email and Postcard Notice informed class members of the amount of the settlement, how to submit a claim, how to opt-out of the class, and where to find the Longform Notice. The Longform Notice explained the attorneys’ fee arrangement. The notices did not estimate each class member's recovery. Nationstar agreed not to oppose class counsel’s fee request up to $1,300,000. Class counsel submitted records that supported $1,261,547.50 in fees and $217,657.26 in unreimbursed expenses but requested only $1,300,000. The value of a class member’s claim is determined by a points system based on Nationstar’s treatment of their account and the class member’s expenses.An absent class member, having sued Nationstar in California state court, objected to the settlement, arguing that the notice was insufficient; the settlement was unfair and inadequate; the release was unconstitutionally overbroad; and the attorneys’ fee award was improper. The magistrate overruled those objections. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that over 97% of the nearly 350,000 class members received notice and the low opt-out rate. View "McAdams v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Raymond and Michelle Plata were property owners in the City of San Jose and customers of Muni Water. Muni Water’s annual budget was reflected each year in a document called a source and use of funds statement, which was part of the City’s annual operating budget. In 2013, the Platas filed with the City a claim pursuant to Government Code sections 910 and 910.2, accusing Muni Water of violating Proposition 218 ab initio by collecting money from customers and illegally transferring it to the City’s own general fund. The City rejected the claim, so in early 2014, the Platas brought a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City under Proposition 218, as well as recovery of the amounts overpaid. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision finding: (1) the late fees charged by Muni Water were not a fee or charge covered by Proposition 218; (2) any claims accruing prior to November 4, 2012 were time-barred because of the statute of limitations provided under Government Code section 911.2, and there was no basis for applying any equitable tolling doctrine; (3) as for tiered water rates, the discussion of high rates in the Platas’ government claims adequate to gave notice to the City that its rate structure was being questioned; and (4) “[a] more significant complication” raised by the City in its class decertification motion. The tiered rate structure would impact different class members differently from month to month, thus making it potentially “impossible” to draw a “line between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on monthly water consumption[.]” The court granted the City’s motion to decertify the class, and refused to grant the Platas any relief as to their tiered rate argument. The Platas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed judgment only as to the trial court’s findings on the tiered rate structure. In all other respects, it was affirmed. View "Plata v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

About 100 Pennsylvania landowners filed a class-action complaint, alleging that EQT has been storing natural gas in six separate storage fields, thereby utilizing the landowners’ underground pore space without providing them compensation. Months later, all landowners except for Laudato voluntarily dismissed their claims without prejudice. Laudato later moved for class certification, seeking approval of a class of: All persons and/or entities that own and/or owned real property—and/or natural gas storage rights to real property—located within the certificated boundaries of one or more of the Gas Storage Fields for any period of time, not before Defendants’ inception of the respective gas. The district court, exercising federal-question jurisdiction over claims under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–17z, agreed to class certification but rejected Laudato’s proposed class definition, refusing to grant other downstream requests such as the appointment of a class representative, the appointment of class counsel, and certain issues’ certification. The court directed the parties to meet and confer “regarding the establishment of an appropriate class definition.”The Third Circuit granted a petition for review, holding that because the order clearly implicates Rule 23(f), it had jurisdiction and that interlocutory review was appropriate. View "Laudato v. EQT Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this petition for review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming a circuit court order that certified a class and appointed Timothy Rave as class representative, holding that this case was moot.In the underlying action, Rave alleged that SVA Healthcare Services, LLC (SVA), a medical records vendor, improperly charged him and others similarly situated a fee for copies of medical records that exceeded the fee restrictions set forth in Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f)(b). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in granting Rave's motion for class certification. In Townsend v. ChartSwap, LL, 967 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2021), the Supreme Court held that fee restrictions in section 146.83(3f)(b) apply only to "health care providers" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. 146.81(1). Following the issuance of Townsend, Rave filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Townsend rendered this matter moot because no evidence showed that SVA met the definition of a health care provider in section 146.81(1). View "Rave v. SVA Healthcare Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's award of fees to class counsel in a class action settlement involving consumers who purchased defective toilet tanks against defendants. The court agreed with Porcelana that the district court erred in calculating the lodestar and refusing to decrease it. In this case, the district court abused its discretion by failing to make any factual findings regarding the nature of the class's unsuccessful claims and an unsupported assertion is insufficient to permit the district court to bypass the proper lodestar calculation and only consider the unsuccessful claims under the eighth Johnson factor. Nor is this a case where the record supports such a conclusion in the absence of an explicit finding by the district court. Even assuming the district court had adequately supported its conclusion that unsuccessful claims were intertwined with those that proved successful, the court stated that the district court still failed to properly analyze the award in relation to the results obtained. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fessler v. Porcelana Corona de Mexico, S.A. de C.V." on Justia Law

Simpson unsuccessfully applied to work as a Correctional Officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections four times in 2014-2017. Simpson believed the hiring practices underlying those rejections violated his rights—and those of other unsuccessful Black applicants—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Invoking disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Simpson’s class action complaint alleged that, through the use of a five-step hiring process for correctional officers, the Department both intended to discriminate against Black applicants and succeeded in producing that result. The district court denied Simpson’s motion for class certification, finding that none of his proposed classes—a general class of all unsuccessful applicants and five subclasses of candidates dismissed at each step of the hiring process—satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that they present “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis apparently merged Simpson’s disparate impact claims with his disparate treatment claims for intentional discrimination. While disparate treatment claims may require a more searching commonality inquiry, disparate impact claims most often will not: the common questions are whether the challenged policy has in fact disparately impacted the plaintiff class and, if so, whether that disparate impact is justified by business necessity. The court did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify three of Simpson’s disparate impact subclasses. View "Simpson v. Dart" on Justia Law