Nijjar hired Judge as a resident property manager. Nijjar terminated her employment. Judge filed claims for unpaid compensation, meal and rest period premiums, waiting time penalties, and wrongful termination. Under the Private Attorney General Act, Judge alleged similar claims on behalf of other employees. Judge also filed a class action, alleging similar claims on behalf of herself and class members. The trial court determined that the actions were related cases and designated the individual/PAGA action as the lead case, but denied Judge’s subsequent application to consolidate the cases. Based on an arbitration agreement that Judge had signed as an employee, the trial court granted a petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the individual and PAGA claims. The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement and that Judge’s employment-related claims and individual PAGA claims were covered. The arbitrator issued a clause construction award, finding that the agreement permitted arbitration of class and representative claims. The trial court granted the defendants’ petition to vacate the n award. The court of appeal dismissed, stating that because the arbitrator has not ruled on any substantive issues, the order did not vacate a final arbitration award and is not appealable. View "Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

The single issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on attorney's fees: was the trial court's grant of over $7 million in a multi-jurisdictional, class action law suit an abuse of discretion when the entire class was awarded only $45,780. The trial court originally determined the appropriate attorney fees to be $3,610,719.15 based on Oklahoma ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 598 P.2d 659 and the directives of 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 section 2023.2 Rajine Hess filed a motion to reconsider based on the fees awarded in Berry v. Volkswagen Group of America, 397 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. 2013), a Missouri Supreme Court case involving a class action against Volkswagen related to defective window regulator claims. The trial court considered the Missouri case; and, adopting the identical analysis utilized in reaching a determination that the appropriate fee award was approximately $3.6 million, the trial court amended its order to reflect a multiplier of 1.9 for an adjusted award of $7,221.438.30. In calculating the lodestar, the trial court included hours in failed, out-of-state litigation concerning similar issues to those presented here. Based on these facts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the $7 million attorneys' fee award constituted an abuse of discretion. View "Hess v. Voklswagen of America, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this discretionary appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the class action proceedings in this case improperly subjected Appellants to a “trial by formula.” The trial court certified the class, a jury rendered a divided verdict, and the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Appellees brought various class action claims against their former employers, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Sam’s Club (collectively, “Wal-Mart”), based on policies and conduct pertaining to rest breaks and meal breaks. Appellees alleged Wal-Mart promised them paid rest and meal breaks, but then had forced them, in whole or in part, to miss breaks or work through breaks, and also to work “off-the-clock.” The trial court certified a class consisting of "all [then] current and former hourly employees of Wal-Mart in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from March 19, 1998 to the present December 27, 2005.” The class ultimately consisted of 187,979 members. Ultimately, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Wal-Mart on all claims relating to meal breaks but in favor of Appellees on all claims relating to rest breaks and off-the-clock work. The amount of the judgment ultimately entered on the verdict was $187,648,589. After Wal-Mart appealed, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part in a published unanimous per curiam opinion, which corrected a patent mathematical error committed by the trial court, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded to the trial court to recalculate the lodestar it had employed to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees. The issues Wall-Mart's appeal raised for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether Wal-Mart was subjected to a “trial by formula,” (suggesting that the class claims could only be properly proven by an individual examination of the 187,979 class members to determine their claims); and (2) whether Appellees were thereby improperly relieved of their burden to produce class-wide common evidence on key elements of their claims. The Supreme Court found there was a single, central, common issue of liability here: whether Wal-Mart failed to compensate its employees in accordance with its own written policies. On that question, both parties presented evidence. Wal-Mart’s liability was proven on a classwide basis. Damages were assessed based on a computation of the average rate of an employee’s pay (about eight dollars per hour) multiplied by the number of hours for which pay should have been received but was not. In the Court's view, "this was not a case of 'trial by formula' or of a class action 'run amok.'" Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Hummel v. Walmart Stores, Inc" on Justia Law

A defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal court must file a notice of removal “containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,” 28 U. S. C. 1446(a). Owens filed a putative class action in Kansas state court, seeking compensation for underpaid oil and gas lease royalties. Dart removed the case, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U. S. C. 1332(d)(2). Dart’s notice of removal alleged underpayments of more than $8.2 million. Following a motion to remand, Dart submitted a detailed declaration supporting an amount in controversy higher than $11 million. The district court granted Owens’ remand motion, reading Tenth Circuit precedent to require proof of the amount in controversy in the notice itself. The Tenth Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court vacated. Notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold; it need not contain evidentiary submissions. By borrowing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s “short and plain statement” standard, Congress intended that courts apply the same liberal rules to removal allegations as to other pleadings. The amount-in-controversy allegation of a plaintiff is accepted if made in good faith. No anti-removal presumption attends cases invoking CAFA. View "Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens" on Justia Law

Judon was injured while riding in a commercial passenger vehicle that was insured by Travelers. Judon sought first-party medical benefits of $7,636.40. Travelers paid $5,000, up to the policy’s first-party medical benefits limit. Judon filed a class-action complaint in state court, alleging that Pennsylvania law required that the policy offer up to $25,000 in first-party medical benefits. Judon alleged that “there are hundreds of members of the class” who were wrongfully denied payment of first-party benefits. Travelers removed to federal court, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, arguing that the parties were minimally diverse; the proposed class consisted of at least 100 putative members; and the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The district court remanded, finding that CAFA’s numerosity and amount-in- controversy requirements were disputed and placing the burden of proof on Travelers to establish jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Judon’s complaint unambiguously pleaded that the numerosity requirement was satisfied, so the court should have placed the burden of proof on Judon to show, to a legal certainty, that the numerosity requirement was not satisfied. The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the amount-in-controversy requirement. View "Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

The 965 plaintiffs were people who borrowed money from Countrywide in the mid-2000’s. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure Section 378). Had this case been filed prior to 2005, in all probability it would have been filed as a class action (in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged that in the mid-2000’s, defendant Countrywide Financial Corporation developed a two-prong business strategy to increase its profits: Countrywide would use captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that would inflate home prices beyond levels that would otherwise prevail in an honest market; then Countrywide would induce its borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they couldn’t afford by misleading them as to their ability to pay their loans, including misrepresenting key terms of the loans themselves. Plaintiffs alleged Countrywide did this because it had no intention of keeping the loans on its books, but intended to bundle them into saleable tranches and sell them to investors. This appeal raised two questions of state law: (1) despite the rather staggering number of joined plaintiffs, did the third amended complaint allege, to track the statutory language of section 378, the “same . . . series of transactions” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact; and (2) whether California's procedures governing permissive joinder were up to the task of managing mass actions like this one. The Court of Appeal answered "yes" to both questions: a few years after section 378’s enactment in 1927, the California Supreme Court declared the statute’s same-series-of-transactions language is to be construed broadly in favor of joinder, and there are sufficient common questions of law and fact in this case to satisfy section 378, including whether a mortgage lender has a duty to its borrowers not to encourage “high ball,” dishonest appraisals and whether Countrywide really had a deliberate strategy of placing borrowers into loans it “knew” they couldn’t afford. While the Court reversed the judgment dismissing all but one plaintiff for misjoinder, the Court emphasized that on remand the trial court would have to consider a variety of procedural tools with which to organize this case into appropriate and manageable subclaims and subclasses. "While the irony of requiring the case to be divided into tranches has not escaped as, we are confident the trial court can handle the task." View "Petersen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In 2002, Warren Lester and hundreds of other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corp. and others seeking personal injury damages allegedly caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) and other hazardous materials at various Louisiana pipeyards operated by Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (“ITCO”). A flight of several plaintiffs, including John Oleszkowicz, was severed and transferred to the 24th Judicial District Court, at which point the only remaining defendants were ITCO and Exxon. The jury considered each of the plaintiffs’ compensatory claims for increased risk of cancer, as well as a claim for exemplary damages pursuant to former La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. During the course of trial, the district court instructed the jurors that plaintiffs could bring a “new lawsuit” in the event they actually contracted cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for the increased risk of cancer. Oleszkowicz was personally awarded $115,000 in compensatory damages. Significantly, the jury did not award exemplary damages to the plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, based on a finding that Exxon did not engage in wanton or reckless conduct in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied writs. Several months after the verdict, Oleszkowicz was diagnosed with prostate cancer. As a result, he filed the instant suit against Exxon and others, alleging his cancer stemmed from the same NORM exposure at ITCO’s pipeyard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim for punitive and exemplary damages was barred by res judicata and, if so, whether “exceptional circumstances” existed to justify not applying res judicata to bar the claim, as set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A). Although the court of appeal cited “exceptional circumstances” to justify relief from the res judicata effect of the jury’s verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the Supreme Court found no such “exceptional circumstances” exist under the facts of this case and reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Accretive provides cost control, revenue cycle management, and compliance services to non-profit healthcare providers. Accretive and Fairview entered into a Revenue Cycle Operations Agreement (RCA), accounting for about 12% of Accretive’s revenue during the class period, and a Quality and Total Cost of Care (QTCC) contract, promoted as the future for healthcare services. In 2012, the Minnesota Attorney General sued Accretive for noncompliance with healthcare, debt collection, and consumer protection laws. Accretive wound down its RCA contract short of its term, expecting a loss of $62 to $68 million. The AG released a damaging report on Accretive’s business practices. Fairview cancelled its QTCC contract. Accretive’s stock fell from over $24 to under $10 per share. Plaintiffs filed a class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that Accretive concealed its practices to artificially inflate its common stock. The parties negotiated a settlement of $14 million: $0.20 per share ($0.14 with attorneys’ fees and expenses deducted). Notice was sent to 34,200 potential class members. Only one opted out; only Hayes filed an objection. At the fairness hearing, the district court granted approval, awarding attorneys’ fees of 30% and expenses of $63,911.14. Hayes did not attend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hayes v. Accretive Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado Golf Club Holding Company LLC (CGC Holding), Harlem Algonquin LLC and James Medick proposed certification of a class action suit. They alleged a group of lenders conspired to create a fraudulent scheme to obtain non-refundable up-front fees in return for loan commitments , and misrepresented their ability and their objective to make good on the promises to meet certain financing obligations as part of a scheme to entice borrowers to pay the up-front fees. The class intended to offer generalized proof that the lenders concealed the financial history of Sandy Hutchens, the principal defendant, and his use of pseudonyms, to preserve the superficial integrity of the operation. The borrowers argued that had they known about this pretense, no putative class member would have taken part in the financial transactions that caused each to lose its up-front fees, amounting to millions of dollars of cumulative losses. The ultimate issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the class could pursue claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In opposing the claims, the lenders argued that each class member would have to demonstrate that it relied on the lenders’ misrepresentations or omissions to satisfy RICO’s causation element, making a single trial unwieldy and unworkable. The Tenth Circuit held that the lenders were wrong in this respect: RICO class-action plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary presumption of a factual element of a claim. The Court agreed with the district court that a class could be certified in this context. Plaintiffs' theory sufficiently allayed any concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over those idiosyncratic to individual class members. The Tenth Circuit affirmed certification of the class, but reversed the district court with regard to certification decision as to the lenders’ law firm and lawyers, Broad and Cassel, Ronald Gache and Carl Romano. Because several claims were not properly before the Court in this interlocutory appeal, the Court declined to address: (1) whether plaintiffs’ claims constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of RICO; (2) whether the plaintiffs could prove proximate cause; or (3) whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over certain defendants. View "CGC Holding v. Gache" on Justia Law

In plaintiff-appellant Dagmar Hale's second appeal in a class action against Sharp Healthcare and Sharp Grossmont Hospital (collectively, Sharp), she argued Sharp unfairly charged her and other uninsured patients more for emergency services than the fees it accepted from patients covered by private insurance or governmental plans. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeal partially reversed a judgment of dismissal following a demurrer. The trial court thereafter certified the class. After engaging in discovery, Sharp moved to decertify the class arguing a class action was inappropriate based on lack of ascertainability and lack of predominantly common issues. The trial court considered the evidence presented and found there was no reasonable means to ascertain the members of class without individual inquiries of more than 120,000 patient records and continued class treatment was not appropriate because individualized issues, rather than common issues, predominate, particularly with respect to whether or not class members are entitled to recover damages. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class. View "Hale v. Sharp Healthcare" on Justia Law