Appellees brought this suit against the City of Little Rock for just compensation for the taking of Appellees’ property in connection with a modification of the I430/I630 Interchange. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The City filed a notice of appeal and later filed a motion for extension of time to lodge the record. The circuit court denied the motion for extension. The City subsequently filed a second motion for extension. A special judge granted an extension to lodge the record. Appellees filed an amended and substituted motion to dismiss, contending that the circuit court erred in granting the extension of time because the City did not strictly comply with the requirements of Ark. R. App. P-Civ. 5. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that the City failed strictly to comply with Rule 5, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the motion for extension of time to file the record. View "City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claimed that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). At issue in this appeal was whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods was compensable under the FLSA. The Third Circuit concluded there was no provision of the FLSA that directly addressed this issue. Two tests were suggested by other courts of appeal: one looked to whether the employee had been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other (more generally adopted) looked to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that the Third Circuit had not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. After its review of this case, the Court adopted the “predominant benefit test” and affirmed the District Court. View "Babcock v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were hourly, non-nursing employees of Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs d/b/a Arkansas Veterans Home and Fayetteville Veterans Home (ADVA). Appellees sought class certification alleging that ADVA violated the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act by failing to pay Appellees for overtime hours worked. The circuit court found that class certification was appropriate as to claims alleging that ADVA automatically deducted thirty minutes daily from Appellees’ hours worked to account for meal breaks even though they were regularly required to work during their meal breaks. ADVA appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellees’ claims were highly individualized, the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class action. Remanded with instructions to decertify the class. View "Ark. Dep't of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett" on Justia Law

When Kent Roose was injured in an automobile crash his wife was an employee of Lincoln County, which provided health benefits via a group health plan (the Plan) that was part of Joint Powers Trust (JPT). Employee Benefit Management Services, Inc. (EBMS administered the Plan. The Plan contained an exclusion stating that medical benefits would not be paid when any automobile or third-party liability insurance was available to pay medical costs. EBMS denied Roose’s request for reimbursement for medical expenses he paid out of the liability insurance payment he received from the tortfeasors’ insurer. Roose subsequently brought suit against EBMS and JPT. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion violated Mont. Code Ann. 2- 18-902(4). Appellants subsequently reimbursed Roose the requested amount. In 2014, Roose filed a motion for partial summary judgment and class certification, arguing that Appellants violated section 2-18-902 through systematic practices that amounted to seeking subrogation against the tortfeasor’s liability carrier before Roose was made whole. Roose also sought class certification on behalf of every member of Appellants’ plans subject to Montana law that contained the coverage exclusion. The district court granted Roose’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class or in defining the class. View "Roose v. Lincoln County Employee Group Health Plan" on Justia Law

Western Union Company and its subsidiary, Western Union Financial Services, Inc. (collectively, Western Union), appealed the district court’s award of $40 million in attorney fees to class counsel after the settlement of a putative class action against Western Union. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action to challenge Western Union’s practice of failing to timely notify customers of failed money transfers and of holding customer money for years while accruing interest and charging administrative fees. While litigation over procedural hurdles to class certification was ongoing, the parties agreed to a settlement of the class claims against Western Union. “Generally, a settling defendant in a class action has no interest in the amount of attorney fees awarded when those fees are to be paid from the class recovery rather than the defendant’s coffers.” Western Union argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that it had standing to challenge the attorney-fee award in this case because it claimed it would be injured by a diminution of the Class Settlement Fund (CSF) if Class Counsel was awarded an excessive attorney-fee award. Western Union argued its interest in the CSF (and the potential effect of the attorney-fee award on the size of that fund) established its standing to challenge the fee award. The Tenth Circuit concluded any potential injury to Western Union was too attenuated from the award of attorney fees to Class Counsel to support Western Union’s standing. Because Western Union lacked standing to challenge the attorney-fee award, the Tenth Circuit lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Tennille v. Western Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three health-benefit plans (HBPs), filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and state laws, claiming that Aventis engaged in a pattern of mail fraud by failing to disclose the true risks of the antibiotic drug telithromycin, marketed as “Ketek.” The district court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a class of all HBPs that paid for Ketek prescriptions on the theory that such HBPs were injured as a result of paying for Ketek prescriptions that would not have been written if Aventis had not concealed Ketek’s safety risks. The court concluded that UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Zyprexa) does not foreclose class certification for all RICO mail‐fraud claims brought against a drug manufacturer. However, the court concluded that Zyprexa’s reasoning applies to this case, and bars plaintiffs’ attempt to certify a class. While it may be possible for a class of plaintiffs to prove the causation element of a pharmaceutical fraud claim such as this one with generalized proof, plaintiffs have failed to offer such proof here. Therefore, class certification was correctly denied. The court's certification decision necessarily disposes of the summary judgment question as well: if plaintiffs’ RICO claims cannot be proved by generalized proof and plaintiffs have adduced no individualized proof, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive summary judgment. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the state‐law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sergeants Benevolent Ass'n v. Sanofi-Aventis US" on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that Honeywell engaged in uncompetitive and illegal conduct to increase its market share of round thermostats and to use its dominant market position to overcharge customers. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement and asked the trial court to preliminarily approve it. The court initially declined to do so because it had concerns about the notice proposed to be sent to class members. Those concerns were subsequently addressed to the court’s satisfaction, and on February 4, 2014, the court preliminarily approved the settlement. The notice of settlement was subsequently published and distributed to class members. The long version was distributed and posted on a website, and the short version was published in various print publications. The trial court found that four objectors to the settlement failed to establish they had standing, but rejected one objection on timeliness grounds and rejected the other three on their merits. The court of appeal affirmed, except for the ruling on standing, finding that the court properly approved the distribution of residual settlement funds and awarded class counsel attorney fees that amounted to 37.5 percent of the settlement fund. View "Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Durand filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 (ERISA) class action against her former employer and the pension plan it sponsors, challenging the projection rate used by the Plan to calculate the lump-sum payment Durand elected to receive after ending her employment at the Company in 2003. The Plan then used a 401(k)-style investment menu to determine the interest earned by members’ hypothetical accounts. Durand alleged that it impermissibly used the 30-year Treasury bond rate instead of the projected rate of return on her investment selections in the “whipsaw” calculation required under pre-2006 law. The Sixth CIrcuit reversed dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants then answered the complaint and raised defenses, including that the claims of putative class members “who received lump-sum distributions after December 31, 2003” were barred due to an amendment to the Plan that took effect after that date. Plaintiffs argued that the 2004 Amendment was an illegal reduction or “cutback” in benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the “cutback” claims were time-barred and did not relate back to the “whipsaw” claim asserted in the original class complaint. View "Durand v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Julie Freeman, individually and on behalf of over five-thousand similarly situated car buyers, filed a lawsuit against J.L.H. Investments, LP, a/k/a Hendrick Honda of Easley ("Hendrick"), seeking damages under the South Carolina Dealers Act on the ground that Hendrick "unfairly" and "arbitrarily" charged all of its customers "closing fees" that were not calculated to reimburse Hendrick for actual closing costs. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Freeman in the amount of $1,445,786.00 actual damages. In post-trial rulings, the trial judge: (1) denied Hendrick's motions to overturn or reduce the jury's verdict; (2) granted Freeman's motions to double the actual damages award and to award attorneys' fees and costs; and (3) denied Freeman's motion for prejudgment interest. The South Carolina Supreme Court certified this case from the Court of Appeals, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freeman v. J.L.H. Investments" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review came from a class action challenging a 2011 City of Atlanta ordinance and the subsequent amendment by the City of its three defined benefit pension plans. The Ordinance and Amendment increased the percentage of salary required as the annual contributions of the members of the Plans. The action filed against the City, the Mayor, and members of the Atlanta City Council (collectively “Defendants”), was on behalf of City employees who participated in the Plans prior to November 1, 2011, and had not retired prior to that date, which was the start date for the increase, and were otherwise subject to the Amendment. The complaint alleged that Defendants breached Plaintiffs’ employment contracts and violated the impairment clause of the State Constitution when Defendants passed the portions of the Ordinance which increased the amounts that the Plaintiffs were required to contribute to the Plans, even though Plaintiffs would receive the same amount of retirement benefits to which they were already entitled prior to passage of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the subject portions of the Ordinance violated the Impairment Clause and that Plaintiffs were not required to continue to make the increased contributions to the Plans, and an order enjoining and restraining Defendants from collecting or attempting to collect the increased contributions. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract and their consequent requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Borders v. Atlanta" on Justia Law