Plaintiffs filed this complaint on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Chesapeake common stock from 2009 to 2012, and who were damaged from those purchases/acquisitions. The complaint alleged that Defendants materially misled the public through false statements and omissions regarding two different types of financial obligations: (1) Volumetric Production Payment transactions (under which Chesapeake received immediate cash in exchange for the promise to produce and deliver gas over time); and (2) the Founder Well Participation Program (under which Chesapeake CEO Aubrey McClendon was allowed to purchase up to a 2.5% interest in the new gas wells drilled in a given year). With respect to the "VPP program," Plaintiffs alleged Defendants touted the more than $6.3 billion raised through these transactions but failed to disclose that the VPPs would require Chesapeake to incur future production costs totaling approximately $1.4 billion. Plaintiffs contended the failure to disclose these future production costs was a material omission that misled investors into believing there would be no substantial costs associated with Chesapeake’s obligations to produce and deliver gas over time. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs had failed to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Viewing all of the allegations in the complaint collectively, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded they gave rise to a cogent and compelling inference of scienter. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Weinstein, et al v. McClendon, et al" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether a plaintiff had a private right of action for damages against a health care provider under the Health Care and Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act. Plaintiff Yana Anderson alleged that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. She received medical treatment at an Ochsner facility. Anderson was insured by UnitedHealthcare. Pursuant to her insurance contract, Anderson paid premiums to UnitedHealthcare in exchange for discounted health care rates. These reduced rates were available pursuant to a member provider agreement, wherein UnitedHealthcare contracted with Ochsner to secure discounted charges for its insureds. Anderson presented proof of insurance to Ochsner in order for her claims to be submitted to UnitedHealthcare for payment on the agreed upon reduced rate. However, Ochsner refused to file a claim with her insurer. Instead, Ochsner sent a letter to Anderson’s attorney, asserting a medical lien for the full amount of undiscounted charges on any tort recovery Anderson received for the underlying automobile accident. Anderson filed a putative class action against Ochsner, seeking, among other things, damages arising from Ochsner’s billing practices. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the legislature intended to allow a private right of action under the statute. Additionally, the Court found an express right of action was available under La. R.S. 22:1874(B) based on the assertion of a medical lien. View "Anderson v. Ochsner Health System" on Justia Law

"This procedurally complex writ" concerned the tolling of prescription in a class action entitled "Fulford v. Transport Services Co." (Fulford/Abram), filed in Louisiana state court, then removed to federal court where class certification was denied. After class certification was denied and the case was still pending in federal court, other putative class members filed individual claims in a Louisiana state court, entitled "Smith v. Transport Services Co." (Smith). The specific issue this case presented was whether Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 596A(3) suspended prescription for putative class members, plaintiffs herein, when a class action filed in a Louisiana state court was removed to federal court. The Louisiana Court found that under Article 596 prescription was suspended for the putative class members (Smith et al.) upon the filing of the Fulford/Abram class action in a Louisiana state court, and none of the three triggering events contained in Article 596 to resumed the tolling of prescription occurred. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and overruled defendants’ exception of prescription.View "Smith v. Transport Services Co. of Illinois" on Justia Law

A putative class action was filed against West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital for alleged violations of La. R.S. 22:1874, also known as the "Balance Billing Act." This case was expanded to name several health insurance issuers as defendants. The claim under review by the Louisiana Supreme Court was asserted by plaintiff Laura Delouche against her insurer, Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company, d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana (Blue Cross). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a cause of action existed, whereby Delouche could pursue a legal remedy against Blue Cross. Finding no cause of action, and no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Emigh v. West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged an insurance company's use of "retained asset accounts" (RAAs) as a method of paying life insurance benefits in the ERISA context. They presented the district court with two basic questions: (1) whether the insurer's method of paying death benefits in the form of RAAs constitute self-dealing in plan assets in violation of ERISA section 406(b); and (2) whether this redemption method offended the insurer's duty of loyalty toward the class of beneficiaries in violation of ERISA section 404(a). The district court answered the first question in favor of the insurer and the second in favor of the plaintiff class. The court then awarded class-wide relief totaling more than $12,000,000. Both sides appealed. Upon review, the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the insurer's use of RAAs in this case did not constitute self-dealing in plan assets. However, the Court disagreed with the district court's answer to the second question and held that the insurer's use of RAAs did not breach any duty of loyalty owed by the insurer to the plaintiff class. View "Merrimon, et al v. Unum Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable.View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant published a daily newspaper and contracted with individual carriers to deliver the paper. Named plaintiffs were four newspaper carriers for Defendant. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a putative class of carriers, alleging that Defendant wrongly treated its carriers as independent contractors when they were employees as a matter of law. The trial court denied class certification, concluding that alleged individual variations in how carriers performed their work presented unmanageable individual issues that precluded certification. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that proof of employee status would not necessarily entail a host of individual inquiries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whether a common law employer-employee relationship exists turns principally on the degree of a hirer’s right to control how the end result is achieved; (2) whether the hirer’s right to control can be shown on a classwide basis will depend on the extent to which individual variations in the hirer’s rights concerning each putative class member exist, and whether such variations, if any, are manageable; and (3) the trial court in this case erred in rejecting certification based not on differences in Defendant’s right to exercise control but on variations in how that right was exercised.View "Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc." on Justia Law

Non-Settling Defendants seek to overturn a partial final judgment approving the settlement of certain putative class actions. The settled claims were brought by Investor Plaintiffs who were individual and institutional investors in so-called Bernard Madoff feeder funds managed by the Fairfield Greenwich Group (Settling Defendants). The Non-Settling Defendants challenged a provision in the settlement agreement that provides that investors who filed claims under the settlement submit to the district court's jurisdiction for the sole purpose of participating in the settlement and not for any other purpose. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that a settlement which does not prevent the later assertion of a non-settling party's claims, does not cause the non-settling party "formal" legal prejudice. Therefore, the court concluded that the Non-Settling Defendants did not have standing to object to the settlement. The court declined to address the remaining issues on appeal and dismissed for lack of standing.View "Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, et al. v. Bhatia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of retired U.S. Airways pilots, filed a class action seeking interest for the period of delay in the payment of their retirement benefits. The district court refused to certify the class. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the class members were not required to exhaust internal remedies before bringing their claims in court because they sought enforcement of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., substantive guarantees rather than contractual rights. View "Stephens, et al. v. US Airways Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

An Employee filed a class action complaint against his Employer. The Employee, however, had entered into an arbitration agreement with his Employer that waived his right to class proceedings. The Employee also sought to bring a representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The Court of Appeal concluded that the entire arbitration agreement, which included a PAGA waiver, should be enforced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, as regards the class action complaint, (1) a state law that restricts enforcement of the waiver of the right to class proceedings in arbitration agreements on grounds of public policy or unconscionability is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); but (2) the class action waiver at issue in this case was unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act, and the Employer waived its right to arbitrate. With regard to the PAGA action, the Court held (1) the FAA does not preempt a state law that prohibits waiver of PAGA representative actions in an employment contract; and (2) an arbitration agreement requiring an employee to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.View "Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC" on Justia Law