After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility.View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent for unfair and deceptive trade practices and for common law fraud. Petitioner's complaint was based on an automobile warranty he purchased from Respondent that expired more than two years earlier than he had been led to believe. Petitioner purported to bring his action on behalf of others similarly situated. Before Petitioner filed a motion to certify the class, however, Respondent paid to extend Petitioner's warranty. The circuit court (1) denied Petitioner's motion for class certification, finding that because he had been made whole, Petitioner was no longer a member of any class; (2) granted in part Respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding Petitioner's claim moot; and (3) granted Petitioner attorney's fees for the period before and after Respondent tendered Petitioner individual relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondent's tender of individual compensatory relief to Petitioner did not require the court to deny class certification; (2) an award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by the tender of individual compensatory damages; and (3) an award of attorney's fees to Petitioner under a fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Protection Act is not limited to fees incurred before the tender. View "Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd." on Justia Law

On behalf of himself and a proposed class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff filed an action challenging the legality of Ticketmaster's collection of a service charge on a concert ticket he purchased for a concert in the city. The complaint was based on provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) if a ticket agency is authorized in writing by a licensed exhibitor to sell tickets as an agent of the exhibitor, the ticket agency is not required to be licensed; (2) the Code prohibits the collection of a service charge, in addition to the established price printed on the ticket, in connection with the original sale of the ticket by the exhibitor, and is not limited to ticket resales; (3) the Code does not permit anyone other than a ticket agency licensed under the Code to collect anything more for a ticket than the established price printed on the ticket plus taxes; and (4) a common law action for money had and received will lie to recover money paid in excess of that allowed by statute if the agreement pursuant to which it has been paid has not been fully consummated.View "Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were royalty owners entitled to receive a share of the production of natural gas in a gas field. Plaintiffs brought a class action against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (APC) and its affiliates challenging the manner in which APC was paying royalties on natural gas production under the respective oil and gas leases. Timothy Coulter represented the plaintiff class and negotiated a settlement agreement. More than 6,000 members made up the settlement class, one of whom was Stan Boles. Boles objected to the amended class certification and the class settlement agreement negotiated by Coulter. The district court approved the settlement despite Boles' objection. Boles appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the adequacy of the class representation or the character of the settlement agreement.View "Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant BVF Partners L.P. ("BVF") appealed a Chancery Court certification of Appellee New Orleans Employees' Retirement System ("NOERS") as class representative in this action challenging the acquisition of Celera Corporation ("Celera") by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"). BVF also appealed the Court of Chancery's approval of a class action settlement without an opt out right for BVF between NOERS and Defendants-Appellees Richard H. Ayers, Jean-Luc Belingard, William G. Green, Peter Barton Hutt, Gail M. Naughton, Kathy Ordonez, Wayne I. Roe, Bennett M. Shapiro, Celera Corporation, Quest Diagnostics Incorporated, and Spark Acquisition Corporation ("Spark"). BVF contended that the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as the class representative, because NOERS lacked standing to represent the class. BVF argued that when NOERS sold its stock in Celera on the public market (before the merger was actually consummated and nearly a year before the Court of Chancery certified the class) NOERS no longer had a legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation. BVF raised multiple other grounds for why the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as class representative, including that NOERS was uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses and was therefore an improper class representative. Even if that certification was proper, BVF argued that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretionary powers to allow BVF to opt out of the class in order to pursue its individual claims for monetary damages against the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that NOERS had standing to represent the class. The Court declined to adopt a rule of law that a shareholder class representative in a breach of fiduciary duty action must own stock in the corporation continuously through the final class certification. With regard to BVF's other arguments regarding NOERS' certification as class representative, the Court found them "unconvincing." The Court concluded that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, however, there was merit to BVF's claim that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretion to allow BVF to opt out of the shareholder class under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "In Re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation, et al. v. New Orleans Employees' Retirement System, et al." on Justia Law

The railroad was originally sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in 2002 in Mississippi, where Fennell lived and worked and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He had also worked for the railroad in Louisiana. In 2006, after discovery, the Mississippi court dismissed without prejudice. In 2009, Fennell refiled in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois. The railroad sought dismissal under the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the circuit court did not consider all of the relevant factors. The citizens of St. Clair County should not be asked to bear the burden of this lawsuit. The majority of the witnesses, including treating physicians, are in Mississippi and not subject to Illinois subpoenas. Although the St. Clair County circuit court cited “almost 80 years of relevant evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of the exposure to asbestos” that were held by the defendant’s Belleville law firm located in the county, the supreme court ruled that such documents can be copied and that this is not sufficient to tip the balance as to the proper forum.View "Fennell v. IL Cent. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d).View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

This appeal was the third in the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs were a group of landowners with properties on the shores of Flathead Lake and a portion of the upper Flathead River. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1999 against Montana Power Company (MPC) and MPC's successor, PPL Montana, LLC, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance, a taking of property, and breach of easements. In Mattson II, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court granted the motions as to both Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's orders concerning class certification. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of Mattson II to the class-certification question under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; and (2) the six criteria for certification of a class action under Rule 23 were satisfied in this case. Remanded with instructions to certify the class. View "Mattson v. Mont. Power Co." on Justia Law

Chicago taxi drivers filed a class action in 2000 concerning how they received traffic tickets. The trial court certified the class in 2002 and, in 2005, issued partial summary judgment that a ticket should be issued to a driver at the scene or placed on the vehicle and that to substitute mailed notice (a fly-by ticket) would be illegal. The city argued that such occurrences were rare or had happened only if the driver was confrontational or fled. In 2008 a new judge granted a motion to decertify, concluding that commonality no longer existed. Questions concerning whether there had been a “decision on the merits” were certified. The Illinois Supreme Court held that decertification was not precluded. A decision on the merits requires a complete determination of liability on a claim based on the facts disclosed by evidence, which establishes a right to recover in at least one class member, but which is short of final judgment. Liability which would establish a right to recovery had not yet been determined; the original trial judge did not decide whether the city violated the law by issuing a fly-by citation to any driver. View "Mashal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

This case involved the appeal of Petitioner of her sentence of life without mercy imposed in the circuit court by order, as recommended by the jury which found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. Petitioner assigned four errors committed by the trial court, including the admission of the decedent's statements, failure to give a Harden instruction, failure to give a good character instruction, and the failure to suppress one of Petitioner's statements to the police. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the court did not err in admitting the statements of the decedent; (2) the court's decision to admit the statement was not an abuse of discretion; but (3) under the limited circumstances of this case, the court erred in failing to give a proper good character instruction.View "State v. Surbaugh" on Justia Law