The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiffs' motion to certify three classes for a class action lawsuit, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs were former tenants of residential apartments owned and managed by Defendant. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act. Plaintiffs moved to certify three class of certain fellow tenants, and the trial court granted the motion as to all three classes. Defendant appealed, pointing to three alleged errors in the trial court's class certification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the three classes for a class action lawsuit. View "McMillan v. Blue Ridge Cos." on Justia Law

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) asked the Southern District of Indiana to oversee a multidistrict litigation docket to coordinate discovery and other pretrial proceedings in thousands of medical product-liability suits, alleging that Cook’s inferior vena cava (IVC) filters were defective. The court and the parties agreed to a procedure by which new plaintiffs could join the MDL by filing directly in the Southern District of Indiana rather than filing in their home districts and waiting for the judiciary’s administrative machinery to transfer their cases to the MDL in Indiana. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuits directly in the Indiana MDL rather than filing in the states where they lived and had their IVC filters implanted.Cook moved to dismiss both cases based on Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The plaintiffs’ home states (South Carolina and Mississippi) have three-year statutes. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suits. The unique facts of this case indicate that Cook implicitly consented to using choice-of-law rules for these plaintiffs as if they had filed in their home states. It was not fair to allow Cook to change positions retroactively to dismiss these plaintiffs’ cases that had been timely filed under the “law of the case.” View "Looper v. Cook Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2018, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated persons against Defendants RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC, Little Giant Farmers Market Corporation, Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., River City Capital, LLC, and River City Capital Property Management, LLC for negligence, premises liability, false imprisonment, conversion, and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Plaintiff claimed that Defendants “hired, authorized, or otherwise provided material support to” third parties that immobilized vehicles located on Defendants’ property with boots or similar devices, and required the owners or operators of the vehicles to pay a fee in order to have the immobilizing devices removed. Plaintiff moved to certify the action on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated persons, claiming that between February 2013 and 2018, at least 250 persons “have been booted and have paid a fine for removal of said device” at the Wesley Chapel Lot. Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion, certifying the class. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether there was a common-law right that permits private property owners to immobilize vehicles that were not authorized to be on their property. The Court concluded that the common-law rights the defendants alluded to in the courts below – namely, the right to remove trespassing vehicles and an alleged right to impound trespassing vehicles – did not apply to the defendants’ vehicle immobilization practice. However, because the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “the trial court did not err in finding no common law right to immobilize a vehicle absent an enabling statute or ordinance,” and any reliance on that conclusion in affirming the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff Forrest Allen’s motion for class certification, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with direction to remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the proposed class. View "RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC et al. v. Allen, et al." on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Eight named plaintiffs, including two minors, brought a nationwide putative class action against e-commerce provider StockX for allegedly failing to protect millions of StockX users’ personal account information obtained through a cyber-attack in May 2019. Since 2015, StockX’s terms of service included an arbitration agreement, a delegation provision, a class action waiver, and instructions for how to opt-out of the arbitration agreement. Since 2017, StockX's website has stated: StockX may change these Terms without notice to you. “YOUR CONTINUED USE OF THE SITE AFTER WE CHANGE THESE TERMS CONSTITUTES YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHANGES. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO ANY CHANGES, YOU MUST CANCEL YOUR ACCOUNT.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit and an order compelling arbitration. The court rejected arguments that there is an issue of fact as to whether four of the plaintiffs agreed to the current terms of service and that the defenses of infancy and unconscionability render the terms of service and the arbitration agreement (including the delegation provision) invalid and unenforceable. The arbitrator must decide in the first instance whether the defenses of infancy and unconscionability allow plaintiffs to avoid arbitrating the merits of their claims. View "I. C. v. StockX, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiff's motion for class-action certification in her suit against Defendant, a car dealership, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion.Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Defendant alleging that the "mandatory notice of private or public sale" sent by Defendant repossessing Plaintiff's vehicle and informing her that the vehicle would be sold at a public sale failed to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code and Arkansas law and that the accrued interest rate was unlawful. The circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification without holding a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to certify the class based on the record before it. View "Rivera-Ceren v. Presidential Limousine & Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

A class of Louisiana medical providers sued Louisiana Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) in Louisiana state court, alleging that the PPOs violated the Louisiana PPO Act by discounting their bills without prior notice. After receiving class certification, the Class settled with all of the Louisiana defendants except Med-Comp; CorVel (Homeland’s insured) assigned to the Class its claims against Homeland. The assignment did not initially include the bad faith claim CorVel was pursuing against Homeland in Delaware. The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that the claim was time-barred. CorVel then assigned all of its claims against Homeland to the Class. The Class amended its complaint against MedComp in Louisiana state court to assert the bad faith claim against Homeland.The litigation then consisted of the Class's state law PPO Act claims against one non-diverse defendant (Med-Comp) and a state law bad faith claim as an assignee against one diverse defendant (Homeland). Homeland removed the case to federal court. The district court remanded the PPO Act claims against Med-Comp to state court and dismissed the bad faith claims as barred by the Delaware judgment.The Fifth Circuit reversed in part. The district court lacked jurisdiction because a non-diverse defendant remained from the original lawsuit. Med-Comp was not improperly joined because the Class has a possibility of recovery against Med-Comp (a non-diverse defendant) on the PPO Act claims. The court remanded with instructions to remand the entire case to state court. View "Williams v. Homeland Insurance Co. of New York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing an order granting class certification in the underlying civil action filed by Respondents, holding that class certification was improperly granted.The underlying suit arose after an employee of Petitioners - three hospitals, misappropriated the private information of certain patients from Petitioners' medical records during the course of performing her authorized job duties. Respondents - Deborah Welch and Eugene Roman - successfully certified a class of approximately 7,445 individuals. The Supreme Court granted this petition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order granting class certification, holding (1) Welch lacked standing because she suffered no injury-in-fact; and (2) as to Roman and the subclass of 109 individuals he represented, the prerequisites to class certification were not met. View "State ex rel. W. Va. University Hospitals--East, Inc. v. Honorable Hammer" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting two summary judgment motions in favor of Defendants in this class action lawsuit, holding that Defendants' actions in this case could not support a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).In granting the two summary judgment motions at issue, one filed on behalf of all Defendants and on filed behalf of certain Defendants, the district court adopted the findings of law of the Court of Appeals of Puerto Rico in Collazo Burgos v. La Asociación de Suscripción Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio, No. K AC2010-0179, 2017 WL 6884428 (P.R. Cir. Nov. 30, 2017). The court further held that Defendants' actions were required under Puerto Rico law and thus could not support a RICO claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did err under the Erie doctrine in adopting the reasoning of the court of appeals in Collazo Burgos. View "Torres-Ronda v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The appellants were two of a group of plaintiffs who sued eBay and PayPal, challenging provisions in their respective user agreements. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleged 23 causes of action, 13 against eBay, seven against PayPal, and three against both defendants. The trial court dismissed, without leave to amend, 20 of the causes of action, including 14 claims against eBay. Three causes of action proceeded: breach of contract against both defendants and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against eBay. More than three years later, the appellants opted out of the case against eBay, and voluntarily dismissed the two claims against it. Judgment of dismissal was entered against them.The appellants appealed, contending the trial court got it wrong as to 11 of the dismissed causes of action. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that this was the third appeal of the case. The trial court properly dismissed the claims and did not abuse its discretion in doing so without leave to amend. All of the alleged causes of action failed to state a claim. The court stated that “counsel for appellants has apparently been urging the same contentions for some nine years, all without success. This is enough.” View "George v. eBay, Inc." on Justia Law