Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were former shareholders of McMoRan Exploration Company (MMR). Plaintiffs challenged MMR’s acquisition by Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc. The case settled, and the only remaining issue was an award to Plaintiff of their attorneys’ fees and expenses upon the Court of Chancery’s discretion. After a consideration of numerous factors, the most important of which was the benefits achieved by Plaintiffs for the shareholder class, the Court of Chancery concluded that the appropriate award of fees and expenses for the efforts of Plaintiffs’ attorneys was $2.4 million.View "In re McMoRan Exploration Co. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law

Eight African-American Secret Service agents were certified by the district court to sue the Secretary on behalf of a class comprising of all similarly situated agents who were denied promotions to the GS-14 and GS-15 level. The government sought interlocutory review of the class certification order under Rule 23(f). The court concluded that none of the district court's rulings in support of its order certifying the plaintiff class is foreclosed by controlling precedent and the unsettled questions are not likely to evade end-of-the-case review. Accordingly, the court declined to review the district court's order. View "In re: Jeh Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a securities class action contending that AIG and its board of directors wrongfully reduced the value of certain securities issued by AIG. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 77p(d) and 78bb(f)(3), does not confer federal jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims. View "Campbell v. AIG, et al." on Justia Law

The Hawaii AG filed suit in state court against six credit card providers, alleging that each violated state law by deceptively marketing and improperly enrolling cardholders in add-on credit card products. The card providers removed to federal court and the AG moved to remand. The district court denied the motion to remand. The court concluded that the state law claims were not preempted by the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. 85-86. The court joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that sections 85 and 86 did not completely preempt the claims, as there is a difference between alleging that certain customers are being charged too much, and alleging that they should have never been charged for the service in the first place. Therefore, the AG did not plead a completely preempted claim and the district court erred in finding federal question jurisdiction. The court agreed with its sister circuits in holding that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), does not completely preempt state law. Because the complaints unambiguously disclaimed class status, these actions cannot be removed under CAFA. There is no basis for federal jurisdiction and the cases should have been remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "State of Hawaii v. HSBC Bank of Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initially filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin defendant insurers under New York law from obtaining reimbursement of medical benefits from plaintiffs' tort settlements. Defendants removed to federal court where the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that plaintiffs' claims did not satisfy the Supreme Court's test for being subject to complete Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., preemption, which would have conferred federal subject-matter jurisdiction; such jurisdiction exists, however, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); therefore, the court reached the merits of the express preemption defense and concluded that N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-335 is saved from express preemption under ERISA section 514, as a law that "regulates insurance;" and therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wurtz v. The Rawlings Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Group Health Plan, Inc. (GHP) paid Plaintiff’s medical bills. Plaintiff subsequently recovered a personal injury settlement from the tortfeasor. GHP, through its agent, ACS Recovery Services, Inc. (ACS), asserted a lien against Plaintiff’s settlement, seeking reimbursement or subrogation for its payment of Plaintiff’s medical bills. Plaintiff filed a class action petition against GHP asserting several claims based on the premise that Missouri law does not permit the subrogation of tort claims. ACS intervened. The trial court entered summary judgment for GHP and ACS, concluding that the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) preempts Missouri’s anti-subrogation law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that FEHBA does not preempt Missouri law barring subrogation of personal injury claims. Remanded.View "Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

Former employees of RHI filed suit on behalf of themselves and others, alleging that RHI failed to pay overtime and improperly classified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201. Both had signed employment agreements that contained arbitration provisions: “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment, termination of employment or any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to arbitration. Neither agreement mentions classwide arbitration. RHI moved to compel arbitration on an individual basis. The district court granted the motion in part, compelling arbitration but holding that the propriety of individual versus classwide arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide. The court entered an order terminating the case. Rather than immediately appealing, RHI proceeded with arbitration until the arbitrator ruled that the employment agreements permitted classwide arbitration. The district court denied a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s partial award. The Third Circuit reversed. Because of the fundamental differences between classwide and individual arbitration, and the consequences of proceeding with one rather than the other, the availability of classwide arbitration is a substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court absent clear agreement otherwise.View "Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

KeHE, a Naperville food distributor, assigns each of its “sales representatives” several stores of large chain retailers. The representatives are responsible for stocking shelves at their assigned stores and for reordering merchandise when a store is low on any KeHE products. In 2012, KeHE discharged several representatives as part of restructuring. Four of them sued, claiming that KeHE had failed to pay them overtime wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and seeking to certify a collective action. KeHE argued that many of the discharged employees had waived their right to participate in a collective action in their separation agreements, and that they are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA as “outside sales employees.” The district court upheld the validity of the waivers and certified a collective action consisting only of employees who had not signed or had modified their agreements. The district court then granted summary judgment for KeHE, holding that all of the plaintiffs were outside sales employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred with respect to the outside-sales-exemption issue and erred in excluding from the collective action those who had signed the waivers. View "Killion v. KeHE Distrib., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Denbury, alleging that Denbury breached its duty to act as a reasonable and prudent operator of the well that was drilled under oil, gas, and mineral leases. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in remanding the case on the basis that the local single event exclusion under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii), (ii)(I), applies to this case. The court concluded that the plain text of the exclusion supports plaintiffs' view that the terms "event" and "occurrence" are not generally understood to apply only to incidents that occur at a discrete moment in time. Moreover, this understanding is supported by legislative history and other case law interpreting the local single event exclusion. Therefore, the court held that, although the exclusion applied in cases in which the single event or occurrence happens at a discrete moment in time, the single event or occurrence may also be constituted by a pattern of conduct in which the pattern is consistent in leading to a single focused event that culminates in the basis of the asserted liability. Accordingly, the court held that the failure of the Well constituted the "event or occurrence" from which the claims of plaintiffs arose. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., et al. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law