This dispute arose out of a class action lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, a resident of Defendant City, challenging the City's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of the taxes paid. The trial court ruled that class claims for a refund were barred under Woosley v. State and dismissed the case. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff could file a class claim for a TUT refund under the recently decided Ardon v. City of Los Angeles. In Ardon, the Supreme Court held that the Government Claims Act (Act) permits a class action claim by taxpayers against a local government entity for the refund of an unlawful tax in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims statute. The City appealed, asserting that its municipal code contained an "applicable governing claims statute" barring class action claims for a tax refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a local ordinance is not a "statute" within the meaning of the Act.View "McWilliams v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Immediately following the release of the Supreme Court's previous decision in this case, the Alabama Legislature passed Act No. 2012-198, Ala. Acts 2012, which repealed the statutory provision that underpinned the decision in "Perdue I." In the prior case, the Court vacated the circuit court's judgment that approved a settlement agreement that ended class-action litigation involving the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (PACT) program. Class member Carol Perdue objected to the trial court's approval of the settlement; the Supreme Court originally rejected plaintiffs' argument that Ala. Code 16-33C-19 did not prohibit the PACT Board from entering into the settlement, and that the agreement was "clearly contrary to state law." The Legislature specifically repealed 16-33C-19 and caused the Court to revise its previous decision. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in finding the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable, found the retroactive application of the 2012 Act constitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy.View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law

Darren Berry filed suit against Volkswagen, alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). The trial court certified a class on behalf of Missouri owners and lessors of Volkswagen vehicles (Class). The action settled. After the the settlement for Class was approved and paid out, the trial court held a hearing regarding attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded Class counsel attorney's fees after determining the lodestar amount to be $3,087,320 and applying a multiplier of 2.0 for a total award of $6,174,640 in attorneys' fees. Volkswagen challenged the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lodestar amount was within the trial court's discretion; and (2) the multiplier applied to the lodestar amount was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Remanded.View "Berry v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded.View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC. Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police. Telschow was arrested and prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism and sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment. Ultimately the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numerosity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment which granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. View "Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Defendant a new trial based on one ground of ineffective assistance as to the rape conviction and two grounds of ineffective assistance as to the sexual-abuse conviction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that, based on the standard of review under Strickland v. Washington, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in its rulings on both of Defendant's convictions.View "State v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Strawn, the plaintiff in a class action case, petitioned for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the appellate work done on review before the Supreme Court in the underlying matter. In addition, Strawn sought two supplemental fee awards: one for the cost of litigating the fee petition, and the other for the cost of defending against a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the Oregon court issued its decision. Further, Strawn sought a $5,000 incentive fee for his service on review as class representative. The issues raised by this appeal included: (1) the appropriate method for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award in a case that involved both a statutory fee-shifting award and a common-fund award; (2) the propriety of applying a multiplier to the awards; (3) how fees should be apportioned between the fee-shifting and the common-fund awards; (4) whether this court has authority to award attorney fees for work done in opposing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (5) whether a court has authority to award post-opinion, prejudgment interest on court-awarded attorney fees; and (6) whether an appellate court may award a class representative a class incentive fee on appeal and review. Strawn filed a class action against Farmers raising two contractual claims (breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith) and one common law claim (fraud) in connection with auto insurance policies written by Farmers. The jury found for the class on the contractual claims and the fraud claim, and it made a single award of compensatory damages on those claims. In addition, and for the fraud claim only, the jury awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to discuss the methodology appropriate to award fees based on the issues raised in the appeal, and made adjustments as deemed necessary in compliance with the limits of Oregon law.View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co.  " on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds.View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law