Appellee-defendant TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC (“TEP”) operated wells that produced natural gas in Colorado. These wells were subject to various leases or royalty Appellant-intervenors Ivo Lindauer, Sidney Lindauer, Ruther Lindauer, and Diamond Minerals LLC (the “Lindauers” or the “Intervenors”), were the representatives for a class of royalty owners who filed suit in 2006 in Colorado state court, alleging that TEP had underpaid royalties on various leases and royalty agreements. In 2008, TEP and the Lindauer class entered into a settlement agreement (the “Lindauer SA”) purporting to “resolve all class claims relating to past calculation of royalt[ies]” and to “establish certain rules to govern future royalty” payments. The Lindauer SA declared that the state court would retain “continuing jurisdiction” to enforce provisions of the settlement related to “the description of past and future royalty methodologies.” Approximately eight years passed, free of incident. But on July 18, 2017, a subset of the Lindauer class (the “Sefcovic class”) initiated this action against TEP in Colorado state court, alleging that TEP had calculated and paid royalties in a manner inconsistent with the Lindauer SA and contrary to the underlying royalty agreements. TEP removed the case to federal court. Appellants intervened in the district court, seeking to dismiss the action for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Through two separate motions to dismiss, the briefing from both parties "confused the bounds of federal subject matter jurisdiction and conflated that concept with the doctrines of abstention and comity, and with matters of venue and forum." Despite this misdirection, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction and rebuffed appellants’ attempts to unwind nearly eighteen months of class action litigation. After review, the Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court's judgment and affirmed it. View "Elna Sefcovic v. TEP Rocky Mountain" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and 229 former workers at the Grede Foundry filed suit against ten entities that manufactured, sold, supplied, and distributed the products they believe harmed them. After defendants removed the case to federal court, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that the local event exception to the Class Action Fairness Act's grant of federal jurisdiction applies to any continuing set of circumstances in a single location, regardless of when and how the harm came about. The court held that "an event or occurrence" refers to a series of connected, harm-causing incidents that culminate in one event or occurrence giving rise to plaintiffs' claims. In this case, the complaint does not allege a continuous, related course of conduct culminating in one harm-causing event or occurrence, and thus it does not fall within the local event exception. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc." on Justia Law

John H. Donboli, JL Sean Slattery, and Del Mar Law Group LLP (collectively the Del Mar Attorneys) filed a mislabeling lawsuit on behalf of a putative class of consumers who claimed they were misled by "Made in the U.S.A." labels on designer jeans manufactured by Citizens of Humanity (Citizens). Citizens's jeans were allegedly made with imported fabrics and other components. The focus of the purported class action was that the "Made in the U.S.A." labels violated former Business and Professions Code section 17533.7. However, a new law was passed after the complaint was filed that relaxed the previous restrictions and, ultimately, the lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. Citizens then filed this malicious prosecution action against the named plaintiff in the prior case (Coni Hass), a predecessor plaintiff (Louise Clark), and the Del Mar Attorneys. Each defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Finding that Citizens met its burden to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, the trial court denied defendants' motions. Appellants Hass and the Del Mar Attorneys appealed, contending Citizens failed to make a prima facie showing that it would prevail on its claims. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding: (1) there were no undisputed fact on which it could determine, as a matter of law, whether the Del Mar Attorneys and Clark had probable cause to pursue the underlying actions; (2) there was evidence which would have supported a reasonable inference the Appellants were pursuing the litigation against Citizens with an improper purpose; and (3) the district court's dismissal of the underlying action, with prejudice, constituted a favorable termination in the context of a malicious prosecution suit. View "Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass" on Justia Law

Bennett was assigned to Cook County Jail Division 10, which houses detainees who need canes, crutches, or walkers. He filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–34, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794, alleging that Division 10 lacks grab bars and other necessary fixtures. Bennett claims that he fell and was injured. He unsuccessfully sought to represent a class. The court reasoned that the appropriate accommodation of any detainee’s situation depends on personal characteristics, so common questions do not predominate under FRCP 23(b)(3). Bennett proposed an alternative class to avoid person-specific questions, contending that Division 10, which was constructed in 1992, violates 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)'s requirement that as of “1988 … construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. The Standards require accessible toilets to have grab bars nearby and accessible showers to have mounted seats. The district court rejected this proposal, reasoning that to determine whether the Structural Standards control, thereby mooting the reasonable accommodation inquiry, would require a ruling on the merits, which would “run[] afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The "view that a class cannot be certified unless the plaintiff has already prevailed on the central legal issue is a formula for one-way intervention rather than a means to avoid it." Bennett proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply and were violated, to detainees’ detriment and otherwise will lose. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that defendants deceived plaintiffs into believing their products were approved by the FDA. After the district court remanded the case back to state court, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants' petition for review under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1), limiting review to the issue of federal question jurisdiction.The court held that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case, because plaintiffs rely explicitly on federal law throughout their pleadings and their prayer for relief invokes federal jurisdiction where it seeks injunctive and declaratory relief that necessarily requires the interpretation and application of federal law, including the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint and relief sought, the court found that a federal issue surrounding the state law claims is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Gabriel Montoya bought a 2003 Ford Excursion in April 2003. A jury found that as of November 30, 2005, he knew it was a lemon. The statute of limitations for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability was four years. Montoya didn’t sue Ford for another seven-and-one-half years, waiting until June 2013. Yet he was able to obtain a judgment against Ford of almost $59,000 for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. This was roughly an $8,000 return over what he had originally paid for the vehicle 10 years earlier. This was possible because there were two periods during which the statute of limitations was tolled while separate national class actions were pending against Ford, both of which were applied to Montoya’s case. The Court of Appeal determined a second class action filed in this case did not toll Montoya's claim. "The four-year statute of limitations therefore expired no later than 2010. He sued in 2013. His claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was therefore untimely presented." View "Montoya v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Mussat, an Illinois professional services corporation, received unsolicited faxes from IQVIA, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Pennsylvania. These faxes failed to include the required opt-out notice. Mussat brought a putative class action in Illinois under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, on behalf of itself and all persons in the country who had received similar junk faxes from IQVIA in the four previous years. The district court granted IQVIA's motion to strike the class definition, reasoning that under the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Bristol-Myers” holding, not just the named plaintiff, but also the unnamed class members, each had to show minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Because IQVIA is not subject to general jurisdiction in Illinois, the court turned to specific jurisdiction and found that it had no jurisdiction over the claims of parties who were harmed outside of Illinois.The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Bristol-Myers does not apply to the case of a nationwide class action filed in federal court under a federal statute. Bristol-Myers did not reach the question of whether, in a Rule 23 class action, each unnamed class member must separately establish specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In such an action the lead plaintiffs earn the right to represent the interests of absent class members by satisfying Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) criteria. Absent class members are not full parties to the case for many purposes. View "Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc." on Justia Law

Objectors filed consolidated appeals from the district court's order approving a class action settlement and order awarding attorney's fees to class counsel. The settlement approval order arose from two MDL proceedings related to Lumber Liquidator's sale of allegedly dangerous and defective laminate flooring.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the settlement approval order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the settlement was fair and adequate and, at bottom, the order thoughtfully assessed what the class members would give up in the proposed settlement and then explained why the tradeoff embodied in the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. However, the court vacated the attorney's fee order, because the district court erred by failing to apply to the store vouchers the "coupon" settlement provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions. View "Cantu-Guerrero v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc." on Justia Law

Current and former Whole Foods employees initiated this diversity action seeking to recover purportedly lost wages, alleging that Whole Foods manipulated its incentive-based bonus program, resulting in employees losing wages otherwise owed to them. In the not yet certified class action, Whole Foods moved to dismiss all nonresident putative class members for lack of personal jurisdiction.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Whole Foods' motion to dismiss, on alternative grounds, holding that putative class members -- absent class certification -- are not parties before a court and thus Whole Foods' motion was premature. The court wrote that, only after the putative class members are added to the action, should the district court entertain Whole Foods' motion to dismiss the non-named class members. Finally, the court held that Whole Foods' remaining arguments were without merit. View "Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court certifying a settlement class and approving a settlement reached by the parties with respect to that class, holding that the circuit court erred in approving the proposed settlement.The class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of 100 individuals who had assigned structured settlement annuity benefits they were entitled to receive from certain tortfeasors to Petitioner or its affiliates or designees based on allegations that the assignments were the product of fraud. Ultimately, the circuit court approved the proposed settlement. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment below and concluded that the circuit court erred in approving the proposed settlement under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Linton v. Consumer Protection Division" on Justia Law