Plaintiffs were insured through the State group insurance plan administered by Defendants. Both Plaintiffs were injured in automobile accidents caused by tortfeasors whose insurers accepted liability. The third-party insurers paid Plaintiffs' medical providers, but in both cases, the State and Defendants allegedly exercised their rights of subrogation without confirming that Plaintiffs under the State plan had been made whole. Plaintiffs filed a class complaint seeking a declaratory ruling that Defendants' practices violated the State's made-whole laws. On remand, the district court defined the class to include only those insureds who had timely filed claims for covered benefits, thus excluding from the class all non-filing insureds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incorporation of the filing limitation did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Diaz v. State" on Justia Law

In Feeney II, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court invalidating a class action waiver in the parties' arbitration agreement, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not foreclose a court from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver if it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued an opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex) holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA even if a plaintiff proves that the class waiver effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his federal statutory rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court subsequently concluded that following Amex, the Court's analysis in Feeney II no longer comported with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA, holding instead that a class waiver may not be invalidated on the grounds that it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. Remanded.View "Feeney v. Dell Inc. " on Justia Law

In 2005, a limited liability company and its owners (plaintiffs), on behalf of other similarly situated telephone customers, filed a complaint seeking to certify a class action lawsuit against United Telephone Company of Ohio (UTO), which provided Plaintiffs with telephone service. Plaintiffs claimed that their phone bills from UTO contained unauthorized charges from third parties. The trial court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis to ensure the prerequisites of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, under which plaintiffs must establish seven prerequisites in order to certify a class action, are satisfied; and (2) even though the trial court's consideration of the merits in this case was improper, its order denying certification of the class was correct because Plaintiffs' proposed amended class did not satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23.View "Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Several insureds filed a class action against the predecessor of Washington National Insurance Corporation concerning insurance policies that provide for reimbursement of certain home health care expenses. The district court granted summary judgment for the insureds, concluding that various provisions in the policy, including a certificate schedule, demonstrated an ambiguity concerning whether an automatic increase applied only to the daily benefit or also applied to the lifetime maximum benefit amount and the per occurrence maximum benefit amount. Because there was ambiguity in the policy, the court of appeal certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which held (1) because the policy was ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without consideration of extrinsic evidence; and (2) when so construed, the policy's automatic benefit increase applies to the daily benefit, the lifetime maximum benefit, and the per occurrence maximum benefit.View "Washington Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman" on Justia Law

Under N.Y. Labor Law 196-d, an employer's "agent" may not retain tips. Two former Starbucks baristas brought a putative class action in the U.S. district court alleging that Starbucks' policy of allowing shift supervisors to receive distributions violated section 196-d. The district court concluded that the supervisors could participate in tip pools because their responsibilities did not render them Starbucks agents. Meanwhile, several former Starbucks assistant store managers filed a separate complaint asserting that assistant store managers should be entitled to participate in the tips pools. The U.S. district court concluded that section 196-d does not compel an employer to include any particular eligible employee in a tip pool. On appeal from both cases, the court of appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) an employee whose personal service to patrons is a principal part of his duties may participate in a tip allocation arrangement under section 196-d even if he possesses limited supervisory responsibilities, but an employee granted meaningful control over subordinates is not eligible to participate in a tip pool; and (2) Starbucks' decision to exclude assistant store managers from the tip pool was not contrary to section 196-d.View "Barenboim v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

This suit was filed as a putative class action on behalf of Texas royalty owners alleging that Phillips Petroleum Company underpaid oil and gas royalties. The trial court certified three subclasses of royalty owners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed as to two of the subclasses but reversed as to the third subclass, which alleged breach of a uniform express royalty provision contained in gas royalty agreements that amended the class members' leases. On remand, Respondent, class representative of the remaining subclass, amended her petition to add a claim for breach of the implied covenant to market. Phillips unsuccessfully filed various motions contending that there was no class claim for breach of the implied covenant to market. The court of appeals dismissed Phillips' interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied Phillips' petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in dismissing the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the addition of a class claim for breach of the implied covenant to market without requiring Respondent to file an amended motion for class certification or holding a certification hearing.View "Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were individuals who entered into contracts with Defendants for the provision of janitorial services to third-party customers. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, alleging that Defendants violated the Massachusetts Wage Act. Defendants moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration according to the terms of the arbitration clause contained in the parties' franchise agreements. The superior court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as set forth in Feeny v. Dell Inc. (Feeney I). After the United States Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Defendants sought appellate review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court reversed the order invalidating the arbitration in light of its interpretation of Conception and its impact on Feeney I, as set forth in Feeney II, holding (1) Massachusetts public policy in favor of class proceedings in certain contexts may no longer serve, in and of itself, as grounds to invalidate a class waiver in an arbitration agreement; and (2) in this case, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they lacked a practical means to pursue their claims on an individual basis.View "Machado v. System4 LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action against Defendant, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Dell successfully moved to compel arbitration according to an arbitration agreement signed by the parties. An arbitrator concluded that the parties waived class action relief by signing the agreement. In Feeney I, the Supreme Court invalidated the class waiver provision in the arbitration agreement. In this subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was properly invalidated where (1) Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court after Feeney I, precluded the invalidation of class waiver provisions in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, such as the one at issue here, and therefore, Concepcion undid the principal rationale for the Court's decision in Feeney I; (2) a court is not foreclosed from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver where a plaintiff can demonstrate he effectively cannot pursue a claim against the defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of his agreement, thus rendering his or her claim nonremediable; and (3) Plaintiffs demonstrated that they could not pursue their statutory claim under the individual claim arbitration process required by the arbitration agreement.View "Feeney v. Dell Inc." on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, a matter of first impression: "does Delaware recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling?" Plaintiff Jose Blanco was allegedly exposed to a toxic pesticide manufactured by Defendant Dow Chemical Corporation in 1979-1980. In 1993, he entered a class action lawsuit against Defendant in Texas. The case stalled in procedure, with class certification being ultimately denied. Defendants moved to dismiss, citing the run of the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the putative Texas action tolled the statute of limitations. The Delaware superior court concluded that Delaware recognized the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling. Defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that until class action certification is denied, individual claims are tolled under Delaware law. Accordingly the Court answered the question in the affirmative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Dow Chemical Corp. v. Blanco" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing a derivative and class action complaint against the general partner and other managers of a limited partnership. The governing limited partnership agreement provided that appellees had no liability for money damages as long as they acted in good faith. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint because it failed to allege facts that would support a finding of bad faith. After remand, the Court of Chancery held that appellants waived their alternative claims for reformation or rescission. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law