Plaintiffs are among 24,000 New Jersey merchants who entered into contracts for credit or debit point of sales terminals with Defendants and filed a class action, alleging that Defendants charged small business owners unconscionable and exorbitant fees for leasing terminals and added extra costs not included in the contracts. On July 31, 2013, the district court denied class certification. On August 19, 2013, Plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the denial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), conceding that the Rule 23(f) petition was filed beyond the 14 day deadline. The Third Circuit dismissed, stating that the time to file a Rule 23(f) petition runs from entry of the order, not service of a document. Counsel’s mistake or ignorance of the rules does not constitute excusable neglect; Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(1) states that a court cannot extend the time for filing a petition for permission to appeal. The court also noted that no motion for reconsideration was filed in the district court. View "Eastman v. First Data Corp." on Justia Law

The State filed six in parens patriae complaints in state court alleging that six credit card companies (defendants) violated the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Miss. Code Ann. 75-24-1, by charging consumers for products they did not want or need. Defendants removed to federal court arguing that there was federal subject matter jurisdiction because this was a mass action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, 171 1-171 5, and because the State's MCPA claims were preempted by the federal National Banking Act (NBA), 12 C.F.R. Part 37. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that neither CAFA nor complete preemption by the NBA provided the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hood, et al. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal sua sponte of his class actin complaint brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on application of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 901(b). CPLR 901(b) prohibits class action suits for statutory damages. The court concluded that, in light of Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, not state law, governs when a federal TCPA suit may proceed as a class action. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank v. Independence Energy Group LLC" on Justia Law

Capital One appealed the district court's order remanding a putative class action lawsuit to California state court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court concluded that there must ordinarily be facts in evidence to support a finding that two-thirds of putative class members were local state citizens, which was one of the local controversy exception's requirements, if that question was disputed before the district court. A pure inference regarding the citizenship of prospective class members may be sufficient if the class is defined as limited to citizens of the state in question, but otherwise such a finding should not be based on guesswork. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when groups of plaintiffs filed product liability actions against four manufacturers of transvaginal mesh devices, including Boston Scientific. Three groups filed similar motions proposing that the state court assign each group to a single Judge for purposes of discovery and trial. Two district judges granted plaintiffs' motions and remanded to state court on the ground that no case included more than 100 plaintiffs and plaintiffs had not proposed to the state court that the actions be tried jointly. The court granted Boston Scientific leave to appeal and vacated the order remanding to state court where the three groups of plaintiffs have already proposed to try their cases jointly within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), because plaintiffs' counsel urged the state court to assign the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs to a single judge. View "Atwell, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

Rahman filed a securities class action against KB, an importer of infant furniture and products, and individuals, alleging violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 and (2) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The complaint alleged that defendants misled investors by artificially inflating KB’s stock price by issuing deceptive public financial reports and press releases dealing with compliance with customs laws and overall financial performance. A second amended complaint specified failure to disclose product recalls, safety violations, and illegal staffing practices. The district court dismissed for failure to satisfy the heightened scienter pleading standard required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

MERSCORP operates an online membership organization that records, trades, and forecloses loans on behalf of many lenders. Banks can register their mortgages on the system and assign the mortgages to MERSCORP, which then records them in the counties in which the mortgaged properties are located. MERSCORP has no financial interest in the mortgages. The underlying debts can be repeatedly assigned without transfers being recorded in a public‐records office, facilitating successive interbank sales of mortgages, often to create mortgage‐backed securities. Union County, Illinois filed a class action suit on behalf of all Illinois counties against MERSCORP and banks that do business with MERSCORP, claiming that MERSCORP is violating a statute that requires every Illinois mortgage be recorded; 765 ILCS 5/28 provides that deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate “shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated.” The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois law does not require that mortgages be recorded, without deciding whether to certify it as a class action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to certify the issue to the Illinois Supreme Court. View "Union Countyv. Merscorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

In a proposed class action, Schilke alleged that Wachovia, her lender and holder of a mortgage on her home, fraudulently placed insurance on her property when her homeowner’s policy lapsed. Wachovia secured the replacement coverage from ASI and charged her for it, as specifically permitted by her loan agreement. The premium was more than twice what she had paid for her own policy and included a commission to Wachovia’s insurance-agency affiliate, also as permitted under the loan agreement. Schilke calls the commission a “kickback” and asserted statutory and common-law claims, most sounding in fraud or contract. The district court dismissed based on federal preemption and the filed-rate doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The loan agreement and related disclosures and notices conclusively show that there was no deception at work. Wachovia fully disclosed that lender-placed insurance could be significantly more expensive than her own policy and could include a fee or other compensation to the bank and its insurance-agency affiliate. Maintaining property insurance was Schilke’s contractual obligation and she failed to fulfill it. . View "Schilke v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Waupaca manufactures iron castings and provides its foundry employees with personal protective equipment (PPE), including hard hats, safety glasses, ear protection, steel-toed footwear, and a fire-retardant uniform. Waupaca requires these employees to wear PPE while working; failure to comply can result in discipline. Waupaca provides locker rooms with showers. Typically, foundry workers finish their shift, clock out and proceed to locker rooms, where they remove their PPE, shower, and change into street clothes. Because of hazards associated with chemicals and dust to which some workers are exposed, Waupaca recommends that employees shower and remove their PPE on-site. Not all employees do so. Employees, representing a class of more than 400 (an opt-in class, 29 .S.C. 216(b)) alleged that Waupaca violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by not paying for time spent showering and changing clothes at work. The district court granted Waupaca summary judgment, ruling that those activities were not compensable under the FLSA because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had not mandated that foundry workers shower and change clothes on-site. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that OSHA’s decision not to promulgate a rule requiring such activities does not bar a party from presenting evidence as to compensability under the FLSA and that factual disputes otherwise precluded summary judgment.View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law