DIRECTV and its customers entered into service agreements that included a binding arbitration provision with a class-arbitration waiver. It specified that the entire arbitration provision was unenforceable if the “law of your state” made class-arbitration waivers unenforceable. The agreement also declared that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. After California customers entered into the agreement, the Supreme Court held that California’s rule invalidating class-arbitration waivers was preempted by the Federal Act. When California customers sued, the trial court denied DIRECTV’s request to order the matter to arbitration. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the entire arbitration provision unenforceable under the agreement because the parties were free to refer in the contract to California law as it would have been absent federal preemption. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The California court’s interpretation does not place arbitration contracts “on equal footing with all other contracts,” as required by the Act. California courts would not interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the same way. The language the court used to frame the issue focused only on arbitration. View "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this putative class action was a Texas resident. Plaintiff alleged she received deceptive debt collection letters from defendant Seattle Service Bureau Inc. (SSB), a corporation with its principal place of business in Washington, pursuant to the referral of unliquidated subrogation claims to SSB by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Plaintiff alleges these letters constitute CPA violations by both SSB and State Farm as its principal. Plaintiff asserted she incurred damages caused by the alleged deceptive acts. This case involved two certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. First, the Washington Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW) allowed a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts. Second, the Court was asked to determine whether the CPA supported a cause of action for an out-of-state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its instate agent. The United States District Court noted an absence of Washington case law providing guidance on these issues. The Washington Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the affirmative. View "Thornell v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this putative class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), claiming that LVNV Funding, Inc. violated the FDCPA when it sought to collect or settle debts that are not legally enforceable because the statute of limitations has run. Plaintiff sought to certify a class of persons in Illinois who had received dunning letters from LVNV containing language that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that the debt was legally enforceable. The district court declined to certify the class. Plaintiff petitioned the Seventh Circuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order of the district court, holding that the district court denied class certification on an improper ground and raised a question worthy of immediate appeal under Rule 23(f). Remanded for further proceedings on the class allegations. View "Scott McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

This dispute centers around Lexis’s sale of personal data reports to debt collectors. Plaintiffs alleged that Lexis failed to provide the protections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq., in connection with its reports. The district court subsequently certified a settlement class. In this appeal, a group of class members claim the right to opt out of the settlement class and pursue statutory damages individually seeking to undo that settlement. At issue is the the (b)(2) Class, which includes all individuals in the United States about whom the Accurint database contained information from November 2006 to April 2013 – roughly 200 million people. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the release of the statutory damages claims as part of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) settlement, and no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement. View "Berry v. LexisNexis Risk and Info." on Justia Law

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers sued ADOC and its commissioner alleging ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the correctional officers, finding that there was a lack of substantial evidence in support of the officers' claims against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA. As such, defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson et al." on Justia Law

Michael Howard appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him in the action he commenced on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated taxpayers in Cullman County against Cullman County and its Revenue Commissioner Barry Willingham, in his official capacity. Howard sought a refund of property taxes he and other taxpayers paid in 2013. Howard sought a judgment declaring that, pursuant to former section 40-7-42, the Commission's levy of property taxes for October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013, was invalid because it was done in May 2013 rather than at the Commission's first regular meeting in February 2013. He also sought the return of property taxes collected in 2013. The Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly concluded that the Commission's failure to follow the timing provision of former 40-7-42 did not invalidate its subsequent levy in 2013 of property taxes upon Howard and other property owners in Cullman County. Therefore, the Court affirmed summary judgment on all of Howard's claims in favor of Cullman County and the revenue commissioner. View "Howard v. Cullman County" on Justia Law

Appellees brought this suit against the City of Little Rock for just compensation for the taking of Appellees’ property in connection with a modification of the I430/I630 Interchange. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The City filed a notice of appeal and later filed a motion for extension of time to lodge the record. The circuit court denied the motion for extension. The City subsequently filed a second motion for extension. A special judge granted an extension to lodge the record. Appellees filed an amended and substituted motion to dismiss, contending that the circuit court erred in granting the extension of time because the City did not strictly comply with the requirements of Ark. R. App. P-Civ. 5. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that the City failed strictly to comply with Rule 5, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the motion for extension of time to file the record. View "City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claimed that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). At issue in this appeal was whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods was compensable under the FLSA. The Third Circuit concluded there was no provision of the FLSA that directly addressed this issue. Two tests were suggested by other courts of appeal: one looked to whether the employee had been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other (more generally adopted) looked to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that the Third Circuit had not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. After its review of this case, the Court adopted the “predominant benefit test” and affirmed the District Court. View "Babcock v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were hourly, non-nursing employees of Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs d/b/a Arkansas Veterans Home and Fayetteville Veterans Home (ADVA). Appellees sought class certification alleging that ADVA violated the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act by failing to pay Appellees for overtime hours worked. The circuit court found that class certification was appropriate as to claims alleging that ADVA automatically deducted thirty minutes daily from Appellees’ hours worked to account for meal breaks even though they were regularly required to work during their meal breaks. ADVA appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellees’ claims were highly individualized, the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class action. Remanded with instructions to decertify the class. View "Ark. Dep't of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett" on Justia Law

When Kent Roose was injured in an automobile crash his wife was an employee of Lincoln County, which provided health benefits via a group health plan (the Plan) that was part of Joint Powers Trust (JPT). Employee Benefit Management Services, Inc. (EBMS administered the Plan. The Plan contained an exclusion stating that medical benefits would not be paid when any automobile or third-party liability insurance was available to pay medical costs. EBMS denied Roose’s request for reimbursement for medical expenses he paid out of the liability insurance payment he received from the tortfeasors’ insurer. Roose subsequently brought suit against EBMS and JPT. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion violated Mont. Code Ann. 2- 18-902(4). Appellants subsequently reimbursed Roose the requested amount. In 2014, Roose filed a motion for partial summary judgment and class certification, arguing that Appellants violated section 2-18-902 through systematic practices that amounted to seeking subrogation against the tortfeasor’s liability carrier before Roose was made whole. Roose also sought class certification on behalf of every member of Appellants’ plans subject to Montana law that contained the coverage exclusion. The district court granted Roose’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class or in defining the class. View "Roose v. Lincoln County Employee Group Health Plan" on Justia Law