Convent Corporation brought an interlocutory appeal of a circuit court’s order denying Convent’s motion for class certification; dismissing without prejudice Convent’s trespass claim and its federal and state statutory claims; and denying Convent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, after concluding that there remained genuine issues of material fact. Of these findings, however, only the circuit court’s denial of Convent’s motion for class certification was appealable on an interlocutory basis. On that issue, the circuit court found that because Convent did not present any evidence at a hearing, there was no basis on which to determine whether Convent met the requirements set forth by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Convent’s motion solely on Convent’s failure to present evidence at the hearing without considering the evidence in the record, which would have included any admissible evidence submitted as exhibits by the parties in support of their contentions that the motion for class certification should have been granted or denied. View "Convent Corp. v. City of N. Little Rock" on Justia Law

General Motors challenged the district court's order granting in part a motion for class certification in an action brought by plaintiffs under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. The district court certified a class consisting of all Florida purchasers and lessees of 2014 Cadillac CTS sedans. In this case, the district court found the predominance requirement to be satisfied by an essential question common to each class member: whether the inaccurate Monroney sticker provided by General Motors constituted a misrepresentation prohibited by FDUTPA. The court concluded that, by inaccurately communicating that the 2014 Cadillac CTS had attained three perfect safety ratings, General Motors plainly obtained enhanced negotiating leverage that allowed it to command a price premium. The size of that premium represents the damages attributable to that theory of liability. Because that theory is consistent for all class members, the predominance requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is satisfied. This consistency is also sufficient to establish the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). Because common questions of law and fact predominate, class-wide adjudication appropriately conserves judicial resources and advances society’s interests in judicial efficiency. Finally, the court rejected General Motor's contention that plaintiff failed to prove that she can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carriuolo v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law

Montgomery bought a Tassimo, a single-cup coffee brewer manufactured by Kraft Foods, expecting it to brew Starbucks coffee. After the purchase she struggled to find Starbucks T-Discs—single-cup coffee pods compatible with the brewer. The Starbucks T-Disc supply eventually disappeared as Kraft’s business relationship with Starbucks soured. Montgomery sued Kraft and Starbucks on behalf of a class for violations of various Michigan laws. After dismissing several claims and denying class certification on the rest, the district court entered judgment in Montgomery’s favor when she accepted defendants’ joint offer of judgment under FRCP 68. Montgomery appealed the dismissal of her breach of express and implied warranty claims, the denial of class certification on her consumer-protection claims, and the attorney’s fees awarded as part of the Rule 68 settlement (about 3% of what she had requested). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Montgomery did not purchase the item directly from defendants, for purposes of express warranty, and did not allege that the coffee maker was unfit for its ordinary purpose. View "Montgomery v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc." on Justia Law

Spokeo operates a “people search engine,” which searches a wide spectrum of databases to gather and provide personal information about individuals to various users, including prospective employers. After Robins discovered that his Spokeo-generated profile contained inaccurate information, he filed a class-action complaint alleging that the company willfully failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b). The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Robins’ “personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized.” The Supreme Court vacated. A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing by demonstrating an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct, likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. A plaintiff must show that he suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The Ninth Circuit’ focused on particularization: the requirement that an injury “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” but an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized. Concreteness requires an injury to actually exist; a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a right and purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it. The violation of a statutory procedural right granted can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact, so that a plaintiff need not allege additional harm beyond the one identified by Congress. The Court did not rule on the correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion, but stated that Robins cannot satisfy Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. View "Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins" on Justia Law

Consumer class actions against Global, on behalf of individuals who purchased gym memberships, alleged improper fees, unfair sales practices, lack of disclosures, improper bank account deductions, and improper handling of contract cancellations. The cases claimed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and violation of state consumer protection laws. Objectors challenged a settlement, claiming it was unfair under FRCP 23(e); that class counsel’s fees were disproportionate to claims paid; that the settlement unnecessarily required a claims process; and that the settlement contained a “clear-sailing” agreement from Global not to oppose any application for $2.39 million for costs and fees or less and a “kicker” clause, providing that if the court awarded less than $2.39 million, that amount would constitute full satisfaction of Global’s obligation for costs and fees. Some further argued that the settlement failed to provide adequate compensation for Kentucky state-law claims and for plaintiffs who had signed an early, more favorable version of the contract. The district court approved the settlement based on a magistrate judge’s 80-page Report and Recommendation, which addressed each objection. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though some courts disfavor clear sailing agreements and kicker clauses, their inclusion alone does not show that the court abused its discretion in approving the settlement. View "Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Home and Community‐Based Care Waiver Program allowed states to diverge from the traditional Medicaid structure by providing community‐based services to people who would, under the traditional structure, require institutionalization, 42 U.S.C. 1396n. The Indiana Family and Social Services Administration operates the Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program (A&D waiver), the Community Integration and Habilitation Medicaid Waiver Program (CIH waiver), and the Family Supports Medicaid Waiver Program (FS waiver). Because Indiana has closed most of its institutional facilities, these waiver programs serve the vast majority of its people with disabilities. Until 2011, the Administration placed many people with developmental disabilities on the A&D waiver, which has no cap on services. The Administration then changed its policies, rendering many developmentally disabled persons ineligible for the A&D waiver. These people were moved to the FS waiver, under which they may receive services capped at $16,545 annually. The CIH waiver is uncapped, but not everyone qualifies for the CIH waiver. Plaintiffs argue that their new assignments violated the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 because it deprives them of community interaction and puts them at risk of institutionalization. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the integration‐mandate claims and denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the individual claims based on the integration mandate. The court agreed that the proposed class is too vague. View "Steimel v. Wernert" on Justia Law

CIT, a large finance company, leased credit‐card processing machines to businesses and individuals. The leases describe themselves as business rather than consumer contracts and contain a forum‐selection clause that requires any disputes to be litigated in Cook County, Illinois and governed by Illinois law. Each lease also required a personal guaranty, by the lessee, an agent of the lessee, or someone else. The leases were ultimately assigned to Pushpin, which filed suits in small‐claims courts in Cook County against more than 3000 of the guarantors of defaulted leases. The guarantors filed a class-action, claiming that in invoking the forum‐selection clause Pushpin hoped to induce default judgments, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and related torts. After remands, the district court accepted jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), and dismissed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: Any forum‐selection clause will be an inconvenience to a nonresident signer of the contract, so that the challenge amounted to urging a blanket prohibition of such clauses. View "Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 108 individuals with property near the Boeing facility, filed suit against Boeing and Landau in state court, alleging that for several decades Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its facility in Auburn, Washington, and that for over a decade Landau had been negligent in its investigation and remediation of the resulting pollution. Boeing removed to federal court based on diversity and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court remanded to state court finding that there was not complete diversity and plaintiffs' action came within the single-event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction. In this appeal, Boeing argued that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they seek “significant relief” from Landau, the in-state defendant, and that Landau’s conduct does not form “a significant basis of the claims asserted,” as required by section 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). The court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pled both that they are seeking “significant relief” from Landau and that Landau’s alleged conduct forms a “significant basis” for their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

After Sandusky received an unsolicited fax from MedTox, Sandusky filed a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court denied class certification, finding the class not ascertainable. Sandusky’s class definition includes: “All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages regarding lead testing services by or on behalf of Medtox, and (3) which did not display a proper opt out notice.” The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification because the proposed class is clearly ascertainable. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the class here does not meet the commonality and predominance requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc." on Justia Law

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law