In this putative class action, plaintiffs are a class of black steel workers who allege endemic racial discrimination at a South Carolina plant owned by Nucor. At issue was whether the workers have presented a common question of employment discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the district court on remand refused to certify the class. The court held that the district court has for a second time erred in refusing to certify the workers’ class, where (1) statistics indicate that promotions at Nucor depended in part on whether an individual was black or white; (2) substantial anecdotal evidence suggests discrimination in specific promotions decisions in multiple plant departments; and (3) there is also significant evidence that those promotions decisions were made in the context of a racially hostile work environment. The court concluded that the district court fundamentally misapprehended the reach of Wal-mart and its application to the workers' promotions class. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for recertification of the class. View "Brown v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

The Andermanns obtained mobile phone service from U.S. Cellular in 2000. Their renewable two-year contract was renewed for the last time in 2012. It included an arbitration clause that “survives the termination of this service agreement” and provided that “U.S. Cellular may assign this Agreement … without notice.” In 2013 U.S. Cellular sold the Andermanns’ contract to Sprint, without notice to the Andermanns. Months later Sprint sent Andermanns a letter, informing them of the sale and that their mobile service would be terminated on January 31, 2014 because Andermanns’ phones were not compatible with Sprint’s network. In December Sprint phoned to remind them that their service was about to expire, and added that Sprint had “a great set of offers and devices available to fit [their] needs.” Sprint made six such calls. Andermanns answered none, but filed a purported class action, contending that the unsolicited advertisements contained in the calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Sprint requested arbitration, 9 U.S.C. 4. The district court denied Sprint’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding connection to the contract, asking: What would Sprint have done if forbidden to call the customers whom it had inherited from U.S. Cellular and must now terminate because of technical incompatibility? View "Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, BP appealed three settlement awards, related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that it paid to nonprofits through its Court-Supervised Settlement Program. On appeal, BP argued that the Claims Administrator improperly interpreted the Settlement Agreement. The awards were based on the Claims Administrator’s determination that nonprofits may count donations and grants as “revenue” under the terms of the Agreement (the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation). As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order doctrine and that BP's appeals were timely. On the merits, the court concluded that BP failed to show that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation violates the plain language of the Agreement. The court held that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation does not alter the class definition in violation of Rule 23 or Article III. Finally, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of review of the individual awards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively, Bayer) marketed Cipro, an antibiotic. In 1987, Bayer was issued a United States patent on the active ingredient in Cipro. Twelve years before the expiration of the patent, Barr Laboratories, Inc. filed an application to market a generic version of Cipro. Bayer responded with a patent infringement suit, and Barr counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. In 1997, Bayer and Barr entered into a settlement agreement under which Bayer agreed to make a “reverse payment” to Barr in exchange for Barr dropping its patent challenge and consenting to stay out of the market. The settlement produced numerous state and federal antitrust suits. This case arose from nine such coordinated class action suits brought by indirect purchasers of Cipro in California. The complaint alleged that the Bayer-Barr reverse payment settlement violated the Cartwright Act, unfair competition law, an common law prohibition against monopolies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bayer and Barr. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that parties illegally restrain trade when they privately agree to substitute consensual monopoly in place of potential competition that would have followed a finding of invalidity or noninfringement. View "In re Cipro Cases I & II" on Justia Law

Across the state, plaintiffs were filing complaints against health care providers from whom they sought treatment following automobile accidents and with whom their health care insurers had contracted reimbursement rates for the services rendered. At issue was the legality of these providers' policy of collecting or attempting to collect the undiscounted rate from the insured if a liability insurer may be liable, implemented through the filing of medical liens against plaintiffs' lawsuits and settlements pursuant to the health care provider lien statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the appellate courts of this state on the issue of whether a class action is the superior method for adjudicating actions brought pursuant to the Health Care Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act ("Balance Billing Act"). After review, the Court found plaintiffs in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal proceeded as a class, while plaintiffs in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal were denied class certification. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the class action was superior to any other available method for a fair and efficient adjudication of the common controversy over the disputed billing and lien practices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Finding all other requirements for class certification properly met, the Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Baker v. PHC-Minden, L.P." on Justia Law

CE Design, Ltd. sued Custom Mechanical Equipment in 2008 after it received a junk fax. CE Design brought a class action suit of people and businesses that had also received unsolicited faxes from Custom. After Custom's insurer, Emcasco Insurance Company, declined to defend, Custom settled with CE Design for a considerable sum. In settling, CE Design agreed not to enforce the judgment against Custom but to proceed directly against Emcasco. After Emcasco refused to pay the judgment, CE Design and Emcasco filed rival declaratory judgment suits in separate federal courts (CE Design in Oklahoma, and Emcasco in Illinois). Ultimately, the federal district court in Illinois transferred its case to the federal district court in Oklahoma. Based on the insurance policy's terms, the district court held that Emcasco had no duty to defend Custom or to pay the judgment. CE Design appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Emcasco Insurance Co. v. CE Design" on Justia Law

Four Western Union customers whose wire transfers failed sued Western Union, alleging state-law claims for, among other things, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty. The Named Plaintiffs initiated this litigation as a class action on behalf of all Western Union customers whose wire transfers failed. This class included three groups: 1) those customers who, like the named Plaintiffs, had already reclaimed their funds from Western Union; 2) those customers whose funds had already escheated to a state; and 3) those customers whose funds Western Union was currently holding. Two unnamed class members challenged the district court’s decision to certify the class and approve the settlement. They argued, among other things, that the class representatives could not adequately represent all of the class members; the settlement was unfair because it used primarily the money belonging to the class to fund the settlement; and the district court did not adequately notify absent class members of the class action and the settlement. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded their objections lacked merit. View "Tennille v. Western Union" on Justia Law

Former and current employees filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Gilster and other defendants, alleging lung impairment (or potential lung impairment) from exposure to butter-flavoring products, including diacetyl, used in Gilster’s microwave popcorn packaging plant in Jasper, Missouri. Defendants removed the action to federal court. Six weeks later, the employees dismissed all defendants except Gilster. The district court ordered a remand to state court based on the Class Action Fairness Act’s local-controversy exception, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4), under which, a court is required to decline jurisdiction when “greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” determined as of the date of the filing. The district court permitted discovery on state citizenship. For all of the potential class members, except the current employees, plaintiffs provided only last-known addresses, some 27 years old, and did not identify state citizenship. The court ultimately found that 41 percent of potential class members were Missouri citizens. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Because the employees did not meet their burden of proof that a CAFA exception applies, the court erred by resolving doubt in favor of the party seeking remand. View "Hood v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp." on Justia Law

In 1998, a driver hit pedestrian-plaintiff Roberta Folks with the side mirror of his vehicle and injured her. State Farm, the driver’s insurer, informed Folks she could receive basic personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits under the driver’s policy. She received $104,000 in medical expenses and essential services. In 2002, State Farm told her she had exhausted the benefits available to her under the policy. Folks subsequently joined a lawsuit seeking additional PIP benefits in 2004. Over the course of the litigation, Folks unsuccessfully sought to certify a class on three attempts. In response to her last attempt in 2011, the district court determined she failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) and denied class certification. A jury heard Folks’s individual claims and found in her favor in 2012. The district court amended the judgment in 2013 to correct errors in the calculation of damages. On appeal, Folks alleged the district court erred in denying class certification. She also argued the district court miscalculated the treble damages and statutory prejudgment interest to which she is entitled. Finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Folks v. State Farm Mutual" on Justia Law

Senne parked his car on the street in front of his Palatine, Illinois house in violation of an ordinance. A police officer stuck a parking ticket face down under the windshield wiper; it included Senne’s name, birthdate, sex, height, weight, driver’s license number, and address (outdated), plus the vehicle’s description and vehicle identification number. Senne filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which forbids knowing disclosure of personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record, “except as provided in subsection (b).” Subsection (b) permits “disclosure” “in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding”” and “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions.” After a remand, the court rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that anyone has ever taken a parking ticket from a windshield in Palatine and used personal information on the ticket. There has never been a crime or tort, resulting from personal information placed on traffic tickets. Had the Village made parking ticket information publicly available over the Internet, or included highly sensitive information such as a social security number, the risk of a nontrivial invasion of privacy would be much greater and might outweigh the benefits to law enforcement. View "Senne v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law