This case arose when plaintiff filed suit seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at JCS restaurants in California on claims they had been misclassified as exempt employees and were entitled to overtime pay. The trial court subsequently permitted additional plaintiffs to join the lawsuit. The trial court denied class certification based on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that their claims were typical of the class, they could represent the class, common questions predominated the claims, and a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. The court concluded, however, that the class is adequately represented by plaintiffs and these claims are typical of the class; the trial court failed to adequately assess the means by which plaintiffs' theory of recovery could be proved through resolution of common questions of fact and law; the trial court must reconsider whether class certification provides a superior method of resolving plaintiffs' claim, and therefore, the court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings" on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, filed a first amended class action complaint alleging that Gentry Homes, Ltd. constructed Plaintiffs’ home without adequate high wind protection. Gentry filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty (HBLW) between Gentry and Plaintiffs. The circuit court ordered Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Gentry but severed and struck an arbitrator-selection provision for potential conflict of interest. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court should have enforced the HBLW’s arbitrator-selection provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court orders, holding (1) the ICA erred in required a party challenging an arbitrator-selection provision to show evidence of “actual bias”; and (2) in resolving a challenge to an arbitrator-selection provision, the “fundamental fairness” standard should be applied, and under this standard, the arbitrator-selection provision was fundamentally unfair. View "Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd." on Justia Law

This class action arose out of the termination of approximately 7,600 former teachers and other permanent employees of the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the State of Louisiana’s subsequent takeover of Orleans Parish schools. Although the district court denied defendants’ exceptions of res judicata, a five judge panel of the court of appeal unanimously found that res judicata ordinarily would apply to the facts of this case, but that exceptional circumstances barred its application. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted two writ applications to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiffs’ claims against the OPSB and/or the State defendants, and, if not, whether the OPSB and/or the State defendants violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights in relation to the plaintiffs’ terminations. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that res judicata applied but found no exceptional circumstances that would preclude its application. Furthermore, the Court found that, even if res judicata did not apply to certain parties’ claims, neither the OPSB nor the State defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights. View "Oliver v. Orleans Parish School Board" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against AB Trucking, claiming that AB did not pay its drivers for all hours worked, misclassified some drivers as non-employee trainees and did not pay them at all, and failed to provide required meal and rest breaks. The trial court certified a class of drivers who performed work for AB out of its Oakland, facility. Plaintiffs prevailed on most of their claims and the court awarded the class a total of $964,557.08. In a post-judgment order, the court awarded attorney fees, litigation expenses, and class representative enhancements to plaintiffs. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that federal law preempts application of California’s meal and rest break requirements to motor carriers; that the order granting class certification was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court should have reserved individual determinations of damages for the claims administration process; that AB’s drivers are expressly excluded from coverage under Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order No. 9-2001; and that the award of attorney fees and representative enhancements must be reversed. View "Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp." on Justia Law

In this case involving a class action complaint filed against CVS Pharmacy Inc. in Massachusetts Superior Court for wage and hour violations, the First Circuit clarified the removal time periods and mechanisms under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. CVS filed a second notice of removal, claiming that there was a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, holding (1) CVS’s notice of removal came too late to meet the thirty-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), and the second thirty-day deadline in section 1446(b)(3) did not apply; and (2) CVS had not met its burden to establish the substantive amount in controversy requirement. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the time limits in section 1446(b) apply when the plaintiffs’ pleadings or the plaintiffs’ “other papers” provide the defendant with a clear statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which damages can be readily calculated; (2) CVS’s second notice of removal was timely under section 1446(b)(3); and (3) CVS sufficiently demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. View "Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005 class counsel initiated a class action against Wells Fargo on behalf of thousands of mortgage consultants who had allegedly been misclassified as exempt employees. In 2006 ILG filed a putative class action alleging similar claims on behalf of a similar class. An ILG class was initially certified, but was decertified in 2010. Eventually, ILG filed multiple lawsuits, each with 30 to 90 plaintiffs, on behalf of 600 clients, including Maxon. ILG, Wells Fargo and class counsel mediated all pending claims. In 2011, class counsel moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class and settlement; Wells Fargo agreed to pay $19 million, including attorney fees to class counsel, to settle all class claims and $6 million for the ILG claims. At the preliminary approval hearing, the court was told that ILG’s clients would opt out of the class action. Contrary to that explanation, ILG assisted its class member clients in securing the benefits of the class action settlement rather than in opting out to seek recompense from the $6 million fund. ILG claimed that that settlement was for its attorney fees, but was willing to pay $1,750 to each plaintiff for a claim arguably not resolved in the class action. Maxon objected. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring ILG to deposit the funds into escrow. The appeals court affirmed. The court presiding over the class action had jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the settlement of class member claims, even for class members represented by ILG and had a duty to ensure that ILG’s fees were reasonable in light of the overall result. View "Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg." on Justia Law

In 2005, in connection with a magnetic resonance imaging procedure (MRI), Decker received a dose of Omniscan, a gadoliniumbased contrast agent manufactured by GEHC. After taking Omniscan, Decker developed Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF). In 2012, the Deckers sued GEHC, as part of a multidistrict litigation (MDL). Before the Deckers’ case, hundreds of similar cases in the MDL involving GEHC had been settled. The Decker case was the first case in the MDL to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Deckers on a failure-to-warn claim, awarding $5 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court judge should have recused himself from the trial and a motion for a new trial; made several erroneous evidentiary rulings, which were applicable to all MDL cases; erroneously denied GEHC’s motion for a new trial because insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict regarding the causation element of the Deckers’ failure-to-warn claim; and erroneously failed to issue two proposed jury instructions. View "Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

These consolidated writ petitions arose from a construction-defect action initiated by The Regent at Town Centre Homeowners’ Association against Oxbow Construction, LLC. Oxbow served as the general contractor of the Regent at Town Centre mixed-use community (Town Centre). The Association, on behalf of itself and the condominium unit-owners, served Oxbow with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40 notice, alleging construction defects in the common elements of the condominiums. The district court ultimately allowed claims seeking Chapter 40 remedies to proceed for alleged construction defects in limited common elements assigned to multiple units containing at least one “new residence.” Both parties filed writ petitions challenging the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court denied both petitions, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to perform a Nev. R. Civ. P. 23 class-action analysis; (2) determining that previously occupied units in Town Centre did not qualify for Chapter 40 remedies; and (3) concluding that the Association could pursue Chapter 40 remedies for construction defects in the common elements of buildings containing at least one previously unoccupied unit, i.e., a “new residence.” View "Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law