This appeal arose from two related class-action lawsuits that were first brought by Appellees almost fifteen years ago. Appellees sought damages from Appellants, Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Management Company, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA). The trial court eventually certified a class of plaintiffs and ruled that all class members could recover damages. The trial court then ruled that Appellants violated the OCSPA and awarded damages to each class member. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order certifying the class without squarely addressing Appellants’ claim that there was no showing that all class members had suffered damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the trial court’s order certifying the class, holding (1) all members of a plaintiff class must have suffered injuries as a result of the conduct challenged in the suit; and (2) because the class certified in this case included plaintiffs whose damages were inchoate, the class as certified was inconsistent with the law. View "Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000 and 2002 the FDA issued warnings to Caraco, a Michigan pharmaceutical manufacturer, stating that failure to correct violations promptly could result in enforcement action without further notice. After follow-ups in 2005, the FDA sought a definitive timeline for corrective actions. The FDA issued notices of objectionable conditions in 2006, 2007, and 2008. A consultant audited Caraco’s facilities and stated that it was “likely that FDA will initiate some form of seizure action.” Caraco executives thought the consultant “alarmist.” Later, the FDA issued a formal warning, determining that Caraco products were adulterated and that its manufacturing, processing, and holding policies did not conform to regulations and noting its poor compliance history. The letter stated that failure to promptly correct the violations could result in legal action without further notice, including seizure. A new consultant warned of likely enforcement action. Caraco followed some of its suggestions. In 2009, Caraco issued a nationwide drug recall, constituting “a situation in which there is a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” The FDA filed a complaint, served Caraco, and seized products. Days later, Caraco began a mass layoff, indicating that it did not “reasonably foresee" the FDA action. A certified class of former Caraco employees alleged that Caraco violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101, by failing to provide 60 days notice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the FDA action was not an unforeseeable business circumstance that would excuse WARN Act compliance. View "Calloway v. Caraco Pharma. Lab., Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against First American, seeking to represent a class of similarly-situated home buyers and alleging that First American engaged in a national scheme of paying the title agencies things of value in exchange for the title agencies’ agreement to refer future title insurance business to First American, in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601–2617. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court concluded that section 2607(c)(2) cannot apply to First American’s transactions as a matter of law, so the district court erred in relying on section 2607(c)(2) to determine the propriety of class certification. The district court erred in concluding that the common issue does not predominate over individual issues for the proposed class members. Here, plaintiffs contends that First American utilized a nationwide scheme of buying minority interests in the title agencies in order to secure remittance streams from the agencies’ future referrals. This common scheme, if true, presents a significant aspect of First American’s transactions that warrant class adjudication: Whether First American paid a thing of value to get its agreement for exclusive referrals. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of class certification in part as to these transactions that involved the common scheme presented to First American’s board of directors. The court also concluded that, even if other service providers may have also influenced the home buyers’ decision to choose First American, there remains a predominant, common question of whether the title agencies’ contractual obligations affirmatively influenced the home buyer’s choice of First American. First American's transactions with the newly-formed agencies at issue do not share common questions of fact between First American and the transactions with the preexisting title agencies and thus do not require common proof to resolve the validity of each of the class members’ claims. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification in part as to the newly-formed title agencies, vacated the district court’s denial of class certification in part as to the remaining title agencies, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. The First American Corp." on Justia Law

In the underlying putative class action, counsel for the named plaintiffs obtained a collection of records owned by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase). Plaintiffs sought to rely on the documents to pursue claims sounding in fraud, deceit, and conversion against Chase. A dispute arose as to whether portions of the Chase records were shielded from discovery and litigation under a provision of Bank Secrecy Act and related regulations. A magistrate judge reviewed all of the disputed documents in camera and concluded that the majority of the documents were not shielded by statute or regulation. Chase then initiated this mandamus proceeding, asking the First Circuit to intervene by declaring that the Act and related regulations shielded an additional fifty-five pages of Chase records from production or use in the putative class action. The First Circuit denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that, even assuming that the Act and regulations apply, the documents at dispute would not be shielded from discovery or use in litigation. View "In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims individually and on behalf of three putative classes against Defendant seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Prior to the parties’ agreed-upon deadline for the class certification motion that Plaintiff announced it would pursue, Defendant tendered to Plaintiff an offer for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Four days after receiving the offer, Plaintiff moved for class certification. The unaccepted offer was subsequently withdrawn due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the offer. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of matter jurisdiction, arguing that its unaccepted and withdrawn Rule 68 offer resolved any case or controversy between the parties, thereby mooting Plaintiff’s claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a rejected and withdrawn offer of settlement of the named plaintiff’s individual claims in a putative class action made before the named plaintiff moves to certify a class does not moot the named plaintiff’s claims and divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court, in evaluating whether it had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), over the removed action, analyzed this consolidated case as though it remained two separate class actions, and concluded that CAFA’s local controversy exception applied to the first-filed class action, Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of California, but that the exception did not apply to the second-filed class action, Crowder v. Blue Cross of California. The court held that it was improper for the district court to view Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder as two separate class actions after they had been consolidated by the state court. In this case, the Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated class action should have been viewed by the district court as a single class action when evaluating jurisdiction under CAFA. Once it is recognized that the two cases became one, it is clear that CAFA’s local controversy exception applies to the consolidated class action, and, therefore, the district court was required to remand the entire Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated class action to state court. View "Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of CA" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs purchased Align, Procter & Gamble’s probiotic nutritional supplement, and found that the product did not work as advertised—that it did not promote their digestive health. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of state unfair or deceptive practices statutes because it has not been proven scientifically that Align promotes digestive health for anyone. The district court certified five single-state classes from California, Illinois, Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina under FRCP 23(b)(3) comprised of “[a]ll consumers who purchased Align . . . from March 1, 2009, until the date notice is first provided to the Class.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed class to be sufficiently ascertainable; there is significant evidence that Plaintiffs could use traditional models and methods to identify class members. View "Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Southwest Airlines stopped honoring certain in-flight drink vouchers issued to customers who had bought “Business Select” fares. Customers filed suit, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement to provide replacement drink vouchers to all class members, and injunctive relief constraining how Southwest could issue future vouchers. The parties negotiated an agreement on fees for class counsel. The court certified the class and approved the settlement’s class relief components, but awarded counsel a smaller fee than requested. Two class members objected, arguing that the settlement was unfair to the class because it was too generous to class counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The “coupon settlement” provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712, allowed the court to award attorney fees based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed coupons. While the fee aspects of the settlement include troublesome features, the settlement provides class members essentially complete relief. The financial and professional relationship between lead class counsel and one lead plaintiff created a potential conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, but another lead plaintiff had no conflict and the class received essentially complete relief, so there was no basis for decertification or rejecting the settlement. The court instead removed that plaintiff’s $15,000 incentive award and reduced the lawyer’s fee. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Parnow, Shawn Lisenby, Bob Andrade, Gabriel Bautista, and Saiyaz Abdul filed a class action against Universal Protection Service, LP and Universal Services of America, Inc. (collectively, UPS). Plaintiffs worked as armed security guards at the Yolo County Superior Court, under the employ of UPS. As part of their job, they have to provide equipment, such as guns, handcuffs, and radios, and have to pay the costs to maintain their certification to work as armed guards, but they are not reimbursed for equipment or training costs. When they filed an administrative complaint, they were all fired except plaintiff Lisenby, and none were paid their wages. The trial court granted a stipulated stay, pending the outcome of a then-pending case in the California Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a “representative action” under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) and also petitioned to compel class-wide arbitration. The agreement listed a number of disputes that were covered, including “any state or local statutes and ordinances relating to wage and hour or wage payment matters.” It excluded employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, and disputes involving workers compensation and unemployment insurance. UPS answered with a general denial, coupled with various affirmative defenses, including that the class action claims were barred by the arbitration agreement. UPS also filed a cross-complaint seeking a declaration that: (1) the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether class action relief was barred by the arbitration agreement; and (2) that the arbitration agreement barred class actions. After plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint, UPS moved to compel individual arbitration and stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, in part arguing that under American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules, whether class arbitrations were permitted was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Plaintiffs obtained judicial notice of the AAA Rules. The trial court denied the motion to compel individual arbitration, and stayed the suit pending the arbitration. UPS petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the order compelling it to submit to arbitration. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the agreements’ incorporation by reference of the AAA Rules vested the arbitrator with the power to decide the disputed issue. The alternative writ was discharged, the stay (issued previously) was vacated, and the petition for mandate was denied. View "Universal Protection Service v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

More than 200 foreign agricultural workers allege they were exposed to the pesticide DBCP on banana farms throughout Central America, in the 1960s through the 1980s, resulting in health problems. Litigation began in 1993 with a putative class against Dole and related companies in Texas state court. Numerous suits were filed (and consolidated) in 2011 in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Dole and others. The court agreed granted Dole summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, in 2012, several actions were filed in the District of Delaware against the same defendants and alleging the same causes of action. Dole moved to dismiss the Delaware lawsuits, arguing for the application of the first-filed rule. The court held that the rule applied while the case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and dismissed, reasoning that “one fair bite at the apple is sufficient.” Delaware subsequently dismissed other defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed: where there is federal concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, “the court which first ha[d] possession of the subject must decide it.” Plaintiffs conceded that the Delaware cases were “materially identical” to those previously filed in Louisiana. Concurrent jurisdiction existed at the time. View "Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc" on Justia Law