In 2012 the Golans received two unsolicited, prerecorded messages on their home phone line. Each message, recorded by Mike Huckabee, stated: "Liberty. This is a public survey call. We may call back later." The Golans had not answered the phone; more than one million people did and received a much longer message. The Golans filed a putative class action, alleging that the phone calls were part of a telemarketing campaign to promote the film, Last Ounce of Courage, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Missouri Do Not Call Law. The district court dismissed with prejudice, concluding that the Golans did not have standing and were inadequate class representatives, being subject to a "unique defense" because they had heard only the brief message recording on their answering machine. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The calls were initiated and transmitted in order to promote Last Ounce of Courage and qualified as "telemarketing" even though the messages never referenced the film. Because the purpose of the calls was the critical issue, the Golans were not subject to a unique defense. Nor did they suffer a different injury than class members who heard the entire message. View "Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC" on Justia Law

Zcom, a former Verizon retail sales agent, filed suit in state court alleging state-law contract and tort claims against Verizon and others. Zcom alleged that Verizon's termination of the parties' sales-agent relationship violated state law. Defendants removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and Zcom filed an amended complaint dropping all class-action allegations. The court joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that “jurisdiction under CAFA is secure even though, after removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to eliminate the class allegations.” Therefore, the district court properly maintained subject-matter jurisdiction over the First Amended Complaint. On the merits, the court affirmed for substantially the reasons set forth in the opinions issued by the district court. View "In Touch Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P'ship" on Justia Law

Appellants were twelve nursing-home facilities doing business as Golden Living Centers in cities throughout Arkansas as well as related entities and individuals serving in leadership positions. Appellees, former residents of the nursing homes or their special administrators, guardians, or attorneys-in-fact, brought this class-action suit alleging that Appellants failed properly to staff the facilities and failed to meet minimum staffing requirements. Appellees brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Residents’ Rights Act (Residents’ Rights Act) and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA). the circuit court entered an order granting class certification of the three claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden of proving the predominance of common issues; (2) the class action approach was a superior method for resolving the question of Appellants’ liability; and (3) the class definition was sufficiently definite and precise. View "GGNSC Arkadelphia LLC v. Lamb" on Justia Law

Appellants, objectors to a class action settlement between day laborers and Labor Ready, appealed the district court’s final approval of the settlement, as well as the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Objectors’ untimely motion to intervene because it was filed after four years of ongoing litigation, on the eve of the settlement, and threatened to prejudice settling parties by potentially derailing settlement talks. The court vacated the final approval and remanded to the district court so that it can conduct a “more searching inquiry into the fairness of the negotiated distribution of funds in light of In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., as well as consider the substantive reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee request in light of the degree of success attained.” View "Allen v. Bedolla" on Justia Law

In 2002, ESI acquired NPA, which provided pharmacy-benefit-management services to health funds created by the police union. In 2003, those funds brought a class action against ESI and NPA. The funds had never contracted with ESI. In 2004, the New York Attorney General sued ESI, resulting in a consent judgment. Based on that consent judgment, ESI moved for summary judgment in the funds’ suit. The district court granted ESI’s motion, applying res judicata. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. ESI argued that the AG “alleged claims on behalf of the” funds, but the funds were not parties to the AG’s suit, nor did the AG allege claims on their behalf. The AG complaint referred to “other New York government plans,” meaning “counties and municipalities that contract with ESI.” The funds did not contract with ESI and are neither a county nor a municipality. They are private trusts. Their trustees are union officers, not city officials with whom they bargain. View "Lynch v. Nat'l Prescription Admin." on Justia Law

In a securities-fraud class action, plaintiffs won a verdict of $2.46 billion, apparently one of the largest to date, against Household International and three of its top executives. The suit was based on a dramatic increase (and subsequent collapse) in the price of Household’s stock that was driven by predatory lending practices and creative accounting to mask delinquencies. The Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial on two issues: whether plaintiffs failed to prove loss causation and instructional error concerning what it means to “make” a false statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony did not adequately address whether firm-specific, nonfraud factors contributed to the collapse in Household’s stock price during the relevant time period. View "Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that for many years the commercial filmmaking wing of the NFL used the names, images, likenesses, and identities of former NFL players in videos to generate revenue and promote the NFL. It asserted claims for false endorsement (Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125), common law and statutory rights of publicity claims under several states' laws, and unjust enrichment. The court approved a settlement calling for: creation of the Common Good Entity, a non-profit organization; payment of up to $42 million to the Common Good Entity over eight years; establishment of the Licensing Agency; payment of $100,000 worth of media value to the Licensing Agency each year until 2021; (5) Payment of attorneys' fees and settlement administration expenses; a reserve for the NFL's potential fees and costs involving class members who opt out; and class members' perpetual release of claims and publicity rights for the NFL and related entities to use. The Common Good Entity is "dedicated to supporting and promoting the health and welfare of Retired Players and other similarly situated individuals." Six players (the class had about 25,000 members) objected. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate despite not providing for a direct financial payment to each class member. View "Marshall v. Nat'l Football League" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies for providing home childcare services for low-income families. A union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. A collective bargaining agreement was executed; the state began deducting union dues and fees from subsidy payments. Plaintiffs filed a purported class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the proposed class (all Michigan home childcare providers) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs proposed a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, stating that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if they did, their reasons were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of its 2014 decision, Harris v. Quinn, that a similar agency fee provision violated the First Amendment as applied to homecare providers because the providers were not full-fledged state employees. The Court did not address class certification. On remand, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Harris did not affect its class certification decision and affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In this putative class action, plaintiffs are a class of black steel workers who allege endemic racial discrimination at a South Carolina plant owned by Nucor. At issue was whether the workers have presented a common question of employment discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the district court on remand refused to certify the class. The court held that the district court has for a second time erred in refusing to certify the workers’ class, where (1) statistics indicate that promotions at Nucor depended in part on whether an individual was black or white; (2) substantial anecdotal evidence suggests discrimination in specific promotions decisions in multiple plant departments; and (3) there is also significant evidence that those promotions decisions were made in the context of a racially hostile work environment. The court concluded that the district court fundamentally misapprehended the reach of Wal-mart and its application to the workers' promotions class. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for recertification of the class. View "Brown v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

The Andermanns obtained mobile phone service from U.S. Cellular in 2000. Their renewable two-year contract was renewed for the last time in 2012. It included an arbitration clause that “survives the termination of this service agreement” and provided that “U.S. Cellular may assign this Agreement … without notice.” In 2013 U.S. Cellular sold the Andermanns’ contract to Sprint, without notice to the Andermanns. Months later Sprint sent Andermanns a letter, informing them of the sale and that their mobile service would be terminated on January 31, 2014 because Andermanns’ phones were not compatible with Sprint’s network. In December Sprint phoned to remind them that their service was about to expire, and added that Sprint had “a great set of offers and devices available to fit [their] needs.” Sprint made six such calls. Andermanns answered none, but filed a purported class action, contending that the unsolicited advertisements contained in the calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Sprint requested arbitration, 9 U.S.C. 4. The district court denied Sprint’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding connection to the contract, asking: What would Sprint have done if forbidden to call the customers whom it had inherited from U.S. Cellular and must now terminate because of technical incompatibility? View "Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P." on Justia Law