Plaintiffs, individual CIGNA Plan participants, filed suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging that CIGNA defendants made misleading communications in regards to the terms of the Plan. Subsequently, on remand, the court concluded that the district court acted within the scope of its discretion in denying CIGNA's motion to decertify the plaintiff class; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the elements of reformation have been satisfied and that the Plan should be reformed to adhere to representations made by the plan administrator; and, in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting relief to A+B benefits rather than ordering a return to the terms of CIGNA's original retirement plan. View "Amara v. CIGNA Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants Sikora Nelson and Paul Dorsey challenged the district court’s order requiring them to post an appeal bond of $1,007,294 in order to pursue their appeals objecting to a class action settlement. Plaintiffs initiated the underlying class action suit against Defendants Western Union Company and Western Union Financial Services, Inc. (collectively, “Western Union”), based on the fact that, at any given time, Western Union maintains between $130 and $180 million in wire transfers sent by Western Union customers that fail for some reason. These funds belong to Western Union’s customers, but Western Union returns this money (minus administrative fees) only when a customer requests a refund. Frequently, however, the customer is unaware that the wire transfer failed and thus does not know to ask Western Union to return his money. And Western Union, although possessing the customer’s contact information, does not notify the customer that his wire transfer failed, but instead holds the unclaimed money and earns interest on it. Eventually, after several years, the law of the state where the customer initiated the wire transfer requires Western Union to notify the customer that his unclaimed funds will soon escheat to the state. At that time, Western Union uses the contact information it had on record to give the customer this required notice. If the customer still fails to claim his money, those funds (minus the administrative fees) escheat to the relevant state, which then holds the funds until the customer claims them. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision to impose the appeal bond, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but reduced the amount of that bond. View "Tennille v. Western Union Co." on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants-respondents Stella Stephens, Timothy Young, and Melissa Young purchased homes from plaintiff and appellant Lennar Homes of California, Inc. The agreements between Lennar and Stephens and between Lennar and the Youngs contained identical indemnity clauses. Lennar sought to enforce those indemnity clauses, seeking to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in defending a class action lawsuit, brought initially by Stephens, and later joined by Timothy Young (but not Melissa) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Lennar appealed the trial court’s order granting defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Lennar argued on appeal that the trial court’s ruling that the indemnity clause at issue was unenforceable under California law, precluding Lennar from demonstrating a probability of success on the merits. Lennar also disagreed with the trial court’s finding that Lennar’s claim against Melissa Young arose from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Lennar Homes of Cal. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Nijjar hired Judge as a resident property manager. Nijjar terminated her employment. Judge filed claims for unpaid compensation, meal and rest period premiums, waiting time penalties, and wrongful termination. Under the Private Attorney General Act, Judge alleged similar claims on behalf of other employees. Judge also filed a class action, alleging similar claims on behalf of herself and class members. The trial court determined that the actions were related cases and designated the individual/PAGA action as the lead case, but denied Judge’s subsequent application to consolidate the cases. Based on an arbitration agreement that Judge had signed as an employee, the trial court granted a petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the individual and PAGA claims. The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement and that Judge’s employment-related claims and individual PAGA claims were covered. The arbitrator issued a clause construction award, finding that the agreement permitted arbitration of class and representative claims. The trial court granted the defendants’ petition to vacate the n award. The court of appeal dismissed, stating that because the arbitrator has not ruled on any substantive issues, the order did not vacate a final arbitration award and is not appealable. View "Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

The single issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on attorney's fees: was the trial court's grant of over $7 million in a multi-jurisdictional, class action law suit an abuse of discretion when the entire class was awarded only $45,780. The trial court originally determined the appropriate attorney fees to be $3,610,719.15 based on Oklahoma ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 598 P.2d 659 and the directives of 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 section 2023.2 Rajine Hess filed a motion to reconsider based on the fees awarded in Berry v. Volkswagen Group of America, 397 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. 2013), a Missouri Supreme Court case involving a class action against Volkswagen related to defective window regulator claims. The trial court considered the Missouri case; and, adopting the identical analysis utilized in reaching a determination that the appropriate fee award was approximately $3.6 million, the trial court amended its order to reflect a multiplier of 1.9 for an adjusted award of $7,221.438.30. In calculating the lodestar, the trial court included hours in failed, out-of-state litigation concerning similar issues to those presented here. Based on these facts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the $7 million attorneys' fee award constituted an abuse of discretion. View "Hess v. Voklswagen of America, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this discretionary appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the class action proceedings in this case improperly subjected Appellants to a “trial by formula.” The trial court certified the class, a jury rendered a divided verdict, and the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Appellees brought various class action claims against their former employers, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Sam’s Club (collectively, “Wal-Mart”), based on policies and conduct pertaining to rest breaks and meal breaks. Appellees alleged Wal-Mart promised them paid rest and meal breaks, but then had forced them, in whole or in part, to miss breaks or work through breaks, and also to work “off-the-clock.” The trial court certified a class consisting of "all [then] current and former hourly employees of Wal-Mart in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from March 19, 1998 to the present December 27, 2005.” The class ultimately consisted of 187,979 members. Ultimately, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Wal-Mart on all claims relating to meal breaks but in favor of Appellees on all claims relating to rest breaks and off-the-clock work. The amount of the judgment ultimately entered on the verdict was $187,648,589. After Wal-Mart appealed, the Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part in a published unanimous per curiam opinion, which corrected a patent mathematical error committed by the trial court, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded to the trial court to recalculate the lodestar it had employed to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees. The issues Wall-Mart's appeal raised for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether Wal-Mart was subjected to a “trial by formula,” (suggesting that the class claims could only be properly proven by an individual examination of the 187,979 class members to determine their claims); and (2) whether Appellees were thereby improperly relieved of their burden to produce class-wide common evidence on key elements of their claims. The Supreme Court found there was a single, central, common issue of liability here: whether Wal-Mart failed to compensate its employees in accordance with its own written policies. On that question, both parties presented evidence. Wal-Mart’s liability was proven on a classwide basis. Damages were assessed based on a computation of the average rate of an employee’s pay (about eight dollars per hour) multiplied by the number of hours for which pay should have been received but was not. In the Court's view, "this was not a case of 'trial by formula' or of a class action 'run amok.'" Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Hummel v. Walmart Stores, Inc" on Justia Law

A defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal court must file a notice of removal “containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,” 28 U. S. C. 1446(a). Owens filed a putative class action in Kansas state court, seeking compensation for underpaid oil and gas lease royalties. Dart removed the case, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U. S. C. 1332(d)(2). Dart’s notice of removal alleged underpayments of more than $8.2 million. Following a motion to remand, Dart submitted a detailed declaration supporting an amount in controversy higher than $11 million. The district court granted Owens’ remand motion, reading Tenth Circuit precedent to require proof of the amount in controversy in the notice itself. The Tenth Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court vacated. Notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold; it need not contain evidentiary submissions. By borrowing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s “short and plain statement” standard, Congress intended that courts apply the same liberal rules to removal allegations as to other pleadings. The amount-in-controversy allegation of a plaintiff is accepted if made in good faith. No anti-removal presumption attends cases invoking CAFA. View "Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens" on Justia Law

Judon was injured while riding in a commercial passenger vehicle that was insured by Travelers. Judon sought first-party medical benefits of $7,636.40. Travelers paid $5,000, up to the policy’s first-party medical benefits limit. Judon filed a class-action complaint in state court, alleging that Pennsylvania law required that the policy offer up to $25,000 in first-party medical benefits. Judon alleged that “there are hundreds of members of the class” who were wrongfully denied payment of first-party benefits. Travelers removed to federal court, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, arguing that the parties were minimally diverse; the proposed class consisted of at least 100 putative members; and the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The district court remanded, finding that CAFA’s numerosity and amount-in- controversy requirements were disputed and placing the burden of proof on Travelers to establish jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Judon’s complaint unambiguously pleaded that the numerosity requirement was satisfied, so the court should have placed the burden of proof on Judon to show, to a legal certainty, that the numerosity requirement was not satisfied. The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the amount-in-controversy requirement. View "Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

The 965 plaintiffs were people who borrowed money from Countrywide in the mid-2000’s. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure Section 378). Had this case been filed prior to 2005, in all probability it would have been filed as a class action (in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged that in the mid-2000’s, defendant Countrywide Financial Corporation developed a two-prong business strategy to increase its profits: Countrywide would use captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that would inflate home prices beyond levels that would otherwise prevail in an honest market; then Countrywide would induce its borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they couldn’t afford by misleading them as to their ability to pay their loans, including misrepresenting key terms of the loans themselves. Plaintiffs alleged Countrywide did this because it had no intention of keeping the loans on its books, but intended to bundle them into saleable tranches and sell them to investors. This appeal raised two questions of state law: (1) despite the rather staggering number of joined plaintiffs, did the third amended complaint allege, to track the statutory language of section 378, the “same . . . series of transactions” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact; and (2) whether California's procedures governing permissive joinder were up to the task of managing mass actions like this one. The Court of Appeal answered "yes" to both questions: a few years after section 378’s enactment in 1927, the California Supreme Court declared the statute’s same-series-of-transactions language is to be construed broadly in favor of joinder, and there are sufficient common questions of law and fact in this case to satisfy section 378, including whether a mortgage lender has a duty to its borrowers not to encourage “high ball,” dishonest appraisals and whether Countrywide really had a deliberate strategy of placing borrowers into loans it “knew” they couldn’t afford. While the Court reversed the judgment dismissing all but one plaintiff for misjoinder, the Court emphasized that on remand the trial court would have to consider a variety of procedural tools with which to organize this case into appropriate and manageable subclaims and subclasses. "While the irony of requiring the case to be divided into tranches has not escaped as, we are confident the trial court can handle the task." View "Petersen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law