Before the patents expired (2012) for the individual coffee pods used in Keurig coffeemakers, defendants wanted to enter the market for Keurig‐compatible pods. In 2010 they introduced a product that used the external K‐Cup design, but did not contain a filter so that use of fresh coffee grounds was impossible. They used small chunks of freeze‐dried brewed coffee that dissolve and are reconstituted when hot water is added. The packaging stated in small font that it contained “naturally roasted soluble and microground Arabica coffee”; it never explained that soluble coffee is instant coffee or that the pods contained 95% instant coffee. The package included a warning: “DO NOT REMOVE the foil seal as the cup will not work properly in the coffee maker and could result in hot water burns.” Except to ensure that the user did not view the contents of the pod, this made no sense. Customers began to complain and were told that the pods were “not instant coffee” but “a high quality coffee bean pulverized into a powder so fine that [it] will dissolve,” which was largely false. Consumer protection lawsuits were consolidated. The district court refused to certify a class and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the class they propose all derive from a single course of conduct. The court overlooked genuine issues of fact when it granted summary judgment. View "Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Kuda Mujeyi filed a class action suit in state court asserting claims against several defendants. The case was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). Mujeyi's claims were severed and transferred to the District of Arizona. The district court ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint to reflect the severance and she did, then she moved to remand the action to state court under one of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction under section 1332(d)(4). The district court granted plaintiff's motion under section 1332(d)(3), determining the citizenship of the plaintiff class by considering the class as pleaded in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The court concluded that, for the purpose of considering the applicability of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction, the district court should have determined the citizenship of the proposed plaintiff class based on plaintiff's complaint as of the date the case became removable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doyle v. OneWest Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal." View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

A group of employees filed class and collective actions against Tyson Foods, Inc., seeking unpaid wages for time spent on pre- and post-shift activities. After the employees obtained a sizeable verdict and fee award, Tyson unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Tyson: (1) challenged the judgment and denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) argued the fee award was excessive. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, after review, that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of undercompensation and the district court acted within its discretion in setting the fee award. View "Garcia, et al v. Tyson Foods, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's decision to certify five related class action suits where plaintiffs in each case generally alleged that EQT and CNX have unlawfully deprived the class members of royalty payments from the production of coalbed methane gas (CBM) in Virginia. The court granted defendants' petition to appeal the five orders granting class certification and concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it certified the five classes. The court held that the district court's analysis lacked the requisite rigor to ensure that the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied by any of the certified classes. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EQT Production Co. v. Adair" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendant for failure to pay overtime wages, among other causes of action. The complaint alleged that the putative class members were non-exempt employees who chauffeured vehicles for defendant, and that defendant failed to compensate them for periods when they were required to remain on-call in between trips transporting clients. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's denial of their motion for class certification. The court reversed because the trial court's analysis of the numerosity factor was incorrect; the trial court improperly considered the merits of defendant's affirmative defenses; and the trial court denied plaintiffs due process by failing to grant them an adequate opportunity to perform discovery on and brief certification issues. View "Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by another driver. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff sustained both bodily injury and property damage. Plaintiff carried an automobile insurance policy through United Services Automobile Association General Indemnity Company (USAA). USAA paid vehicle repair and car rental costs, after which it sought subrogation for the property damage expenses from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, alleging that USAA violated Montana law by seeking subrogation for property damage loss before its insured had been made whole with respect to related personal injuries. The U.S. district court certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Montana law does not prohibit an insurer from exercising its right of subrogation under the limited, specific circumstances presented in the certified question.View "Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Home Service on behalf of customer service managers who were not reimbursed for expenses pertaining to the work-related use of their personal cell phones. The court held that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work-related calls, Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to reimburse them; whether the employees have cell phone plans with unlimited or limited minutes, the reimbursement owed is a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills; and, because the trial court relied on erroneous legal assumptions about the application of section 2802, the court reversed the order denying certification to the class. On remand, the trial court shall reconsider the motion for class certification in light of the court's interpretation of section 2802. View "Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

Defendant-Employer Tilly’s Inc. (and World of Jeans & Tops, Inc.) hired plaintiff-respondent Maria Rebolledo to work in its warehouse from July 6, 2000, to December 28, 2001. She was rehired on January 28, 2002, and terminated October 30, 2012. In December 2012 she filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and a putative class of "similarly situated" persons (amended February 2013) alleging her Employer: (1) failed to provide meal periods; (2) failed to provide rest periods; (3) failed to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees; (4) knew and intentionally failed to comply with itemized wage statement provisions; and (5) violated the unfair competition law. Furthermore, plaintiff sought enforcement of Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion the parties' arbitration agreement expressly excluded statutory wage claims from the arbitration obligation. Therefore, the order was affirmed.View "Rebolledo v. Tilly's, Inc." on Justia Law

Regions appealed the district court's decision to certify a class action based on alleged misrepresentations about Regions' financial health before and during the recent economic recession. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings in light of Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. to allow consideration of Region's evidence of price impact and for the district court to review the duration of the class period. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Local 703, et al. v. Regions Financial Corp., et al." on Justia Law