In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the County Sheriff’s Office did not release him. Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained in detention. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. "In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory language waiving immunity for 'claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted' and who 'can show injury due to negligence' sets a floor, not a ceiling. To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we cannot countenance." Accordingly, the judgment of the division below was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

In this second appeal in a class action case alleging a breach of the implied duty to market gas and underpaid royalties the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying a class's motion to amend its petition and granting partial summary judgment for Oil Producers Inc. of Kansas (OPIK) on the class's breach of duty to market gas as it related to the marketable condition rule, holding that there was no error.In the first appeal in this case, the Supreme Court listed the conditions under which a well operator may satisfy its duty to market raw gas production. On remand, the class of royalty owners moved to amend the petition to clarify that its original claim of breach of implied duty to market implicated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court denied the motion and granted summary judgment for OPIK. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law of the case doctrine precluded thecClass from relitigating its claim that OPIK breached its implied duty of faith and fair dealing as alleged in the motion to amend the petition; (2) the class was not entitled to prejudgment interest; and (3) the lower courts appropriately denied OPIK's statute of limitations defense to the class's conservation fee claim. View "L. Ruth Fawcett Trust v. Oil Producers Inc. of Kansas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against air conditioner manufacturer Carrier Corporation alleging that his air conditioner was defective, asserting state law claims and a federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") claim. The court reasoned that although the MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000. At issue is whether attorneys’ fees count toward the MMWA’s amount in controversy requirement.The panel held that attorneys’ fees are not “costs” within the meaning of MMWA, and therefore they may be included in the amount in controversy if they are available to prevail plaintiffs pursuant to state fee-shifting statutes.The panel next considered whether Plaintiff could include attorneys’ fees toward the MMWA’s $50,000 jurisdictional threshold. Plaintiff’s MMWA claim was premised on Carrier’s alleged breach of express and implied warranties pursuant to Michigan law. Neither of these statutes grants a prevailing plaintiff attorneys’ fees. The court found that even if this claim was included in his lawsuit, the Act makes clear that attorneys’ fees are not available in a class action. Thus, because Plaintiff brought this claim as part of a putative class action, he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under state law. View "NICHOLAS SHONER V. CARRIER CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order granting class certification in this action brought by Letha's Pies, LLC and Rhonda and Timothy Glenn, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, Letha's Pies), for alleged violations of the Arkansas Securities Act, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to enforce a class-action waiver.Letha's Pies entered into a merchant agreement to sell Funding Metrics, LLC $21,900 of Letha's Pies' future receivables in exchange for an immediate payment of $15,000 by Funding Metrics. The agreement contained a class-action waiver provision. Letha's Pies subsequently brought a class-action complaint claiming that Funding Metrics promoted and sold securities in violation of Arkansas law. Funding Metrics moved to dismiss based on the class-action waiver. The circuit court denied the request, finding that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation. The circuit court then certified two classes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to enforce the class-action waiver in the merchant agreement as a bar to class certification. View "Funding Metrics, LLC v. Letha's Pies, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought Title IX claims for failure to provide equal treatment and benefits, failure to provide equal opportunities to male and female athletes, and retaliation against female athletes when they brought up Title IX compliance to high school administrators. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, finding that they failed to meet the numerosity requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).The Ninth Circuit reversed. Rule 23(a)(1) requires a party seeking class certification to prove that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” The proposed class of plaintiffs at the time of filing exceeded 300. Additionally, the district court failed to consider the future students who also fell within the class. To satisfy the numerosity element of Rule 23(a) Plaintiffs do not need to show that the joinder of all possible class members is impossible, only that it is impracticable. The court also found Plaintiffs’ other claims met Rule 23(a)’s requirements, remanding the case for the district court to determine whether Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(b). View "A. B. V. HAWAII STATE DEPT OF EDUC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class-action lawsuit alleging that SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The parties reached a settlement agreement. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), SC Data moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff first alleged that SC Data took an adverse employment action based on her consumer report without first showing her the report. The court reasoned that the right to pre-action explanation to the employer is not unambiguously stated in the statute’s text. Next, the plaintiff asserts that SC Data obtained her consumer report without first obtaining an FCRA compliant disclosure form. The court found that plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure. Finally, the plaintiff’s last claim asserts that she did not authorize SC Data to obtain a consumer report. She did authorize a company to conduct a criminal background search. The court found that plaintiff has not pleaded any facts demonstrating concrete harm—a prerequisite for Article III standing. As such, she lacks standing to pursue her failure-to-authorize claim. The court vacated the district court's orders. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered two questions of law concerning the authority of counsel or the courts to protect the interests of putative class members when the named plaintiff has died, no party has been substituted for the named plaintiff and no motion has been made to certify the putative class.Charles Kingara brought this lawsuit alleging both class and individual causes of action arising under the wage act, the minimum fair wage law, and the overtime law. Before Kingara's counsel had filed for class certification Kingara died. Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to order notice to putative class members informing them of Kingara's death and inviting them to join the action. After the motion was granted, Defendants filed a petition for interlocutory relief, which resulted in the questions of law before this Court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the circumstances, counsel had no authority to act on behalf of Kingara or the putative class, but the courts may act to protect the interests of the putative class members when those individuals would face significant prejudice without notice. View "Kingara v. Secure Home Health Care Inc." on Justia Law

After determining that it has appellate jurisdiction and that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's remand of a putative class action to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), concluding that the district court erroneously applied the local controversy exception. The court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are Florida citizens. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Simring v. GreenSky, LLC" on Justia Law

Gorss operated a Super 8 Motel as a franchisee of Wyndham. Gorss agreed to furnish the facility in accordance with Wyndham’s standards and to purchase supplies and equipment from approved vendors. Brigadoon sells fitness equipment and is an approved vendor for Wyndham franchisees. Wyndham periodically provided contact information for its franchisees, including fax numbers, to Brigadoon. Gorss also attended trade shows and personally provided contact information to Wyndham-approved suppliers. Gorss received a fax from Brigadoon advertising its fitness equipment. The fax was sent to more than 10,000 recipients. Brigadoon formulated the list of recipients from a variety of sources.Gorss filed a purported class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(c), seeking statutory penalties. The district court declined to certify a class, finding that common issues did not predominate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Gorss’s argument that the court should have required Brigadoon to show with specific evidence that a significant percentage of the class is subject to the “prior permission” defense. Gorss offered no generalized class-wide manner to resolve the permission question. Brigadoon’s claim of permission was not speculative, vague, or unsupported; it was based on a multitude of contracts, relationships, memberships, and personal contacts. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were employees at three separate carpet manufacturing facilities operated by defendant Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (Royalty), also known as Royalty Carpet Mills, LLC. They alleged representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), and class claims primarily based on purported meal and rest period violations. They sought premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7 for these violations and asserted derivative claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties, among others. The trial court initially certified two classes: one for employees that worked at a facility in Porterville (the Porterville class) and another for employees that worked in two separate facilities in Orange County (the Dyer/Derian class). Following the presentation of evidence at trial, the court decertified the Dyer/Derian class and entered judgment. The results were mixed and both sides appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with three of Plaintiffs' six contentions: the court erred in failing to apply the relation back doctrine, in decertifying the Dyer/Derian class, and dismissing the PAGA claims as unmanageable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc." on Justia Law